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In my Masters thesis (Sung-Ming Confucianism and Ecology) I explored the 
relevance, for ecological issues, of various aspects of Songming Confucianism. I would 
now like to follow up on my Masters work by going more deeply into the said aspects of 
this branch of Confucianism, focusing in particular on its crowning figure, Zhu Xi, so as 
to form an estimate of the Chinese contribution as represented by this philosopher in 
addressing the scientific and also the religious needs of the modern world, and conversely 
(though to a lesser extent) what ramifications for his thought what we know about 
religion and science today would have. What I would like to do is basically to answer the 
following questions: (1) What are the scientific elements present in Zhu Xi’s world-view? 
(2) What are the religious elements present in Zhu Xi’s world-view? (3) What is the 
relationship between the religious and scientific elements in Zhu’s system? Can this 
system be both religious and scientific without any contradiction?
Zhu Xi’s thought has exerted the greatest influence on the East Asian intelligentsia in 
the seven hundred or so years before the collapse of the imperial order in the early 
Twentieth Century. Clearly the intellectual and cultural effects exerted by a thinker of 
such weight, for better or for worse, are likely to persist in the East Asian cultural milieu, 
albeit in the absence of explicit and tangible manifestations signifying a conscious 
endorsement of his thought, such as special curricula drafted by the state for civil service 
examination candidates. The study of this philosopher’s thought and how it relates with 
the ideas and concerns of the modern world thus becomes entirely pertinent.  
Zhu Xi has promulgated certain ideas, chiefly the teaching of gewu, ‘the investigation 
of things’, which at least some modern scholars have considered highly scientific in 
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spirit. On the other hand, li (often translated as ‘principle’), another concept of central 
importance in Zhu’s thought, has obvious religious connotations, being the embodiment 
of the moral and spiritual values of humanity. Thus it would be most interesting to find 
out how the two categories of science and religion could come together in his thought 
(and the ramifications thereof for religion and science today). If Zhu Xi could be shown 
to have a positive and significant contribution to make in this respect, this would also go 
a long way towards affirming his place in the contemporary intellectual scene as one of 
East Asia’s (if not indeed the world’s) greatest minds, as opposed to a peripheral and 
intellectually obsolete relic from some ‘feudal’ past.
I would like to thank my two supervisors, Prof Alan Chan and Prof Cecilia Lim, for 
their extreme patience in correcting my errors. I would also like to thank my mother, 
sister and two brothers for their emotional support and willingness to bear with me 
through the long and difficult gestation of the present work.
Last but certainly not least, there are a number of friends, both at the National 
University of Singapore and elsewhere, whose great sense of humor and interest in my 
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The present thesis is intended as an investigation of the relationship between the 
scientific and religious aspects of the Chinese philosopher Zhu Xi. In Chapter One a 
bibliographical study of a number of works on Zhu Xi’s thought shall be undertaken and 
prevalent views on it noted alongside various issues one would encounter in 
understanding it, in particular if Zhu Xi may at all be considered as a scientific thinker 
and why. This shall be followed by a brief defense of the relevance of Zhu’s thought for 
the current debate on the troubled relationship between science and religion. In Chapter 
Two I shall give an overview of the major features of Zhu’s religious thought, focusing 
chiefly on the concept of li (principle), before proceeding to argue for the presence in his 
thought of a scientific dimension for which an overview shall be provided as well, the 
concept of gewu (the investigation of things) being here the main focus of attention. An 
examination of the concepts of yin, yang and wuxing (the Five Agents) shall also be 
undertaken. In this chapter any manifestations of the organic worldview underlying Zhu’s 
thought shall be given special attention for its possible implications for the acquisition of 
knowledge, as well as Zhu’s avoidance of ‘conceptual fixation’.
This shall pave the way for Chapter Three where I shall state and defend the case for 
the mutual interdependence of the religious and the scientific side of this philosopher’s 
system. In the first section the attributes of sagehood, the summum bonum of Zhu’s 
religious thought, shall be enumerated and various aspects of gewu shown to be essential 
for the attainment of the said attributes. In the second section I shall point out the 
existence of a problem with the possibility of acquiring knowledge and show how the 
problem can be solved only on the basis of a metaphysics such as that of Zhu Xi’s li, 
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which entails the presence of all knowledge within oneself. Other issues, such as that 
concerning the place of the conceptual schemata we adopt beforehand in the pursuit of 
knowledge, shall be discussed as well.
The concluding chapter shall look at the prospects for an independent scientific 
tradition in the East Asian milieu which would be affirmative of its traditional religious 
views, and how other cultural milieux might be inspired to develop the same — a science 
in concord with their own views and beliefs. The place of religious belief in the modern 
world, in particular the neo-Confucian daoti, shall also be discussed.
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1. AIM OF THE PRESENT THESIS
 1.1 Issues Regarding Scientific and Religious Elements in Zhu Xi
The Confucian tradition did not always limit its area of interest to ‘human society and 
human society alone.’1 Over the centuries its adherents actually developed a keen interest 
in the nature and causes of Natural phenomena — these being the concern of what we 
term science today — and also what aspects of existence there might be beyond the 
merely empirical which would serve as a basis for our most cherished values — these
being the central concern of all religion. All this was to culminate in the Twelfth Century 
philosopher Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130 – 1200), who explored both domains of inquiry 
extensively in his thought.
Now it is well-known that science and religion are often considered today, at least in 
the West, as locked in irreconcilable conflict. Advocates of science condemn religion as 
the mass delusion of gullible minds, and supporters of the religious cause in turn accuse 
science of fostering a despairing view of reality which negates all human values. As early
back as the 1920s, British philosopher Alfred North Whitehead already noted that ‘The 
conflict between religion and science is what naturally occurs to our minds when we 
think of this subject.’2
In the context of the present work, this leads to an interesting and important question: 
if scientific and religious elements are both present in Zhu Xi, what is the relationship 
between them? Are they mutually antagonistic, or mutually indifferent, or could some 
more positive relationship obtain between them?
It is by no means a foregone conclusion what the answer would be. Science and 
religion can actually assume many forms. Theravāda Buddhism differs greatly from 
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Protestant Christianity in many respects, nor does Aristotelian science see eye-to-eye 
with modern science on everything. The conflict between science and religion, for all we 
know, might therefore turn out to be a highly localized and culture-specific conflict 
between certain preconceived notions of what religion and science consist in, notions not 
necessarily endorsed by all; other views and ideas identifiable as religious or scientific
might exist which might be able to circumvent such conflicts or even coexist in a state of 
harmonious interdependence — it being just the present author’s intention to 
demonstrate that such is in fact the case with the religious and scientific dimensions of 
Zhu Xi’s thought in particular. (For this purpose a working definition on just what being 
scientific and being religious consist in shall be provided in due course.)
The value of such an endeavor is self-evident if we acknowledge the value of both 
science and religion and if living in a state of intellectual schizophrenia does not 
recommend itself to us as a delectable state of affairs. As Whitehead said:
It would… be missing the point to think that we need not trouble ourselves about the conflict 
between science and religion. In an intellectual age there can be no active interest which puts aside 
all hope of a vision of the harmony of truth. To acquiesce in discrepancy is destructive of candor, 
and of moral cleanliness. It belongs to the self-respect of intellect to pursue every tangle of
thought to its final unravelment.3
Contemporary Confucians would do well to heed Whitehead’s message. Without a 
careful examination of science in its different manifestations and of the relationship 
between them and the Confucian narrative — the different manifestations of science
being understood here to mean not only the many claims and findings made in the name 
of science but also the experimental methodologies and basic assumptions underlying or 
leading to them — all efforts at preserving traditional Confucian values and passing them
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down to posterity can be nothing short of deficient. What might the two camps have in 
store for each other? Should certain elements in the Confucian tradition (such as the 
emphasis on studying the classics, often at the expense of other domains of human 
inquiry) prove inimical to scientific progress, what is to be done? Again, should various 
scientific (or allegedly scientific) claims and findings (such as the claim, not entirely 
unpopular among scientists today, that human minds are nothing more than the workings 
of computers) prove prejudicial to Confucian values, what response could the Confucian 
camp give?
That a thorough understanding of and rapport with science is of supreme importance 
for Confucianism should by now be plain. And what better place to begin than with a 
thinker from the Confucian tradition itself who has exhibited a keen interest in the nature 
of the phenomenal reality we inhabit, with his source of motivation being none other than 
how the values of the Ru School 儒家 may be grounded in this reality?
To the present author’s knowledge, no major work on Zhu Xi has ever embarked 
specifically on this goal, the examination of the relationship between the religious and 
scientific aspects of his thought. Certain accepted interpretations of his views as found in 
the literature do not exactly conduce to the aim of this thesis either, or the views are 
simply noted as they are without any exploration of what special implications they might 
lead to. A review of some of the more important literature is in order here.
First a rough summary of Zhu’s worldview. In Zhu’s thought, all entities in existence 
possess what he termed li理 (often translated as ‘principle’). An entity’s li constitutes the 
reason for its characteristic modes of behavior, but is not merely that, being at the same 
time its xing性, its nature, so the li of an entity could therefore be thought of actually as 
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a quasi-conscious inner inclination on its part to behave the way it does. Zhu also 
conceived of all li as being ultimately one, of all creation as partaking of one and the 
same li, this one li being conceived of furthermore as a form of Universal Mind, the 
‘Mind of Heaven and Earth’. What is implied here is that all entities behave the way they 
do by virtue of the dictates of their inner inclinations, not the directives of a Supreme 
Being issued from without. Zhu in fact stated explicitly that this Mind of Heaven and 
Earth does not deliberate, at least not the way humans do. This unity of the li would 
imply as well a fundamentally harmonious relationship between the myriad beings, like 
the many parts of a single living organism. Hence Zhu’s is an organic worldview. Now li
is also considered as the embodiment of the Highest Good, the ultimate source of all 
human virtue, so it becomes very important for our moral development that we acquire as 
much knowledge as we can of the li, one avenue to such knowledge being found 
precisely in gewu 格物, ‘the investigation of things’, things such as the phenomena of 
Nature.
How have these ideas been understood? Interestingly, in history emphasis has shifted
at times between the twin roles played by li as (1) the source of our values and as (2) the 
reason things behave as they do. One such shift occurred in Nineteenth Century Japan
when, according to contemporary scholar Rumi Sakamoto, the scholar-statesman Sakuma 
Shōzan (1811 – 1864) sought to understand Western science in Confucian terms ‘by 
reinterpreting Confucianism, especially by emphasising the notion of ri (universal 
principle) in the Zhu Xi school,’4 ri being the Japanese transliteration of li. Sakuma chose 
to place greater emphasis on ri as butsuri, the principle of physical objects, as opposed to 
ri as dōri, the principle of morals. ‘In linking Confucian ri and scientific rationality, he 
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shifted the emphasis within the metaphysical concept of ri: of the two undivided aspects
[i.e. dōri and butsuri], he emphasised the physical principle which had been downplayed 
by mainstream Zhu Xi scholars.’5 Sakuma knew of ‘the investigation of things’, and was 
seriously persuaded that the fruits of Western science were fully compatible with 
Confucian learning. ‘‘If one follows the intention of Zhu Xi,’ he assured, ‘everything, 
even Western knowledge, is part of our learning and knowledge; it is not external to our 
framework.’ In his logic, the adoption of Western science even came to mean a better 
realisation in the present of the intention of past sages.’6
To use Sakuma’s language, it is precisely the purpose of the present thesis to defend 
the case for the mutual interdependence of (a) our understanding of ri as dōri and (b) our 
understanding of ri as butsuri. The pursuit of each of these two can and should entail the 
pursuit of the other. But to return to Sakuma, his understanding of ri was contrasted with 
that of another Confucian scholar, Ohashi Totsuan (1816 – 1862), in whose view ‘ri
could only mean moral principles in the human mind.’ This second view is the one which 
has apparently gained the upper hand among scholars of Zhu Xi today, some of whom, as 
shall be seen from the review of their works that follows, have actually denied to his 
thought any scientific dimension. (I am not suggesting that all scholars of Zhu Xi today 
who happen to agree with Ohashi were directly influenced by his thought, merely taking 
note of a view shared by Ohashi with modern scholars which I believe stands in need of 
some correction.) One of these would be the scholar Chen Lai 陳來, who argued in his 
Zhuzi Zhexue Yanjiu 朱子哲學研究 (Researches into the Philosophy of Zhu Xi) that the 
pursuit of science admits of no preconceived ideas regarding any moral or spiritual ends 
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towards which this pursuit should be directed, and yet such ends are served by Zhu’s 
gewu. As Chen said after examining some of Zhu’s writings:
Going by the above ideas, speaking logically and from the purpose of the totality of human 
knowledge, the call is precisely that people grasp the more widely applicable principles and laws
which run through Nature, society and human life. But as far as the Chengzhu 程朱 School of li is 
concerned, these principles are required to be able to exert a supportive effect on all norms of 
society which are considered a matter of course, and this makes the abstractions they seek such 
that they could not possibly be regarded as scientific, but as by nature unavoidably appended with 
many subjective ideas on account of the moral purpose which they serve.7
Chen acknowledged in his book that Zhu was highly interested in the workings of the 
Natural world; it was merely that this interest disqualifies as scientific in nature by virtue 
of the final purpose to which it defers.
To rule out the presence of any scientific dimension in Zhu Xi would be a serious 
move indeed. With no intention of being disrespectful to Chen, I believe such a move 
could be disputed as well, at least on the basis of the reasons provided by him. To begin 
with, one would like to know if it is in fact possible not to bring in one’s personal 
interpretations and prejudices in one’s attempts to understand the workings of Nature. 
Modern philosophers of science have actually argued against this. As shall be explained, 
a perfectly objective science devoid of subjective elements is impossible: we cannot but 
bring in a priori views and ideas in such attempts. The very process of taking in sensory 
qualia from the phenomenal/Natural world and turning it into meaningful information 
already requires that the qualia be filtered through an a priori conceptual schema which 
would unavoidably contain ‘subjective’ elements. Without such a schema all we get 
would be bare, meaningless qualia, as witness the example of the Ming 明 Confucian 
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Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472 – 1528) who once in his youth sought to gain insight into 
the nature of some bamboo by sitting in front of it and staring for days — an endeavor 
which yielded nothing but illness and presumably a very sore bottom. Substituting the 
term ‘personal’ with ‘cultural’ helps little, since cultural preferences etc. are but the 
accumulations of individual ones over time. 
What are the consequences for Zhu’s views on how we should study Nature? If there 
can be no science devoid of personal/subjective elements, are all human attempts to 
understand the workings of the Natural world doomed to failure, including Zhu’s gewu? 
Or could his ideas perhaps offer a special way out of this state of affairs? We shall return 
to this important question later. For now it will be of interest to note that Zhu himself, as 
we shall see in greater detail, actually advocated what appears a form of objectivity, as 
well as some of his predecessors, such as Shao Yong 邵雍 (1001 – 77), who was cited by 
the great sinologist Joseph Needham as having said that ‘there are often things which one 
cannot understand. One must not attempt to ‘force’ them, for ‘forcing’ them brings in 
one’s self (and one’s prejudices), and thus one loses the (objective) principles, and falls 
into artificial constructions. 或有所不通，不可以强通。强通則有我，有我則失理而
下入於術矣。’8
Shao Yong himself ironically did not appear to follow his own injunctions. According 
to Needham, he ‘did not bear this wisdom more in mind in the construction of his 
theoretical schemes.’9 As we have seen, Chen Lai thought Zhu guilty of the same thing. 
We shall explore in due course whether Zhu was indeed guilty of this and whether indeed 
it is possible not to be; for now let us proceed to Needham’s epic Science and Civilization 
in China, the second volume of which, being the source of the above passages on Shao 
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Yong, traces the developments of Chinese thought from pre-Qin 秦 Confucianism down 
to the Ming idealists such as Wang Yangming. Our main focus shall be on Chapter 16, 
which discusses Zhu Xi and other Confucians of the Song Dynasty.
After a brief survey of the Song Confucians who came before Zhu Xi, such as Shao 
Yong whom we already noted, Needham comes to Zhu himself. While Needham’s 
assessment of Zhu’s thought is largely positive, certain claims Needham made about Zhu 
again seem open to question, for example the claim that Zhu rejected all possibilities of 
post-mortal survival for the individual.
As for death and survival after death, Chu Hsi [the Wade-Giles Romanization for Zhu Xi] was 
quite clear that individual spirits did not survive… The opinion of the Buddhists, he said, that 
human spirits may survive as ghosts, and be reincarnated in later human beings, is absolutely 
wrong. 10
As shall be seen, this stands to be corrected on certain counts; Zhu himself actually 
exhibited a certain ambivalence on the matter, and Buddhists themselves — at least the 
Theravāda Buddhists — would in fact be the first to reject the idea of human souls 
persisting through time, an idea wrongly attributed to them by Zhu and Needham. But 
here another question of interest presents itself: would believing in things like post-mortal 
survival disqualify a thinker as scientific in outlook? One gets the impression that 
Needham thought so and therefore was anxious to establish that Zhu entertained no such 
belief. But why is such a belief unscientific? What would mark out a view or belief as 
unscientific, or as scientific for that matter? 
The same question can be raised with respect to what Needham referred to as the 
‘rationalization of Confucian terms’ undertaken by the Song Confucians, whereby such 
traditional terms as gui 鬼 (ghost, demon or spirit) and shen 神 (god, deity) were given 
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fresh meanings and understood merely as the different modes of behavior of qi 氣, the 
basic stuff which constitutes all entities. Needham voiced his grievance that the new 
meanings did not supplant the old ones but merely supplemented them. ‘…this serious
failure to elaborate new terminology instead of merely rationalizing ancient words with 
all their religious undertones, was one of the most unfortunate aspects of the social milieu 
in which Chinese science struggled for birth.’11 But is it really unfortunate and why? Is
there something about believing in such things as discarnate spirits and life after death —
both common manifestations of religion — that militates against scientific thought, as 
many today seem to opine? If so, what is it? 
These are not unimportant questions because they have a direct bearing on the 
relationship between the religious and the scientific side of Zhu Xi. With all due respect 
for Needham, Zhu did not in fact reject completely the idea of gods and spirits and of 
post-mortal survival. What, then, are the implications for the said relationship? Would it 
be an antagonistic one, or are we even to say, as Chen did, that Zhu was not really a 
scientific thinker after all? These are things we need to find out, as later we shall.
In the collection of essays, Chu Hsi: Life and Thought, the great scholar of Chinese 
thought Wing-tsit Chan (Pinyin: Chen Rongjie 陳榮捷）was to voice other misgivings 
regarding Needham’s views on Zhu Xi and certain features of Chinese culture in general, 
being doubtful for example of Needham’s claim that the idea of a personal God who 
acted as a lawgiver, and hence the idea of laws of Nature, never arose in the Chinese (as 
opposed to the European) milieu, resulting, so Needham thought, in the inhibition of 
scientific development. In Needham’s own words:
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…the autochthonous ideas of a supreme being, though certainly present from the earliest times, 
soon lost the qualities of personality and creativity. The development of the concept of precisely 
formulated abstract laws capable, because of the rationality of an Author of Nature, of being 
deciphered and re-stated, did not therefore occur. 12
This stands in contrast with Needham’s dismissal of such things as the belief in gods 
and spirits and in life after death: now he would instead affirm the idea of a personal God 
as one which could actually promote the development of science. So certain religious 
beliefs are not inimical to science after all, and indeed could even comprise a sine qua 
non for scientific development! This would be good news indeed for those seeking to 
heal the rift between science and religion! But anyway, part of Chan’s response was that
…Chu Hsi clearly said, “Some understand T’ien 天 (Heaven) as the blue sky, some understand 
T’ien as the chu-tsai 主宰, and some understand T’ien as li.” Chu 主 means master and tsai 宰
means controller. He has also paid special attention to the beginning sentence of the Doctrine of 
the Mean, which says, “What Heaven imparts to man (T’ien-ming 天命, Heaven’s mandate) is 
called human nature.”…Throughout his life Chu Hsi was an ardent follower of Heaven’s mandate. 
Surely Chu Hsi's T’ien was very personal to him.13
Chan was anxious to show that Zhu Xi in fact believed in something very much like a 
personal God, but I think Chan missed out on that bit Needham said on ‘precisely 
formulated abstract laws’. Yes, Zhu Xi did take very seriously the idea of Heaven, but 
Needham’s question was whether this Heaven was thought of as a lawgiver who 
consciously spelt out explicit laws for all of creation to follow, laws which could be 
stated in human language. The answer, as Needham rightly noted this time, was no. The 
notion of a celestial lawgiver, and consequently that of laws of Nature, has no place in 
Zhu’s worldview, as was seen in our brief account of it earlier. Assuming, though, that as 
a result the possibility of the development of modern science might have been denied to 
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the Chinese in the past, as Needham thought, does the said worldview necessarily oppose 
the development of scientific thought of any kind? As it turns out, there is more to the 
story; Needham claimed in addition that the organic worldview formulated by Zhu and 
like-minded Chinese thinkers, while perhaps prejudicial to the initial gestation of modern 
science, was ironically at the same time one which modern Western science in its later
developments was obliged to draw upon as a better alternative for explaining its various 
discoveries than the mechanistic one it had hitherto employed as its modus operandi.14
This is yet again an encouraging claim for those seeking to bridge the two domains of
science and religion, in particular the scientific and religious sides of Zhu Xi, but we 
cannot take Needham’s word for it and shall have to attend to this matter in greater detail 
later in the present work.
To turn to another work on science in Chinese thought which focuses specifically on 
Zhu Xi, let us take Yung Sik Kim’s much more recent The Natural Philosophy of Chu 
Hsi, a largely expository account of Zhu’s thoughts on the nature and causes of what we 
designate today as different varieties of Natural phenomena. In the introductory chapter, 
Kim draws the observation that Zhu took the phenomena for granted: 
Yet, if the natural world thus provided a basis of morality, the actual objects and phenomena 
in that world do not seem to have mattered very much to Chu Hsi. To be sure, he did advocate the 
study of the natural world as part of the ke-wu endeavor… The point, however, is not that such 
objects and phenomena were unimportant but that they were unproblematic. They were not 
excluded but were taken for granted and hence simply accepted without discussion.15
In a sense, in ignoring natural phenomena Chu Hsi's followers followed Chu Hsi himself, who 
was not concerned very much with detailed knowledge about the objects and phenomena of the 
natural world, which he took for granted.16
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Kim also noted that few after Zhu Xi have ever again been able to match the sheer 
scope of his learning. ‘His followers could have felt that everything they might wish to 
know about the natural world had already been included in the corpus of their master.’17
Now here is a question: if Zhu did not concern himself much with detailed knowledge 
about the objects and phenomena of the Natural world, was it because he took them for 
granted? Might not a special and different way of understanding the workings of Natural 
phenomena on Zhu’s part provide an alternative reason for this apparent negligence?
Some of Zhu’s conceptions of li which we had briefly discussed earlier, at first sight little 
more than religious ideas, could in fact lead to profound ramifications for the 
methodologies guiding what we understand by scientific research. For one thing, if an
entity’s li could be thought of as its xing, as an inner inclination on its part to behave as it 
does, and not merely a reason for so behaving which could be articulated in words and 
concepts, grasping its li might no longer then be a purely intellectual matter, but also 
involve developing an empathy with it — possibly none other than what Zhu termed 
ganying感應. Also, if all things (including me) have li and all li are ultimately one, then 
at least in a sense all li would have to be present in me already. It then becomes an 
interesting and important issue whether in the context of Zhu’s thought the pursuit of
acquiring knowledge of the workings of Natural phenomena might not be a process of 
bringing out the li from within one’s consciousness, rather than (or in addition to) taking 
in sensory data from without.
None of these, however, were discussed by Kim in the second chapter of his book, ‘Li
and Ke-wu’, which was to culminate in the conclusion that ‘li has little additional content 
beyond the phenomenon or object of which it is the li. In a sense, li is very much like a 
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definition.’18 Neither does xing appear in the index of the book (even under the entry ‘li’
and allowing for its different Wade-Giles Romanization, hsing). To be sure, in the 
seventh chapter, ‘Heaven and the Sages’, Kim did touch on xing and the Mind of Heaven 
and Earth in discussing the issue whether or how Heaven should be considered as 
directing the behavior of all things in Zhu’s thought, and also noted that in Zhu Xi ‘The 
parallelism between man and heaven and earth even turned into an identity and into a 
mystical notion that man is one with the whole universe and everything of the universe is 
within himself.’19 Yet here again the abovementioned ramifications for our attempts at 
understanding Nature’s workings do not appear to have occurred to Kim in his analysis.
Kim’s focus is more on what finalized ideas Zhu had regarding various aspects of 
Nature, rather than his views concerning how knowledge of Nature’s workings should be 
acquired or even what he would have meant by knowledge in the first place. Hence the 
absence of these in Kim’s work is probably fully in keeping with its aims. The same 
would have to be said of Julia Ching’s The Religious Thought of Chu Hsi.
Ching’s book examines, as its title indicates, the various aspects of Zhu’s religious 
thought, including his views on rituals and spiritual beings, critiques of his thought by 
other thinkers, his contemporary relevance, and so on. It is clear that Zhu’s interest in the 
workings of Nature, and hence the relationship between the religious and scientific 
aspects of his thought, would lie largely beyond the scope of the book, but certain issues 
discussed by Ching are still of special interest here.
In the second chapter, ‘The Great Ultimate’, Ching noted, as we also did earlier, that 
Zhu conceived of all li as coming together to form a single li which he termed the ‘Great 
Ultimate’ or Taiji太極. Ching noted further that
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…if the Great Ultimate is only the totality of all the principles of things, it would not transcend 
these things. To ensure such transcendence, Chu Hsi insisted that the Great Ultimate is also the 
Wu-chi 無極 [translated sometimes as the ‘Ultimateless’]. And in doing so, he showed that his 
Great Ultimate is very much like the philosophical and religious Absolute in other traditions.20
Wuji has the meaning of being without boundaries, of transcending all boundaries, 
being therefore present everywhere and at all times. This idea is reinforced by Zhu’s 
utterance, cited by Ching, that ‘Every human being has a Great Ultimate; every thing has 
a Great Ultimate.’21 Much of this confirms what we read in Kim’s work, and here again 
significant implications for the pursuit of scientific knowledge can be found. For one 
thing, if the li of any entity or genus of entities is ultimately that of the totality of all 
existence, it then follows that there can never be an adequate linguistic/conceptual 
account of the li of that genus or entity; any accounts one may formulate will always 
prove tentative and limited at best. Zhu himself appears entirely likely to grant this his 
nod of agreement, as is suggested in the following couplet composed by him to which 
Ching had reason to alert us elsewhere in her book:
The Tao is learned in silence through wordless transmission.
How wrong for me to have made many empty talks on Heaven!22
This effectively denies to us all prospects of a final completion of our knowledge of 
Nature, an ideal expressed in the notion of a ‘Theory of Everything’ by certain modern
scientists. The pros and cons of this shall be weighed against each other later on; in the 
meantime let us direct our attention to another issue of consequence for science in Zhu’s 
conception of li and the Great Ultimate, an issue which we noted briefly while discussing 
Kim’s work. It is this: if all li are already present in me, what need have I then to examine 
the world around us, to engage in what Zhu calls gewu, the investigation of things? 
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Would it not suffice merely to look within to acquire knowledge of the li? And yet from a 
scientific point of view this is plainly perverse and contrary to commonsense; one clearly 
needs to look without, to take in all sorts of empirical data, in the pursuit of scientific 
knowledge. Are Zhu’s ideas of li and the Great Ultimate mistaken, then, or perhaps to be 
understood strictly as metaphysical ideas which have nothing to do with science, with the 
endeavor to understand the workings of Nature?
We cannot yet explore the issue in greater depth at this juncture; suffice here to note 
that the problem of ‘seeking within’ versus ‘seeking without’ comprises precisely one of 
the many disagreements, discussed in detail by Ching in Chapter 7 of her book
(‘Philosophical Disputes with Lu Chiu-yan’), between Zhu Xi and another major 
Confucian philosopher of his time, Lu Xiangshan陸象山 (or Lu Jiuyuan陸九淵, 1139 –
1193). The doctrinal points of disagreement between the two were to become established
in the two schools of Confucian thought later to arise in the Chinese milieu, the 
Chengzhu and the Luwang陸王, with Zhu and Lu being their respective leading figures.
Lu was an uncompromising advocate of searching within for the li, which after all is 
already present in its entirety within oneself; to search without, by studying books and the 
phenomena of Nature, which Zhu recommended, would amount to a misguided waste of 
time. As Ching said of Lu:
For him, human nature is in itself an entirely adequate instrument for its own perfection. It is not 
only the tranquil locale where enlightenment occurs. It is identical with the dynamic hsin 心, 
which Lu regarded to be somehow one with ultimate reality (Tao 道 ). Whoever seeks 
enlightenment should therefore grapple with this hsin, this Tao, without allowing himself to be 
distracted by other affairs and pursuits… Chu’s balanced method of both extension of knowledge 
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and reverence would seem more outer-oriented, since it takes the person out of himself, to the 
investigation of truth in the classical texts and in the natural universe.23
Thus if Zhu’s notion of investigating Natural phenomena as a means to moral 
development appears problematic for science as it is understood today— which as I shall 
argue later need not be the case — with Lu things are even worse. The pursuit of science
would be for Lu a serious distraction from the all-important pursuit of self-cultivation. 
Lu’s view will not do if we wish to affirm the value of science, of course, but how is 
Zhu’s recommendation of gewu to be defended against Lu’s attack? If all li were already 
present within oneself, as Zhu himself conceded, it would certainly appear mistaken to 
seek the li outside of oneself. Thus the vision of all li being present within would seem 
adversarial to science.
It would be a great bonus if a case could be worked out for a fundamentally 
harmonious relationship between the scientific and religious dimensions of Zhu’s 
thought, which could overcome the above problem and at the same time could also heal 
the rift between Zhu and Lu. Certainly the two thinkers are not opposed on every point 
and do share certain views, offering us cause for optimism with respect to the possibility 
of closing the said rift, a possibility we shall explore in due course. To return to Ching’s 
book, let us now look at certain parts of her assessment of Zhu’s relevance for today in 
Chapter 11 (‘Chu Hsi's Relevance’). In the subsection ‘Chu Hsi's Method of Thinking’, 
Ching observes the dangers of applying modern Western categories of thought to Zhu’s 
system, in particular the application of such terms as ‘scientific’ and ‘rationalistic’. While 
not entirely unjustified, such an application needs also to be qualified, Ching points out,
by the fact that Zhu was concerned before anything else with moral and spiritual 
development, with the intuitive, unmediated grasp of the li by one’s whole person as 
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opposed to one’s intellect alone, resulting in one’s moral edification and that of society 
and the world. Now I think Ching’s warning tells us as much about modern Western 
modes of thought as it does about Zhu Xi. Why should the said qualification be 
necessary? Does being scientific and rationalistic necessarily exclude being moral and 
spiritual? Might not Zhu’s philosophy prove otherwise? This is of course one of the 
central concerns of the present thesis, and in this respect a special feature of Zhu’s 
thought was noted and discussed here by Ching, which again has often been associated 
with religion in the modern West and (hence?) considered as being opposed to the 
scientific and rational: the view of intuition as a means to moral knowledge.
In contrast to logical deduction and empirical observation, intuition is often viewed 
today as an unreliable avenue to knowledge, if not indeed purely delusory. Ching herself 
had certain misgivings about intuition, as can be seen from the following:
But then, what value have such intuitions, whether into the nature of truth or wisdom itself or 
into the ways by which this may be acquired? If Chu Hsi has his own conclusions, based on such 
intuitive reasoning, so does Lu Chiu-yan, based on his — even if the two thinkers do not entirely
operate along the same lines in such reasoning. Their conclusions are not the same and difficult to 
verify because they are based in large part on experience, which varies from individual to 
individual. We need more objective norms as a basis for making judgments of relevance.24
These words from Ching, incidentally, stand in unusual contrast to what she said 
earlier in her book on how ‘his [Zhu’s] Great Ultimate is very much like the 
philosophical and religious Absolute in other traditions.’25 In any case, a further issue of 
interest confronts us here: the epistemological status of intuition. Is intuition really 
unreliable as a source of knowledge? Why? Does the fact that different individuals have 
different intuitive experiences about the same ‘object’ bear witness against the reliability 
25
25
of intuition? In what way and to what degree may these experiences actually differ, and 
what is the significance of the difference?
The fascinating fact is that many if not most of the great scientific breakthroughs and 
discoveries of the West in the past few centuries originated as mere intuitions in their
discoverers’ minds, as acknowledged by philosophers of science like Karl Popper. ‘There 
is no such thing,’ Popper once asserted, ‘as a logical method of having new ideas, or a 
logical reconstruction of this process. Every great discovery contains an irrational 
element or a creative intuition.’26 It turns out that intuition has a lot more to offer than the 
poetic visions of a few mystics, having everything to do with the advancement of 
scientific knowledge. Serving thus as the fountainhead of both our scientific insights and
religious visions, the intuitive faculty, with its near-central place in Zhu’s thought,
appears an extremely important piece in the puzzle we are attempting to solve on the 
relationship between the scientific and religious sides of the philosopher, and we shall do 
well to revisit it in greater depth later.
Now a further matter of interest calls for our attention, touched upon in the quote 
from Popper: the role of creativity in scientific pursuits. It is now widely accepted that in 
such pursuits we often need to exercise our creativity and come up with new ideas or 
concepts, often entire systems of them, for expressing the insights we may have gained in 
our investigations into the workings of Nature. The interesting and significant question 
arises as to what place Zhu might have assigned (if any) to intellectual and conceptual 
creativity of this kind in his thought.
It stands as an unfortunate fact that certain religious traditions have opposed new 
ideas pertaining to the nature of reality at various times in history — probably on the 
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presumption that such ideas would constitute an unacceptable usurpation of the 
established body of religious doctrine — thereby inhibiting the growth of science. On this 
basis religion has often been judged as the enemy of science. Hence Zhu’s attitude 
towards creative thought would have a serious bearing on how the religious and scientific 
aspects of his thought are related, indeed whether there is a scientific aspect to his 
thought in the first place.
Ching does discuss the place of creativity in Zhu’s thought in one of the Appendices 
in her work (Appendix C), where she undertakes a comparison of Zhu and Whitehead. 
Some contemporary scholars have been persuaded of the existence of special similarities 
between the two which would warrant such comparisons, and the concept of ‘creativity’ 
occupies a place of supreme importance in Whitehead’s thought. But the creativity 
discussed here is more of a cosmological nature, concerned with how the Ten Thousand 
Things arise in the Cosmos, being therefore of limited relevance to our present query.
To find out what other literature there may be which would address the issue of 
intellectual creativity in Zhu Xi, we shall have to take leave of Ching and search 
elsewhere. John Berthrong’s Concerning Creativity: A Comparison of Chu Hsi, 
Whitehead, and Neville would appear a prospective candidate. In this volume, Berthrong 
sets out to compare Zhu and Whitehead in greater depth and detail, and adds in the ideas 
and views of the contemporary philosopher-theologian Robert Neville. Here again, the 
emphasis is on creativity as a metaphysical and cosmological concept, so at first sight the 
book appears as irrelevant to our purpose as the abovementioned section in Ching’s work.




Chu Hsi's defense of Chou Tun-i’s 周敦頤 concept of wu-chi… is a classic case of a theory of 
the creative advance in philosophic terminology, and hence creativity in general. Chu Hsi argues, 
and Ch’en Ch’un concurs, that there is a kairosmovement in any philosophy when something new 
has to be generated in order to respond to the conditions of the times… Chu Hsi had a doctrine of 
open if austere revelation in theological language: a sage expounds a vision of reality 
commensurate with the demands of the age. The Uncontrived Ultimate of Chou Tun-i is just such 
a case. Chu Hsi admitted that this term was relatively new in Confucian usage, but not 
contradictory to the established usage of the sages. When the notion of the Uncontrived Ultimate 
was linked to the older idea of the Supreme Ultimate, it lent a new precision to the 
conceptualization that made it part of the growth of the Confucian view of reality. Thus, according 
to Chu Hsi, the sage can create new verbalizations when the need arises, and there is always a 
need for new vision to meet the needs of new days.27
Zhou Dunyi (Wade-Giles: Chou Tun-i, 1017 – 1073) was one of several Confucian 
thinkers who arose during the Northern Song Dynasty and whose ideas were later to be 
incorporated into the grand system developed by Zhu Xi, one of Zhou’s most important 
contributions in this respect being the pairing up of the concepts of Wuji and Taiji, 
discussed earlier in our review of Chapter 2 of Ching’s book. As Berthrong pointed out, 
the concept of Wuji, which he translated as ‘The Uncontrived Ultimate’, had not been 
part of the Confucian vocabulary before Zhou. Zhu’s defense of the use of this new 
concept in Confucianism would therefore suggest an affirmation on his part of the value 
of and need for intellectual and conceptual creativity in the articulation of fresh insights 
into the nature of reality. As shall be elaborated upon later, this ought to have interesting 
connections with other aspects of Zhu’s thought, such as the ultimate ineffability of the li.
Of great interest as well would be certain ideas of Zhu pointed out by Berthrong 
which hint at an acknowledgement of the value of abstract models in elucidating the 
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nature of li. Having noted the relative lack of interest in mathematical and logical 
formulations in Zhu vis--vis Whitehead, Berthrong also noted nevertheless that ‘on 
occasion he [Zhu] does imply that principle is something like the straight and horizontal 
lines of a segment of bamboo, showing that such abstraction is entirely possible based on 
Neo-Confucian interpretations of principle.’28 This would be in perfect harmony with 
what we have noted immediately above on Zhu’s approval of the invention and use of 
novel ideas and concepts in expressing fresh insights into the nature of li.
An interesting qualm arises here as to whether Zhu’s own religious convictions might 
not actually come under constant threat from this concession to new insights into the 
nature of things, indeed the whole business of gewu which he himself so enthusiastically 
advocated. Who is to say one fine day this quest might not lead to some new discovery
which would contradict the said religious convictions, say the ‘discovery’ that all of life, 
human life included, amounted to no more than the accidental collocation of insentient 
particles of matter, as so many scientists today claim? If we were to qualify our 
discoveries, on the other hand, with the requirement that they be ‘not contradictory to the 
established usage of the sages’, would that not amount to a form of religious 
conservatism which impedes genuine scientific development? Chen Lai, as we have seen, 
would disqualify Zhu’s thought as scientific on the basis of the said requirement.
It certainly can be tempting at this point to settle for a view of science and religion as 
fundamentally opposed, whether in Zhu Xi or anywhere else. The present author is 
confident that this opposition is ultimately merely apparent, but the grounds for such a 
view we shall have to attend to only afterwards.
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One wonders at times if the idea of the tragic found in Western culture, involving
irreconcilable opposites, might not have actually become fashionable among modern 
Chinese intellectuals (who often give the impression of deeming the culture of the 
Occident the supreme standard of excellence by which all else is measured). A case in 
point which certainly leaves such an impression would be Zhao Feng’s 趙峰 Zhu Xi de 
Zhongji Guanhuai 朱熹的終極關懷 (Zhu Xi’s Ultimate Concern). Employing the ideas 
and concepts of the well-known modern philosopher-theologian Paul Tillich, Zhao 
presents an interesting thesis whereby the human individual is understood in traditional 
Chinese thought as torn between on the one hand (1) his/her subjective need for spiritual 
fulfillment whereby a solution would be effected for the problem of his/her mortality as a 
self-conscious individual; and on the other (2) his/her objective existence as a member of 
society, which entails the development and maintenance of proper and meaningful 
relationships between others and him/herself. Buddhism and Taoism were seen as 
catering to (1), Confucianism (2), and Zhao sets up the two as antipodal: (1) can only be 
fulfilled at the expense of (2) for some reason, and vice versa. And all of Chinese 
philosophy, Zhu Xi included, has been none other than an (ultimately vain?) attempt to 
bridge the two. In Zhao’s own words:
…This is the central problem with the contradiction between Heaven and humanity: humanity is 
ordained to be Heaven’s rebel, and Heaven to be humanity’s home. Should the purity (chuncuixing
純粹性) of the home be insisted upon, humanity would lose its original nature; should we insist on 
the other hand on the integrity (wanzhengxing完整性) of the rebel, humanity would lose its home.
Yet it is only by insisting on the integrity of the original nature of humanity, by conceding that the 
societal structures of our existence (shengchun de shehui jiegou 生存的社會结構) possess the 
same legitimacy as the Natural structures (shengchun de ziran jiegou生存的自然结構), that the 
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effective reshaping of social realities can be implemented; and it is only by maintaining the purity 
of our Heavenly home that the unconditioned affirmation of our existence by this Ultimate
Sanctuary (zhongji guisu 終極歸宿) can be established, which may then ensure that the acts we 
engage in in real life, including the reshaping of society, are not empty of meaning. Heaven and 
humanity cannot be one, and yet cannot be separated either. This is the dilemma faced by 
humanity in real life. The quest consistently engaged in by Chinese culture for thousands of years 
for the ‘Unity of Heaven and humanity’ has been none other than an attempt to untie this knot.29
This thesis seems debatable. Are our societal and spiritual needs indeed mutually 
contradictory, and does the history of Chinese thought really bear witness to this? Who 
decides what the ‘purity’ of the ‘home’ and the ‘integrity’ of the ‘rebel’ consist in 
anyway? Does Buddhism necessarily address our spiritual needs only by negating 
societal norms and values? (The modern scholar of Buddhism Trevor Ling would dispute 
this, as would the Ming Confucian Jiao Hong 焦竑.30) On the other hand, if (pre-Qin)
Confucianism did not address the great existential issues confronting the human 
individual, as Buddhism did, was this due to some fundamental tension between such 
concerns and those pertaining to societal norms and values, as Zhao maintains?
Whatever the case may be, if we grant for now the validity of Zhao’s schema and his 
interpretation of Zhu’s thought on the basis of this schema, it is difficult to see what place 
it has for the pursuit of scientific knowledge. It is far from obvious what such a pursuit 
could contribute to either party in the attempt to resolve the ‘societal-versus-spiritual-
needs’ contradiction posited by Zhao, who himself in fact rejected all interpretations of 
Zhu’s idea of gewu as a dispassionate and rationalistic quest for knowledge. This can be 
seen in Zhao’s analysis of gewu in his book, in the first few pages of the second section 
(‘Gongfu Tixi de Maodun yu Tedian’ 功夫體係的矛盾與特點 or ‘The Contradictions 
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Present in [Zhu Xi’s] System of Applied Effort and Its Special Characteristics’) of 
Chapter 2, ‘Geti Shengming de Yiyi Anzhi’ 個體生命的意義安置 (‘Situating the 
Meaning of the Individual’s Life’).
Starting with the same question brought up earlier, namely why one should engage in 
gewu if all li are already present within oneself, Zhao proceeds to examine what 
Twentieth Century Chinese thinkers like Feng Youlan 冯友蘭 (better known as Fung Yu-
Lan) and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 have written on gewu. Zhao makes the observation that 
Feng Youlan exerted a great deal of effort working on the problem of just how the 
investigation of things is supposed to lead to the all-important Confucian goal of moral 
cultivation, while Mou Zongsan, on the basis of what Zhu stated on the need to 
apprehend li through gewu, criticized Zhu’s idea of li as amounting to no more than a
mere object of knowledge which does not engage the being of the knower — in Mou’s 
words, his/her xin (heart) or xing (nature) — in some fundamental way, and therefore
disqualifies as an agent for spiritual transformation and elevation. The trouble, Zhao 
argued, lay in an understanding of gewu on the part of Mou and Feng which renders it a 
strictly rationalistic and cognitive endeavor, aimed at nothing else besides the acquisition 
of knowledge, be it even knowledge of morals or of the metaphysical. This mode of 
knowing Zhao terms (a) lixing renzhi理性認知 or ‘cognition of a rationalistic nature’, to 
distinguish it from (b) wuxing tizheng悟性體証, ‘realization of an enlightening nature’, a 
more profound mode of knowing involving a kind of illuminative apprehension of the 
truth which transforms the knower, this being in Zhao’s view the true essence of gewu as 
Zhu Xi intended it to be understood. ‘The objective of ‘exhausting the li of things’ found 
in the idea of gewu was always meant in the first place to be ‘exhausting the li of 
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humanity’, it was never from the start for the purpose of increasing one’s knowledge, but 
for that of realizing the noumena (benti本體).’31
This is a conclusion most similar to that drawn by Chen Lai earlier, and just as 
serious. If we accept it, science will have no place in Zhu’s thought. But why should (a)
be opposed to (b)? Can’t they be mutually complimentary instead? (This would be very 
similar to another question touched upon earlier in discussing Ching’s work, whether 
being scientific and rationalistic necessarily exclude being moral and spiritual.) Yes,
Zhu’s primary purpose was moral development, but does the quest for knowledge of 
Nature’s workings really have nothing to do with it? One’s suspicion is that Zhao has 
presented us here with yet another dichotomy which lies open to question. If, as Zhao 
charged, Feng and Mou interpreted gewu as a form of (a) to the neglect of those aspects 
of gewu which correspond more to (b), Zhao would seem guilty of the opposite in 
stressing (b) to the point of negating (a).
The fact is that the pursuit of scientific knowledge involves more than lixing renzhi, 
recalling what Popper said. The critical role of intuition, and the possibility that the 
‘investigation of things’ may actually involve a form of empathy with the objects of our 
investigations, which might be just what Zhu termed ganying (as we discussed earlier in 
reviewing Kim’s work), all suggest that (a) and (b) may actually involve each other a 
whole lot more than we realize. Also to be noted is the fact that many major scientists, 
such as Erwin Schrdinger, Isaac Newton, Albert Einstein and David Bohm, were also 
deeply religious or spiritual in their outlook on life. All in all, the view that being 
concerned with moral and spiritual development leaves no room for the pursuit of 
scientific knowledge appears unpersuasive or at least open to question — and to 
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demonstrate that the two can indeed come together in Zhu’s thought in a state of 
harmonious co-dependence shall comprise the main objective of the present thesis.
Another contemporary scholar, Jin Chunfeng 金春峰 , makes basically the same
charges as Zhao Feng against Feng Youlan and Mou Zongsan regarding their 
understanding of gewu. This can be seen in Jin’s book Zhu Xi Zhexue Sixiang 朱熹哲學
思想 (The Philosophical Thought of Zhu Xi), a work which explores the many facets of 
the philosopher’s thought, including a chapter on his poetry and what it shows about his 
relationship with Buddhism. (Incidentally, in this book Jin seems to draw one parallel too 
many between the thoughts of Zhu Xi and of Immanuel Kant, virtually identifying the 
two thinkers’ conceptions of morality.)
We find Jin’s discussion of gewu in Chapter 4, ‘Gewu Zhizhi Shuo’ 格物致知說
(Discussing ‘The Attainment of Knowledge through Investigating Things’), where he 
shares with us many invaluable insights into the different aspects of the idea of gewu, 
among them the fact that it actually underwent stages of development corresponding to
different periods in Zhu’s career, reaching full maturity only later in his life, with the 
earliest concept of gewu involving a simple schema featuring the cognizing subject on the 
one hand and on the other the li, situated apart from and outside of him/her. Gewu was 
thus thought of initially as a process of taking in things from without; only later, as the li
came to be thought of as being present in all, did the emphasis shift increasingly towards 
the cognizing subject, particularly his/her moral development.32 Also noteworthy is the 
fact, pointed out by Jin, that Zhu assigned at least two meanings to the term xin (heart or 
mind), one of them as simply the bare faculty of cognition and the other as a 
manifestation of the li which we are familiar with.33 Jin’s contention was that Feng and 
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Mou misinterpreted gewu by limiting themselves either to its earliest conception or the 
first of the two meanings of xin.34
Clearly both Zhao Feng and Jin Chunfeng take for granted the existence of a mode of 
knowing which merely involves taking in what is value-neutral and external to one’s 
mind and which ipso facto cannot serve the purpose of moral edification which gewu was 
meant to fulfill. That which is truly moral must be elicited from within, not imposed from 
without — what Jin termed zil自律 (roughly, being regulated by oneself) and tal他律
(being regulated by another) respectively. ‘Strictly speaking, the cognitive mind 
(renzhixin 認知心) as a neutral (zhongxing 中性) faculty of cognition cannot erect any 
moral system.’35 Insofar as science is supposed to be the very epitome of such a mode of 
knowing, gewu ultimately has nothing to do with science. But as I have asserted earlier, 
though worded differently, the notion of a strictly neutral or objective faculty of cognition 
stands open to dispute. 
It also becomes a mystery, given what Zhao and Jin thought gewu should or should 
not be, why Zhu himself exhibited such great interest in the ‘bare facts’ pertaining to the 
behavior of the phenomenal/Natural world, as a scientist would. Citing Zhu himself, Jin 
suggested as the main reason the need to figure out just how the diverse manifestations of
the li ‘come together’. Just knowing of the one li does not suffice; one also needs to get 
down to the details regarding the manifold strands which constitute the fabric of the li. 
Unsupported by a knowledge of them, a lack of substance is only likely to characterize 
any notion of the unity of the li which we may entertain. For one thing, we might not
know how we should act in various concrete situations so as to comply with the dictates 
of the li, such as what type of wood to cut at what times of the year. All the moral 
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edification in the world would be of no avail without the practical knowledge required for 
acting on the moral directives in one’s xin, as when in a Disney cartoon Donald Duck
sought to procure some water to douse a fire ravaging a house, but achieved the opposite 
by failing to differentiate between water and gasoline. 
Now all this is very well, but seems only to deal with the technicalities. It explains 
why knowledge of the phenomenal/Natural world can be useful for knowing what courses 
of action to pursue in various situations, but fails to explain how studying, say grass and 
trees, can provide me with greater insight into the li whereby I may attain to a morally 
and spiritually more exalted state of being. Indeed according to Jin this is impossible, 
because the nature of trees and grass all pertain to knowledge of the external world, 
whereas the sources for moral and spiritual transformation must be found within. But if 
we are to say that things like the nature of trees and grass merely provide useful 
knowledge, why not leave such things to botanists then while we focus exclusively on 
cultivating ourselves? Indeed there is a further problem with this schema of ‘inner’ and 
‘outer’: given this schema, how shall it be possible for me to gain any knowledge of the 
external world at all, including the nature of grass and trees? We have already noted, in 
discussing Chen Lai, that in all scientific pursuits we need a conceptual framework for 
ordering otherwise meaningless qualia into meaningful information; the only trouble is 
that any scientific ideas and theories I may thereby formulate would amount, according to 
the said schema, to little more than personal fantasies, since the gulf between ‘inner’ and 
‘outer’ ensures I would have no way of testing the validity of my ideas against what I 
take in from outside, which would only be further meaningless qualia.   
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This problem would be solved if we rejected the said schema and with it the notion of 
an unbridgeable gulf between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’, whereupon the a priori presence 
‘within’ oneself of all knowledge of the Ten Thousand Things becomes a plausible idea, 
as indeed is allowed if not required by Zhu’s concept of li. In fact we already touched on 
this in discussing Kim and Ching, and shall do so again in greater depth and detail later.
Whereas Zhao Feng’s work opposed the thesis of the presence of scientific thought in 
Zhu Xi, the notion of the objective reality of li was to constitute a further target of attack 
for yet another contemporary scholar, Zhang Liwen 張立文. This may be found in his 
Zhu Xi Sixiang Yanjiu朱熹思想研究 (Researches on the Thought of Zhu Xi), a primarily 
expository though also partly evaluative work exploring the diverse strands of Zhu’s 
thought from Natural phenomena and social values to history, education and even 
economics. In Zhang’s examination of Zhu’s concept of li, he clearly rejects the notion of 
any ordering principle not fabricated by human thought but existing independently of it.
This can be seen for example early in the second section (‘Li, Taiji he Dao’理，太極和
道 or ‘Li, Taiji and Dao’) of Chapter 5, ‘Zhu Xi Zhexue de Luoji Jiegou’ 朱熹哲學的邏
輯结構 (‘The Logical Structures of Zhu Xi’s Philosophy’). Having noted what Zhu said 
on the li of chairs and fans, Zhang commented:
…Clearly, Zhu’s so-called ‘xingeshang zhi li’ 形而上之理 (li which exists above physical form) 
is the result of turning the concepts and ideas present in human knowledge and cognition into 
abstract absolutes. Ideas and concepts are originally the manifestations of the external world in the 
human brain. Hence the arising of ideas and concepts requires that two conditions be satisfied, the 
presence of a human brain and of an external world. Yet Zhu separates ideas and concepts from 
the conditions which give rise to them, and makes them out to be entities with an independent 
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existence which dwell high above those entities which give rise to them in the first place — in 
other words the xingeshang zhi li.36
And philosophically speaking this is just not correct, Zhang maintains. A few pages 
ahead he says again:
Zhu Xi’s ‘Before there were things, there were already their li’ may make out the li to be 
something which existed before all things and events were produced, but when several billion 
years ago there appeared on Earth only the most primitive life forms — microbes and unicellular 
organisms, what li of ruler and minister or of father and son was there?!37
If Zhu’s idea of li as having an existence independent of whether we are aware of it is 
philosophically untenable, so is the idea of innate knowledge of any kind, including that 
of moral values, which Zhu also entertained seriously, being predicated after all on his
conception of li. If I share one li with all of life and if this li is also my xing, I should then 
possess a certain inborn awareness of this unity of self and other, an awareness which 
would prompt me to affirm the existence of others in my thought and actions. Zhang 
would have none of this, though, given his rejection of Zhu’s conception of li, as he 
stated explicitly near the beginning of the third section (‘Zhijue yu Xinsi’自覺與心思 or 
‘Awareness and Thought’) of Chapter 9, ‘Cong Wu dao Li de Renzhi Guocheng’從物到
理的認知過程 (The Cognitive Process from [Knowledge of] Entities to [Knowledge of] 
Their Li’): 
Do children really know of loving their parents in an a priori way, and know of showing 
respect for their seniors when they have grown up? As moral/ethical concepts grounded in society, 
love of parents and respect for seniors are not only absent in the newly born, they did not exist 
among early men either. They are the products of relationships between people, and have 
everything to do with the social activities and interactions of people. A person with eyes and ears 
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closed, cut off from society and the outside world, can only be an imbecile, even with a well-
developed brain.38
With all due respect for Zhang, his arguments on the nonexistence of li beyond ‘the 
concepts and ideas present in human knowledge and cognition’ appear unsatisfactory.
When no humans are present, as was presumably the case a few billion years ago, does 
that necessarily mean that the li of human relations is likewise nonexistent? Can’t this li
be thought of instead as being somehow ‘encrypted’ in matter — or what Zhu would term 
qi — and ‘waiting’ to manifest itself explicitly in the physical world when the conditions 
are right? (Indeed this is what Zhu himself implied in speaking of cosmic cycles of 
dissolution and renewal, an idea to which he subscribed, with the li being still present 
even during the intervals of time between the complete destruction of the physical world 
and its subsequent regeneration.) Also, granting that no concept of ‘fan’ or ‘chair’ exists 
in some realm ‘above physical form’, that such concepts exist strictly in the human mind, 
is Zhu’s idea of li thereby denied all credibility? Certainly we do not draw such a 
conclusion with respect to what we today call the laws of physics underlying the behavior 
of chairs or fans; after all, physical objects will ‘obey’ Newton’s Laws of Motion 
regardless of whether we know of these laws. Why can’t we think likewise of the li?
The thesis that no recognizably moral inclinations of any kind can be found in a 
newly born child is also at least open to dispute in the light of modern research.39 But the 
main thing to note at this point is Zhang’s apparent Kantianism: all that enter our minds 
from without via the senses are bare and meaningless sensory qualia, in our minds alone 
are various ideas pertaining to the nature of reality being formed. The special problems
with this we have already noted in discussing Jin Chunfeng. If Zhu has the solution to 
these problems — as I shall argue he does — the situation here will be supremely ironic: 
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in pointing out Zhu’s ‘mistaken’ views, the ‘correct’ views proposed by Zhang to replace 
them with actually lead us into problems only the said ‘mistaken’ views can solve!
The attacks on Zhu Xi coming from modern scholars are far from exhausted at this 
point; thus we find another line of attack coming from Yu Yingshi’s余英時 two-volume 
study Zhu Xi de Lishi Shijie 朱熹的歷史世界 (The Historical Milieu of Zhu Xi), a work 
which examines the sociopolitical setting of the period during which Zhu lived and its 
influence on his thought as well as his responses to it in attempting to bring his visions to 
realization. 
Yu noted the interesting interplay between the metaphysical and sociopolitical 
thought of the Song Confucians, for example in Zhu’s conception of the ideal ruler as one 
who followed the dictates of li and hence, just like the li itself, engages in no deliberate 
acts in governing — betraying Daoist influence — and also in the concern of Lu 
Xiangshan, noted earlier, that Zhu’s idea of the wuji, the ‘Ultimateless’, would lead to 
political anarchy in the human world. 40 One can see from these examples that 
metaphysical speculation in the Confucian tradition was never permitted to drift away 
from the earthly concerns of human society. In this respect, to return to where Yu 
attacked Zhu, Yu notes (in Volume 1, in the second section [‘Daoxue, Daotong yu 
‘Zhengzhi Wenhua’’ 道學，道統與政治文化 or ‘The Study of the Way, the Lineage of 
Transmission of the Way and ‘Political Culture’’] of the opening chapter ‘Xushuo’ 緒説
[Opening Discussion]) that Zhu and other Confucians of the Song set great store by the 
daotong 道統 , the lineage of transmission of the Way which traces its practice and 
manifestation in the human world back to Yao 堯 and Shun 舜 , and from them to 
Confucius and Mencius and eventually to the Song Confucians, as a source of authority 
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for his ideas and a testimony to the applicability of the Way to human affairs. The 
daotong is seen as complimentary to the daoti 道體, the body of the Way, what It 
essentially is — in other words, the li. Now Yu was dismissive of the daotong as a piece 
of pure fiction, just as Zhang Liwen was dismissive of the li or daoti:
…From the point of view of modern historical studies, the ancient genealogy of the daotong is 
naturally from head to tail a fictitious construct, which can only be relegated to the same category 
as ‘appealing to the ancients to implement reforms in governmental policies’. ‘To mention Yao 
and Shun every time one speaks’ is an old Confucian tradition which in Mencius was already 
present, and the Song Confucians systematically developed this inclination.41
Yu went on to judge from the writings of the Song Confucians that ‘it seems they 
really believed that there exists in the Cosmos a daoti which served as the ‘Master of the 
Ten Thousand Forms’, and also that in remote antiquity there was indeed a daotong.’42
The daoti and the daotong were therefore the very two supporting pillars of the Song 
Confucians’ entire edifice of belief, in consequence of which Zhu Xi and other 
Confucians of the Song were often anxious to seek out textual support for their views and 
ideas in the words and writings bequeathed by ancient worthies, their content being 
accepted without question — in contradiction, in Zhu’s case, to the critical stance with 
which he often perused those texts unsupportive of his views, his bias and selectiveness 
being thus evident according to Yu.43 Apparently certain beliefs were so important to Zhu
that to critically examine the classical texts thought of as the sources of those beliefs 
would simply go too far beyond his zone of comfort. Even with Lu Xiangshan, famous 
for his highly iconoclastic declaration that ‘the Six Classics should be footnotes unto me
(liujing zhuwo六經注我),’ it turned out, Yu claimed, that he had his own canon of texts 
to defer to as well.
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The cult of the ancient, whereby certain individuals from the remote past were 
thought of as having embodied various highly desirable qualities long since lost, is 
widespread in diverse cultures, alongside the veneration of texts left behind (or allegedly 
left behind) by those individuals. The question to ask here is: does Zhu’s system really 
need a daotong to hold it together? Deprived of the authorization provided by special 
individuals from remote antiquity, would his system crash and burn? It may be that in the
peculiar sociocultural setting in which Zhu was situated, appealing to historical authority
was important, as Yu pointed out, for persuading others of the legitimacy of one’s ideas, 
especially those in positions of power who would then hopefully endorse the said ideas. 
Such considerations aside, however, it is difficult to see how such appeal to authority 
would establish the validity of any ideas, especially if the source of authority in question 
is someone who lived long ago (so that for all one knows his/her words might have 
suffered from countless additions and subtractions down the centuries). Just because 
someone said something is so, does not make it so. Even on Confucian terms, a daotong
would still appear superfluous. By traditional accounts, Yao and Shun could have had no 
daotong to defer to, being the earliest sage-emperors, yet they still lived supremely 
virtuous lives, and absolutely anyone in Confucian thought is a potential Yao or Shun.
In one respect may the daotong be granted some value for Zhu’s agenda, namely that 
of providing accounts of virtuous people who lived in the past, which may prove
inspiring and edifying. But the daotong was meant for much more than that, as we now 
know, besides which accounts of virtuous people who live in the present or who come 
from other traditions can prove just as inspiring and edifying.
42
42
My final verdict is that the daotong, the special Lineage of Transmission of the Way, 
does not constitute an essential part of the Confucian tradition and Zhu Xi’s thought in 
particular, which on that account emerges unscathed from Yu’s demolishment of the 
daotong. This leaves us, however, with the daoti, what Zhu otherwise terms the li, and 
here the story gets far more interesting and less straightforward. Do we ultimately really 
need a daoti to serve as a metaphysical basis for moral values, or is the daoti just as 
dispensable as the daotong? Assuming for now, as shall be argued, that we do need the 
daoti, whereupon establishing its existence becomes an important issue, how may that be 
accomplished? Could Zhu’s idea of gewu, the study of phenomenal reality to sound the 
underlying li, be of help in this respect, or is that out of the question since the idea of li is 
an a priori one which precedes and guides the investigation of things? Should the latter 
be the case, would that make the li or daoti something the existence of which cannot be 
established by empirical evidence and therefore has to be accepted on the basis of 
religious faith? These are yet further questions we shall have to attend to later.
It might incidentally be asked what special bearing the political views of Zhu Xi 
might have on the validity of his metaphysical ideas, considering how the latter can be 
shaped by the former. I believe the answer is: very little. A metaphysical view or idea 
arising from various political inclinations may still have a validity of its own beyond its 
circumstances of origin. Certainly that is the case with scientific ideas.
Such then are some of the issues and problems which present themselves regarding 
the religious and scientific sides of Zhu Xi in our review of some of the contemporary 




Scientific Aspects of Zhu Xi’s Thought Kim, Needham
Religious Aspects of Zhu Xi’s Thought Ching, Zhao
Other Special Aspects of Zhu Xi’s Thought Berthrong, Yu
General Expositions of Zhu Xi’s Thought Chan, Chen, Jin, Zhang
It can be readily seen that the largest number of works fall into the last category. 
Assuming that roughly the same proportions for the different categories above apply to 
the whole corpus of available literature on Zhu Xi, one reckons it could be because his 
philosophical system ultimately needs to be taken as a whole; no aspect of it can really be 
studied in isolation from the rest. And it is the raison d’tre of the present thesis to figure 
out just how the different aspects, chiefly the scientific and religious aspects, could fit 
together as a whole i.e. in a way which would be mutually dependent and affirmative.
 1.2 The Relevance of Zhu Xi to the Debate on Science and Religion 
A challenge might be given at this point to the effect that it would be of limited 
relevance and value to the modern world for any school of thought, especially a 
premodern one, to prove capable of uniting its own scientific and religious views and 
ideas if these turned out to be so peculiar to its own conceptual universe as to have 
nothing in common with the ones we entertain today (especially with respect to the 
scientific side of things). My reply is that, while indeed we would do well to keep in 
mind the various conceptual divides found between Zhu Xi’s thought and ours, at the 
same time it is surely an equally inadvisable move to place undue emphasis on these 
divides to the neglect of various elements in his philosophy which happen to be shared by 
the modern world in large measure as well — and many such elements are present, as we 
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shall see. Zhu believed that all phenomena in the Universe followed patterns of order and 
regularity, and sought to uncover these patterns and the causes which give rise to them on 
the presumption that such an undertaking is worthwhile; likewise with today’s scientists. 
Again, he believed in an invisible source of authority for all human values which 
transcends the limitations of mortal existence — a view basically shared by anyone who 
follows a religion, of whom there are still very large numbers today indeed. All this 
argues for at least some measure of common ground; the gap between Zhu and the 
modern world is not entirely unbridgeable.
It is not to be denied, of course, that important differences do indeed exist between 
Zhu Xi and the modern world. Having admitted that, however, there appears little reason
to consider the views and ideas underlying the said divergences as set in stone, as being 
incapable of modifications or developments whereby the conceptual divides may be 
overcome. Any study of the history of Confucianism reveals a constant process of 
adaptation, self-appraisal, learning from other traditions and improving on their ideas 
which continues today; the same holds for the many institutions and schools of thought
which have shaped and defined our world at present. Hence one finds little reason to 
suppose that a similar process of development, of mutual exchange and learning, cannot 
occur in an encounter between the different parties and between the past and present.
Admittedly a certain amount of imposition of modern concepts on Zhu Xi will be 
unavoidable in what the present thesis sets out to accomplish. But this need not be a 
problem. In an article on Zhu Xi, contemporary scholar Liu Xiaogan劉笑敢 has made 
the observation that
the development of ancient Chinese philosophy may be characterized as a process in which new 
philosophical systems were established by means of annotating the classics. And, further… doing 
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these complete annotations of the classics involved doing both textual commentary and 
philosophical innovative reconstruction at the same time.44
Liu argued in consequence of this for the use of the concept of chuanggou 創構 or 
innovative reconstruction in Chinese hermeneutics, in addition to that of nigou 拟構 or 
emulative reconstruction. New systems of thought are actually worked out, based on new 
ways of understanding the ancient classics. This ought to dovetail with what Berthrong 
noted on the propensity for intellectual creativity found in Zhu Xi. Liu’s views find 
support in two other scholars, Pan Derong 潘德榮 and Peng Qifu彭啓福, who have cited 
Zhu to the effect that ‘What sages said at different times is only a sprout. It is very 
important for later readers to study, and expand fresh meanings within the sages’ words.
大抵聖賢之言，多是略發箇萌芽，更在後人推究，演而伸，觸而長。。。’45
Examining this assertion, the two scholars commented that
…What the readers come to understand is called the textual significance… There is in fact 
relatively little difference in the writings and language that are used in ancient and present times, 
but the significance of a text varies for different readers. Not only does the significance vary from 
person to person, but it can also vary at different stages of understanding that text by the same 
person.46
From this it can be no great step towards the observation that it can also vary at 
different stages of historical development within a cultural milieu, whereupon the 
endowment of a traditional body of thought with fresh meanings becomes entirely 
pertinent. Zhu Xi did this with respect to Confucius and Mencius, and a modern thinker 
can surely do likewise with respect to Zhu Xi. Our minds evolve, both individually and 
collectively; it would therefore destroy Zhu Xi’s relevance for us today to insist on a ‘true 
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way’ of understanding him which prohibits the introduction of modern concepts (though 
of course it would be equally unsound to read into Zhu Xi any meanings we please).
Zhu Xi is far from an antiquated thinker whose ideas have served their time. Granting 
that people no longer study his works for passing civil service examinations, the extent of 
his influence in history suggests nevertheless a lasting and pervasive presence in modern 
East Asian sociocultural milieux, albeit in the subtle guise of prevailing cultural attitudes 
and even everyday language. Zhu is probably still very much in our midst.
It needs to be clarified at the outset that the last thing on the present author’s mind is 
to peddle Zhu Xi as a panacea that has all the answers. To make such a claim of any body 
of thought can only be the height of presumptuousness; a plurality of different 
perspectives on world issues, with Zhu’s thought offering precisely one such perspective, 
would surely constitute a far more sensible (and interesting) state of affairs. The 
Confucian narrative is hardly faultless (it is grossly sexist, for example); no body of 
thought could ever be. It then becomes all the more desirable to grant our audience to a 
diversity of views, each of which could potentially serve as a source of invaluable 
correctives for the shortcomings of the other.
The following shall therefore be undertaken. First a summarized account of the two 
aspects of Zhu Xi’s thought, the religious and the scientific, shall be in order, focusing in 
particular on the two ideas of li and gewu — li because it is the ultimate source of all 
moral values in Zhu’s understanding, its religious import being therefore evident, and 
gewu for the reason that it comes the closest of all of Zhu’s ideas to what we would 
consider a ‘scientific method’. This shall set the stage for the next chapter where the 
present author shall state and defend the case for a fundamental unity behind the two 
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sides of the philosopher’s system, mainly by showing what need each side has for the 
other, what special agenda each side may have which requires drawing upon the 
resources available from the other side for its fulfillment. The concluding chapter shall 
explore the possible ramifications of this unity of science and religion in Zhu Xi, mainly 
what Confucianism and other religious traditions, even the modern scientific tradition, 
can learn from each other.
As Zhu Xi’s thought constitutes the main focus of the present thesis, a certain
compromise is regrettably inevitable as to the extent to which issues in the philosophy of 
science and the philosophy of religion shall be examined. What shall be undertaken here 
in these two areas is mainly but the outlining of a criterion each for what being scientific 
and being religious consist in, followed by an examination of Zhu’s thought on the basis 
of the said criteria. Hence, to attend to the scientific side of things, our understanding of 
the term ‘science’ itself shall be limited mostly to its modern ecumenical manifestation in 
the present work. The works of Alan Chalmers and Paul Feyerabend, to mention but two 
of the philosophers of science to be discussed, shall be cited where they are of special 
relevance to our study of Zhu’s thought, but the scope of this thesis shall preclude any in-
depth analysis of their (Chalmers’ and Feyerabend’s) views, or any discussion on more 
specific topics in the philosophy of science such as Bas van Fraassen’s account of 
representation or William Wojtach’s examination of the problems of visual perception as 
a source of empirical knowledge.47
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2. ZHU XI’S THOUGHT AND ITS SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS 
DIMENSIONS
 2.1 Life and Times
The Han 漢 Dynasty (206 B.C. – 220 A.D.) witnessed the promotion of 
Confucianism to the official school of thought for the intelligentsia and the ruling elite in 
China, but also the first inroads of Buddhism into the Chinese milieu, where the teachings 
of the great Indian sage were eventually to gain such wide acceptance as to utterly 
overshadow Confucianism in status for several hundred years. The trouble with (pre-
Song 宋) Confucianism was that, though hints of concern with the metaphysical and 
spiritual were not entirely absent in this tradition, they nevertheless remained 
undeveloped with attention being directed largely instead towards moral, social and 
political issues. Consequently for the most part the Ru school was mute with respect to
questions pertaining to the ultimate ends of the life of the individual, the need for answers 
to such questions being likely to have been felt all the more keenly by the Chinese during 
the chaotic and war-torn centuries which followed the collapse of the Han. Buddhism 
with its elaborate metaphysics answered this need, as did Daoism.
The Buddha Dharma in turn appeared to suffer from certain defects. Within the 
context of this system, with its stress on the emptiness (kong空, śūnya) of all conditioned 
phenomena and on personal salvation, it is understandably difficult to see what place 
there could be for the concerns of social organization and the establishment of proper 
human relationships, which were of paramount importance to Confucians. Add to this the 
great popularity of Buddhism, and a growing voice of protest from the Confucian camp 
was inevitable. But the way to go for Confucianism could not be back to its former state 
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of relative indifference to metaphysical concerns, so Confucianism was forced to develop 
a metaphysics of its own which would answer the same needs as those addressed by 
Buddhism while serving also as a foundation upon which the core Confucian values 
could be established. For this we had to wait until the Song Dynasty (960 – 1279), when 
several thinkers from the Confucian fold would arise, many of their ideas eventually to be 
woven together into a grand system at the hands of the arch-philosopher, Zhu Xi.48
Zhu Xi was born in 1130 in the coastal province of Fujian 福建 in southern China, 
three years after the founding of the Southern Song Dynasty. During his life he served on 
and off in various governmental positions, generally preferring, in the words of Wing-tsit 
Chan, ‘a life of peace and poverty’49, though he often memorialized the throne to offer 
advice on various matters, his advice just as often unwittingly incurring the displeasure of 
people in positions of power in the Imperial Court. So much so, that in the closing years 
of his life he was accused by a censor of various crimes including the spreading of ‘false 
learning’, and even threatened with capital punishment. Stripped of all his posts, Zhu 
finally passed away in 1200, but the extent of his influence by then could be seen from 
the fact that his funeral was attended by nearly a thousand people.50
The Song Dynasty was a time of great commercial, intellectual and cultural activity in 
China, though unfortunately under constant threat as well from hostile peoples living in 
the North. The epochal invention of moveable type by Bi Sheng 畢昇 greatly facilitated 
the circulation of ideas through the agency of the printed word. Scientists such as Shen 
Gua 沈括 and Su Song 蘇頌 made important contributions to the study of medicine and 
of geophysical and astronomical phenomena. All these would no doubt have exerted an 
influence on Zhu Xi, who according to Yung Sik Kim ‘constantly referred’ to Shen Gua’s
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work.51 Landscape painting during this time was also to reach a new maturity, guided, in 
the words of contemporary art historian James Cahill, by an attempt ‘to comprehend the 
physical world intuitively.’ 52 Cahill asserted that the Song landscape artist’s work 
‘reveals his conviction of a coherence and order underlying surface appearances in 
nature,’53 which was ‘the same conviction that inspired Sung philosophers to erect the 
vast and orderly structure of the Neo-Confucian cosmology.’54 And Zhu Xi was the very 
pinnacle of Song philosophical thought. Thus the said conviction could very well have 
been ‘in the air’ already during Zhu’s time, merely waiting to be clearly articulated in a 
body of ideas and concepts.
Zhu’s literary output was, in one word, awesome. The Zhuzi Yulei55 朱子語類
(Recorded Conversations of Master Zhu) alone, a compilation by his students of his 
views on diverse topics, comprises 140 Books spanning eight volumes in a contemporary 
edition, a total of 3,343 closely printed pages. It is this work which shall constitute the 
primary (though not the only) source of reference for his thought in the present thesis.
 2.2 The Religious Side of Zhu Xi
There exists much discussion on just what religion consists in. We shall bypass all of 
it and understand by an examination of the religious side of Zhu Xi simply an attempt to 
answer the following two questions: (1) what he was seriously persuaded of were aspects 
of reality which transcend the limitations of mundane or mortal existence, and from 
which the rest of creation, especially humankind, derives its existence — or at least 
fundamental aspects thereof, and not necessarily in the ex nihilo sense — while
‘deferring’ to it as some kind of norm or ideal, or source of norms or ideals, to be sought 
or followed; and (2) what he held to be the main directions in which human life should be 
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oriented, the values and ultimate telos by which a human being should abide or be 
guided. Clearly these would be largely determined by (1). I single out (1) and (2) because 
they are arguably the central and definitive elements in any religion; the dissenting reader 
is invited to name a third essential element, or to provide an example of a religion in 
which either (1) or (2) are absent, or both. To call such a body of thought a religion 
would seem a contradiction in terms. Certainly it seems inappropriate to consider as 
religions such creeds as Darwinism, socialism or the whole ethos of modern industrial 
capitalism.56
It can be readily seen that both (1) and (2) have a serious bearing on what relationship 
with science a religion (or philosophy with religious leanings) would be likely to 
establish. With respect to (2), a religion which for whatever doctrinal reasons deems the 
study of Nature’s workings a pointless or even blasphemous undertaking would clearly
differ in its relationship with science from a religious tradition which happens to assign 
an affirmative role to such a pursuit — such as Zhu Xi’s system, as we shall see. As for 
(1), a belief in a conscious, anthropomorphic super-being (or a host of several such 
beings) who deliberately exercises control over all events which transpire in the Universe 
is again unlikely to relate to science in the same way as a religion which posits instead, 
say, an impersonal and universally applicable process of causation underlying all 
phenomena, such as the doctrine of ‘co-dependent arising’ (yuanqi 緣起 , pratītya 
samutpāda) in Buddhism. Thus determining what Zhu Xi stated in his system with 
respect to (1) and (2) would be of critical importance in investigating the nature of the 
relationship between the religious and scientific aspects of his thought.
Let us begin with (1) by examining Zhu Xi’s conception of the Universe. In Zhu’s 
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cosmology, two fundamental constituents comprise all events and entities in the whole 
sweep of existence, namely li and qi. Qi may be understood simply as matter in all its 
manifestations, but as Joseph Needham pointed out, it has also been applied to various 
kinds of forces in traditional usage, particularly those of a subtle nature, so he opted for 
the term matter-energy as a translation, matter being found to be a form of energy in 
modern science.57 As for li, the li of any entity is what confers on it its characteristic 
forms and patterns of behavior: ‘All things under Heaven have a reason for why they are 
as they are (suoyiran所以然) and a norm to follow as a matter of course (suodangran所
當然); this is what is meant by li. 天下之物，則必各有所以然之故與所當然之則，所
謂理也。’58 Li is supposed to be non-physical by nature — ‘above physical form’ or 
xingershang形而上. ‘Xing [the fundamental nature of any entity, equated by Zhu with li] 
is above physical form, qi below physical form (xingerxia). What is above physical form 
is all Heaven’s li, and what is below physical form is just the dregs.性是形而上者，氣
是形而下者，形而上者全是天理，形而下者只是那查滓。’59 If we were to employ
the analogy of a house as suggested by the Twentieth Century Confucian philosopher 
Feng Youlan (Fung Yu-Lan),60 qi would correspond to the bricks, concrete, plastering
and other material components that make up the house, while li would correspond to the 
blueprint.
The temptation here to compare Zhu with what one finds in classical Greek 
philosophy clearly offers itself. Julia Ching and Feng Youlan both noted that li was 
supposed to be the embodiment of the Highest Good, just like Plato’s Forms or 
Aristotle’s God. But important differences exist as well. Unlike Platonic Forms, the li do 
not exist in some World of Ideal Forms, but are inherent in things themselves. Zhu Xi 
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stated clearly in the Recorded Conversations that li and qi can never exist separately: 
‘Under Heaven there has never been qi without li, nor li without qi. 天下未有無理之
氣，亦未有無氣之理。’61 This is why the label of dualism, at first sight so well-suited 
to Zhu’s world-view, can in fact be applied to it only with qualifications. Also, unlike 
Aristotelian Forms, which are active in relation to matter, li is actually passive in relation 
to qi. Needham therefore suggested that the most appropriate way to think of li would 
probably be as ‘force fields’ that organize matter into various forms, not unlike magnetic 
fields, which cause iron filings in their vicinity to arrange themselves into all sorts of 
patterns.62
Here again, though, there are limitations with this analogy. Iron filings in modern 
understanding are but passively pushed and pulled about by magnetic fields from outside, 
whereas for Zhu the li of an entity is also its xing, its original or fundamental nature, by 
virtue of which it behaves in various ways which it ‘considers’ to be ‘a matter of course’. 
Li is therefore not to be thought of as an external force that imposes patterns of behavior 
on the Ten Thousand Things, but more like an inner inclination on their part to behave in 
accordance with these patterns. The statement ‘Xing is li’ appears several times in Books
4 and 5 of the Recorded Conversations. ‘Chengzi’s (Cheng Yi 程頤, 1033 – 1107) 
saying, ‘Xing is indeed li,’ is truly well-said. 程子性即理也，此說最好。’63 ‘Xing is 
just li. Yet without that qi from Heaven and substance from Earth, this li will then have 
no place to reside.性只是理。然無那天氣地質，則此理没安頓處。’64 ‘Xing is just li. 
The xing of qi and substances comes from here as well. 性只是理。氣質之性，亦只是
這裏出。’65 ‘Xing is indeed li. The li of that which is a matter of course is never not
good. 性即理也。當然之理，無有不善者。’66 And all things have their own xing. 
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‘Under Heaven there is nothing which is without xing. Where there is such an entity, 
there would be such a xing; if there were no such entity, there would be no such xing. 天
下無無性之物。蓋有此物，則有此性；無此物，則無此性。’67 Needham’s analogy,
therefore, would require some modification whereby the magnetic field is thought of as 
being in a way already present within each grain of iron filing, not outside of it.
But is all this to be taken to mean that there are many different li, one for each entity 
or category of entities? No; li actually should be referred to in singular. There is only one
li, though it may exhibit multiplicity in its manifestations in the concrete world: 
Someone inquired on li and qi. Zhu replied: ‘Yichuan68 said it well; he said that li is one but 
its manifestations are many. Speaking of the totality of Heaven and Earth and the Ten Thousand 
Things, there is only one li, but as to people, each person still has a li of his/her own.問理與氣。
曰：‘伊川說得好，曰：理一分殊。合天地萬物而言，只是一箇理；及在人，則又各自有
一箇理。’69
This single li Zhu equated at times with the Taiji or ‘Supreme Ultimate’, the ultimate 
ontological principle conceived of by the Northern Song philosopher Zhou Dunyi, one of 
the pioneers of Song Confucianism whose ideas were drawn upon by Zhu. Thus in Book 
94 of the Recorded Conversations where Zhu discusses Zhou’s Taiji, he remarks: ‘The 
Taiji is not a separate entity in its own right… it is but a li. Because it reaches the 
ultimate, it is therefore called the Taiji.太極非是别爲一物。。。只是一箇理而已。因
其極之，故名曰太極。’70 ‘Someone asked: ‘What is called Taiji in the Taiji diagram —
is it xing?’ Zhu replied: ‘Indeed. This is li.’ 因問：太極圖所謂太極， 莫便是性否？
曰：然。此是理也。’71
A question likely to arise in one’s mind, upon hearing of Zhu’s conception of li as
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xing, would be whether all things under Heaven, and for that matter li itself, are actually 
possessed of consciousness. To speak of all aspects of creation as having an inclination to 
follow certain patterns of behavior, which is said to constitute their nature, would appear 
to suggest some form of consciousness inherent in all of them whereby they would 
exhibit such preferences. The issue here bears some resemblance to the question whether 
the Western notion of ‘Laws of Nature’ implies a supernatural lawgiver and law enforcer.
Indeed on this score some have even asked of Zhu if li might not alternatively be styled 
the zhuzai, a conscious and supreme controlling force reigning over all — a conception of 
li which probably would leave little difference between it and the Judeo-Christian God.
What is Zhu’s stand on these views and ideas?
Question: Is the Mind of Heaven and Earth also intelligent? Or does It just leave things
indifferently to run their courses, with no deliberations? Answer: It cannot be said of the Mind of 
Heaven and Earth that It has no intelligence, yet it is not like human thoughts and concerns. As 
Yichuan said: ‘Heaven and Earth create and transform without having any mind of their own. The 




Question: [With reference to] the Mind of Heaven and Earth and the Principle of Heaven and 
Earth, Principle is moral principle. Does Mind mean the will of a master? Answer: By the Mind is 
meant the will of a master, it is true, but what is called master is precisely Principle itself. It is not 






If [Heaven and Earth] have no mind, bulls should then give birth to horses and plum blossoms 
appear on peach trees, yet they are all by themselves fixed [in definite patterns of behavior from 
which they do not deviate].若果無心，則須牛生出馬，桃樹上發李花，他又却自定。74
Heaven and Earth have no other business except to have the Mind to produce things. The 
material force of one origin (the Great Ultimate including principle and material force) revolves 




Heaven and Earth reach all things with this Mind. When man receives it, it then becomes the 
human mind. When things receive it, it becomes the mind of things (in general)… All of these are 
simply the One Mind of Heaven and Earth. Thus we must understand in what sense Heaven and 




What these passages from the Conversations present to us is a portrait of li as a 
supreme mind, the Mind of Heaven and Earth, which gives rise incessantly to new 
creation and confers order and regularity upon what would be otherwise a chaotic 
Universe in which ‘bulls give birth to horses and plum blossoms appear on peach trees’, 
yet does not do so in a deliberate manner (as the Judeo-Christian God would), being 
unrestricted by the notion of mind in the normal human sense of having ‘thoughts and 
concerns’, it being in this sense that Heaven and Earth are said to have no mind. Rather 
the Mind of Heaven and Earth acts through all creation as ‘the mind of things’, whereby 
they regulate their own behavior in a voluntary manner, not unlike the way the culture of 
a sociocultural milieu acts through its individual members, who of their own accord 
endeavor to abide by certain norms of conduct as dictated by this culture. Such a 
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conception of mind is, to say the least, quite different from the ‘commonsensical’ one 
where minds are viewed as discrete, existing independently of each other, and present 
only in human individuals (and perhaps a few animals as well).
The problem of the apparent contradiction between unity and multiplicity, between 
the one and the many, was another issue which certainly did not evade Zhu’s attention. 
How can we speak of things having different xing while at the same time maintaining that 
there is only one li? An attempt to overcome the seeming contradiction here concerning 
the nature and identity of li is provided by Zhu in Book 18 of the Conversations: 
De Yuan asked: ‘The Ten Thousand Things each have a li, and the Ten Thousand li all come 
from the same source.’ Zhu replied: ‘The Ten Thousand Things all have this li, and the li all come 




An organic conception of reality is plainly outlined here, whereby all aspects of 
existence are viewed as coming together to form a greater whole, like a single living 
human body, the different parts and aspects of which may differ in shape, size, position 
etc, yet behave nonetheless with a certain unison which allows us to view the body as a 
unitary entity. Each of the different parts of the body is assigned specific functions by 
virtue of the special place it occupies; the Ten Thousand Things likewise have their own 
respective functions, conferred unto them by virtue of the special respective places they 
occupy in the cosmic organism. Indeed Zhu himself explicitly made use of the analogy of 
the human body in Book 98 of the Conversations while citing and discussing the ideas of 
Zhang Zai 張載 (1020 – 1077), another Confucian of the Northern Song, one of whose 
most celebrated ideas is precisely this unity of all creation. ‘Hengqu said: ‘What is one is 
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therefore spiritual. Compare it to the human body, the four limbs being all one 
thing…’Coming out from the heart and arriving at the qi, Heaven and Earth and my body 
are all but one thing. 横渠云：一故神。譬之人身，四體皆一物。。。發於心，達於
氣，天地與吾身共只是一團物事。’78 Nor is it a homogenous form of unity which 
admits of no differences; there is both diversity and unity. Clearly the same vision of the 
unity of all things, found earlier in Zhu’s assertion on the mind of people and things 
being simply the One Mind of Heaven and Earth, has merely been given further 
expression, though here the argument focuses on the qi of all things rather than their li.
Now it has been pointed out that Zhu was specifically concerned here with the proper 
norms of conduct required of people occupying different social positions in a society, 
such as those of the ruler, minister etc. The earlier quote from Book 18 continues: ‘For 
example a ruler should be benevolent, a minister respectful, a son filial, and a father kind.
如爲君須仁，爲臣須敬，爲子須孝，爲父須慈。’ Does this mean it would therefore
in fact be inappropriate to apply the idea expressed in this quote to the nonhuman world? 
Would ‘suoju zhiwei’ be on that account more correctly translated as ‘the position held’? 
I beg to differ. It is surely a perfectly logical extension from this original idea (of people 
in different positions conducting themselves accordingly) to that of the many aspects of 
creation each operating within the proper bounds of its nature as assigned to it by the li; 
we need not confine ourselves to the human world in our interpretation of Zhu. Note, too, 
that he spoke of the Ten Thousand Things, not just humans alone. So if we can speak of 
the ruler conducting himself in ways befitting a ruler as required by the li, and likewise 
with ministers, sons etc, there appears no reason why we may not speak as well of 
animals behaving in ways befitting their species by virtue of the li, along with plants, 
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minerals etc. So grass is green because that is what its place in the larger order of Nature 
requires of it, and likewise with the rest of the Ten Thousand Things. (This could have 
interesting implications for how we may understand li, as we shall see.)
Another explanation given by Zhu for the diversity of nature and temperament among 
the Ten Thousand Things, despite the single source of li which they share, entails taking 
into account the different qi endowments of things and of people. Qi may differ in its
quality, so to speak, being clear and transparent in certain entities but not in others, 
whereupon li would manifest itself through them in different degrees.
Someone stated: ‘People and things have the same xing.’ Zhu replied: ‘People and things 
originally have the same xing, only their qi endowments differ. It is like water which is never 
unclear, but assumes a certain colour when placed in a white bowl, another colour when placed in 
a black bowl, and yet another in a green one.’ Zhu said further, ‘Xing is the hardest to talk about. If 
you want to say it’s the same [in all things], that is acceptable, but if you want to say it differs 
[from one thing to another], that is acceptable too. It is like the sun seen through interstices in 





It is interesting to note at this point a certain aversion to what might be termed 
‘conceptual fixation’ in Zhu’s way of reasoning. To assert that the xing of all things is the 
same, and to assert that the xing of one thing differs from that of another, are equally 
acceptable. One is not to restrict oneself to either alternative to the exclusion of the other.
We may also recall Zhu’s counsel on the avoidance of inflexibility in one’s thinking with 
regards to the issue whether Heaven and Earth have a Mind. What this strongly suggests 
is a recognition on Zhu’s part of the limitations of language and concepts, of the need not 
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to be unduly reliant on them in grasping the nature of things, as language and concepts 
often fall short of the reality they purport to describe. 
This avoidance of ‘conceptual fixation’ appears to manifest itself yet again when one
examines Zhu’s views concerning certain issues of major concern in many religions, 
namely the existence of ghosts and spirits and what happens to the human individual at 
death. Does s/he simply dissolve into plain nothingness, or does s/he continue to exist and 
to maintain some form of individual consciousness and identity, say as a ghost? Are there 
such things as ghosts and spirits? At first, given what we have covered so far regarding li
and xing, one would gather that ghosts and spirits have no place in Zhu’s system, nor can 
the prospects of any individual survival be entertained. As best one can only speak of a
sort of Universal Mind, and of a sort of continued post-mortal existence as this Universal 
Mind, not as an individual. This latter point is in fact clearly borne out in a letter written 
by Zhu in reply to a question raised by a student: ‘The Nature of the Universe is my own 
Nature. How, then, can death be accompanied by sudden annihilation?所謂天地之性即
我之性，豈有死而遽亡之理？’ Zhu replied:
As regards this doctrine, it is not, to be sure, quite incorrect. Nevertheless, I do not know 
whether in propounding it, you regard (the Nature of) the Universe as primary, or do you regard 
that of the ego as primary? If you regard that of the Universe as primary, it follows that this Nature 
is then a Principle common to the entire Universe, in which there are therefore no divisions as to 
what pertains to men and what to creatures, what to the ‘that’ and what to the ‘this’… Although 
one is then to say that there is no annihilation at death, this does not mean that there is a survival 





But if you regard (the Nature of) the ego as being primary, this simply means that you 
recognise as existing in your own body a spiritual, soul-like something, having cognition and 
consciousness, which you look upon as being your Nature, and to which you cling in all its 
operations unto death, unwilling to let it go. To call such a thing “death without annihilation” is 
the height of egotistical thinking…若以我爲主，則只是於自己身上認得一箇精神魂魄，有知
有覺之物，即便目爲己性，把持作弄，到死不肯放舍，謂之死而不亡，是乃私意之尤
者。。。
The doctrines of Buddhism are also fundamentally of this sort… But if such (a doctrine) were 
really true, it would mean that within the single Nature belonging to the Universe there were to 
exist innumerable other separate Natures of men and creatures. Each of these Natures would have 
its own particular domain, without impinging one upon the other. (The creatures possessing these 




Thus in so far as one’s xing is but a temporal manifestation of the universal li, and not 
a self-sufficient li in its own right (such a thing being inconceivable in Zhu’s system) 
there can be no individual soul or spirit which survives death. One also finds in Book 3 of 
the Conversations a discussion on ghosts and spirits, where again the possibility of such 
survival is dismissed out of hand and the terms ‘ghost’ (gui鬼) and ‘spirit’ (shen神) also
have their meanings being altered so that they now refer to purely Natural phenomena. 
‘Shen means to extend; gui means to contract. As when a storm breaks, that is shen, and 
when the storm subsides, that is gui. Gui and shen are but the waxing and waning of yin
and yang. 神，伸也；鬼，屈也。如風雨雷電初發時，神也；及至風止雨過，雷住
電息，則鬼也。鬼神不過陰陽消長而已。’81 ‘Gui and shen are but qi. Contracting and 
extending, going and coming, that is qi. 鬼神只是氣。屈伸往來者，氣也。’82 ‘When 
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qi condenses, there is life, but when qi disperses, death results.氣聚則生，氣散則
死。’83 ‘The shen of the Earth consists merely in such kinds of phenomena as the 
spawning of the Ten Thousand Things or the arising of clouds from mountains and 
ravines.地之神，只是萬物發生，山川出雲之類。’84
To be sure, Zhu did allow for cases where an individual’s qi would not disperse at 
death, but contended that they are unnatural exceptions caused by things such as self-
inflicted injury. ‘Those who rest peacefully at death come to nothingness naturally. Who 
ever saw Yao and Shun become ghosts！安於死者便自無，何曾見堯舜做鬼來！’85
It comes as a surprise after the above to learn that Zhu himself actually made 
sacrifices to Confucius and prayed to deities!86 Nor were these regular and perfunctory 
routines performed by Confucians before and during Zhu’s time; according to Wing-tsit 
Chan, ‘Zhu Xi was perhaps the only one who performed such ceremonies as an 
official.’87 He also performed them only on special occasions which he deemed of great 
significance, and judging from the appeals he made to Confucius and the other spirits 
during such ceremonies, it was evident, Chan commented, that ‘he believed that the spirit
of Confucius existed somewhere.’88 (The other spirits he appealed to, or for whom he had 
shrines erected, included those of the earlier Confucians of the Song and the statesman 
and military strategist Zhuge Liang.) This is in apparent contradiction to his earlier stance 
of dismissal on ghosts and spirits and on post-mortal survival.
Contemporary scholar Hoyt Tillman has argued that Zhu’s offerings to the spirits 
could be part of an attempt to lend legitimacy to his idea of the daotong. It was observed 
by Tillman that ‘in sacrificial rites to the sages, Zhu Xi’s statements provide evidence of 
treating sages as imagined ancestors’89, and that ‘Confucius appears to have occupied a 
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special place in Zhu Xi’s rituals, and he even made confessional prayers to Confucius 
that appear to suggest a kind of fictive familial tie’90. Tillman was eventually to draw the 
conclusion that
Since he portrayed the spirits as coming down from Tian above in response to his sacrificial 
offerings and ensuring that nothing was lost in his inheritance of the dao, he obviously felt that he 
had met his own expressed qualifications for being the proper person qualified to contact the 
spirits of the sages, especially the spirit of Confucius.91
We have seen earlier how a daotong would be of value for Zhu’s purpose of 
propagating his views and ideas. But the question here is: why did he not then simply 
discard the view that people come to nothing at death and fully endorse the view that 
people live on as spirits after death?
Matters are made even more complicated by the fact that the practice of propitiating 
the spirits through rituals was endorsed by none other than some of the classical texts of 
Confucian thought. The texts spoke quite unambiguously of the existence of spirits and
spelt out elaborate rituals precisely for the purpose of propitiating them, rituals beings 
one area where Zhu wrote and discussed a great deal as well. The Zhongyong 中庸 or 
Doctrine of the Mean, for example (which Zhu himself extracted from the Liji 禮記 or 
Book of Rites), exclaims in one of its chapters, ‘how abundant is the display of power of 
spiritual beings! 鬼神之爲德，其盛矣乎！’92 In view of the deep respect Zhu had for 
the words of ancient Confucian worthies, how was he to reconcile their affirmation of the 
existence of spirits — and his own affirmation of them through sacrifices and ceremonies 
— with what he had asserted earlier regarding the non-existence of spiritual beings?
This question was in fact presented to him on one occasion, when someone inquired:
‘When a person dies his/her qi disperses and no trace is left, nor are there ghosts and 
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spirits. So when one performs rites and sacrifices today, what is there for one to appeal 
[for anything] from? 人死氣散，是無蹤影，亦無鬼神。今人祭祀，從何而求之？’
Zhu offered the answer that the likeness in qi which obtains between oneself and one’s 
ancestors actually allowed for one to establish through rituals a sympathetic link (gantong
感通) with them, their qi being also reconstituted through such rituals! ‘To consider the 
example of a son offering sacrifices to his ancestors, he calls on them by virtue of the 
congeniality in qi between them and himself. If I employ my qi in such an invocation, it 
is then the qi of my ancestors [which is invoked].如子祭祖先，以氣類而求。以我之氣
感召，便是祖先之氣。’93 ‘The descendants are still the qi of the ancestor. His/her qi
may have dispersed, yet his/her roots are still here, so through the utmost sincerity and 
respect, it is still possible to invoke his/her qi and gather it here.畢竟子孫是祖先之氣。
他氣雖散，他根却在這裏；盡其誠敬，則亦能呼召得他氣聚在此。’94
But what about those spirits to whose line of descent one does not belong, who are 
therefore unrelated to oneself — the spirit of Confucius, for example? Zhu’s answer is 
that in a sense we are all related.
Yet as to those to whom sacrifices are made, there are none with whom a sympathetic link 
could not be effected through the different manifestations of their qi. All of creation originally 
flows forth from one source, with no intervening divisions; this is so even with Heaven and Earth, 
mountains and ravines, and ghosts and spirits. 但所祭者，其精神魂魄，無不感通。蓋本從一
源中流出，初間無隔，雖天地山川鬼神亦然也。
95
With all due respect for Zhu Xi, there is much to be desired of his attempts at 
resolving the contradictions found in his views on ghosts and spirits. Their rather ad hoc
nature aside, these attempted solutions actually multiply the problems. For one thing, 
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what is the existential status of a deceased person during the time that no one is 
sacrificing to him/her? Does s/he exist or does s/he not exist? Also, since my great-
grandfather, my grandfather and myself all have similar qi on account of belonging to the 
same lineage, what is it that identifies my great-grandfather as my great-grandfather, and 
my grandfather as my grandfather, so that they would be distinguished from each other 
and consequently it would not be the former’s qi which would be mistakenly gathered 
when I perform a ritual intended for the latter? To speak of a separate, independent li for 
each of them, which would then distinguish them clearly, is out of the question in Zhu’s 
system, as we have seen. Further problems could probably be enumerated.
I would like to suggest that an alternative avenue towards overcoming the 
contradictions found in Zhu’s assertions on ghosts, spirits and post-mortal survival could 
lie in taking each of these assertions as expressing only a partial truth, as telling only a 
part of the story, the same way each of the two statements, ‘xing is the same in all things’ 
and ‘xing differs from one thing to another’, expresses only a partial truth. To both we 
may grant a certain degree of validity, but neither tells the whole story. It may well be the 
same with the pair of statements, ‘an individual is no more at death’ and ‘an individual 
continues to exist after death’.
The two statements appear so mutually contradictory at first, it can be difficult to see 
how one could accept both at the same time at all. An illustration from Buddhism should 
help in this respect. As we know, Buddhism — at least the Theravāda school — denies 
the existence of an enduring, self-sufficient substance called ‘the self’; what we 
commonly refer to as a human individual is but a combination of elements in constant 
flux, changing from moment to moment. Now, is this to be taken to mean that, where we 
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normally would look and recognize ‘a person’, there is really nothing there, no entity 
possessed of subjective awareness, intellect, sensations and feelings? That would be 
plainly ridiculous and Buddhists themselves would be the first to say so; after all, 
delivering sentient beings from suffering is the very raison d’tre of Buddhism. The 
notion of the individual being as an unchanging self is indeed a delusion, but so is the 
notion that there are no beings to speak of.
The Buddhist stand on the matter is that the nature of human existence, indeed of any 
aspect of reality, simply does not lend itself to simple articulations in language and 
concepts. They are not without their uses, but we need to recognize their limitations. As 
the famous simile goes, the finger is not the moon. May not Zhu Xi’s views on ghosts
and spirits be understood in a similar light? Yes, in a sense the individual is no more at 
death; his/her qi has dispersed and s/he no longer goes on in the same way s/he did when 
alive. Yet in a sense s/he still lives on, as it is possible to commune with him/her through 
rituals and sacrifices. One is not to limit oneself to either alternative.
A very important question to address here concerns what evidence we can supply that 
Zhu himself meant to be understood in this way, or at least would have allowed himself 
to be so understood. The following should provide a clue. On one occasion when 
someone commented that ‘on views regarding life and death, being and nothingness, 
most people are just confused, 死生有無之說，人多惑之。’ Zhu’s advice was, ‘there’s 
no need to be so perplexed, just be without any views of your own for now. 不須如此
疑。且作無主張。’96 Elsewhere he also maintained the need to ‘see things through’ 
(jian de po見得破) before arriving at conclusions as to their validity or acceptability, and 
to desist from such conclusions so long as doubts are present. ‘Again as for examples like 
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doctrines on past and future lives, and on becoming a human again after death, one also 
has to see things through. 又如前生後生，死複爲人之說，亦須要見得破。’97 (It is 
most interesting here to note that Zhu was prepared to grant reincarnation doctrines the 
benefit of doubt, rather than dismiss them out of hand, his general aversion towards 
Buddhism notwithstanding.) What all these suggest is that he was not exclusively 
committed to any of the views he had propounded earlier on ghosts, spirits etc; had he 
been fully committed, say, to the view that human individuals simply dissolve into 
nothingness at death as their qi is dispersed, there would have been every reason to 
expect him simply to assert this view rather than offering advice on being without any 
views and ‘seeing things through’.
Zhu was also asked on one occasion, regarding sacrifices, whether they serve merely 
as a means of expressing one’s sincerity or whether there actually are spirits coming to 
accept the sacrifices, whereupon he replied, ‘If you say that nothing comes, then why 
sacrifice?... But, if you say that some spirit comes riding in a chariot, that is just wild talk.
若道無物來享時，自家祭甚底？。。。若道真有雲車擁從而來，又妄誕。’98 Here 
again we see the same refusal to commit oneself fully to either view to the exclusion of 
the other.
We may therefore draw the conclusion that Zhu’s stand on the existence of ghosts and 
spirits, and on the status of the individual at death, is one which steers clear of settling 
down to any one view to the exclusion of others, in recognition of the limitations inherent 
in them. Each of them might tell a part — though only a part — of the story; the reality of 
the matter simply does not allow for simple assertions like ‘This is true, and that isn’t.’
Here, then, we find another example of Zhu’s avoidance of ‘conceptual fixation’.
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(A certain clarification, incidentally, is quite in order here. In citing the example from 
Buddhism earlier on to illustrate the problem with ‘conceptual fixation’, the present 
author emphatically has no intention of suggesting that Zhu consciously and directly 
adopted this kind of thinking from Buddhism. Exactly what Zhu might have consciously 
and unconsciously adopted from Buddhism is a large topic which warrants separate 
treatment altogether; here the Buddhist illustration is cited strictly for elucidatory 
purposes.)
One point which speaks in great favor of this way of thinking is that it works against 
religious dogmatism, which is nothing if not an uncompromising and rigid adherence to 
fixed views and ideas. No view or idea can ever give the whole picture, so being attached 
to any views or ideas is something to be avoided. Reality is ultimately ineffable. (Recall 
Zhu’s couplet, cited by Julia Ching.) The qualm might be raised, though, whether this 
merely amounts to a kind of philosophical indecisiveness which might actually prove 
inimical to science. Is science not all about clarity and precision, where all propositions 
are either true or false with no middle ground to speak of? In which case how much 
concord with science may we hope to find in Zhu’s philosophy? This is an important 
question, to which we shall return in a later chapter on the scientific side of Zhu Xi.
Ultimately, true to the Confucian tradition, all concerns with ghosts, spirits and the 
afterlife take second place in the scheme of things as conceived by Zhu Xi; of greater 
concern to us should be the affairs of living people and of moral cultivation. Hence when 
confronted with issues on ghosts and spirits on yet another occasion, Zhu was to cite the 
following well-known passages from the Analects: “Before I can serve people, how can I 
serve ghosts? Before I know life, how can I know death? 未能事人，焉能事鬼！未知
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生，焉知死！”99 One should instead direct one’s energies to what is close at hand, what 
is urgent and immediate; matters concerning ghosts and the afterlife can take care of 
themselves.
After this long excursion through Zhu Xi’s views on ghosts and the afterlife, let us
return to the issue on qi endowments. Recalling Zhu’s view that qi may be clear and 
transparent in certain entities but not in others, whereupon li would manifest itself 
through them in different degrees, a further difference between humankind and the rest of 
creation is that with the former the obscurement of the li cause by the qi could still be 
remedied, but not the latter.
Someone asked: ‘The xing of people and things come from one source, so how is it that there 
could be differences?’ Zhu replied: ‘One discusses brightness or darkness when it comes to the 
xing of people, and as for the xing of things it is just biased and obstructed. What is dark can be 




Just what is the difference made by the penetrability or otherwise of the qi, and what 
is the significance of this difference? After all, the xing is always there regardless of the 
state of the qi, is it not? The difference is that the extent of one’s direct knowledge or 
awareness of the li, and hence his/her ability to abide by its dictates, varies to the same 
measure as the degree of clarity or penetrability of his/her constituent qi. It is to be noted 
in this respect that li is more than a mere aspect of Nature which accounts for the
different modes of behavior found among the Ten Thousand Things; for Zhu it is also 
supposed to be the embodiment of the highest ideals of moral conduct, the basis of all 
proper human relationships and of all that is morally good and right. (This is yet another 
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point which further limits the magnetic field analogy provided by Needham.) ‘Someone 
inquired on the Taiji. Zhu replied: ‘The Taiji is but a supremely good and beneficent 
principle. All people have a Taiji, all things have a Taiji.’或問太極。曰：太極只是箇
極好至善底道理。人人有一太極，物物有一太極。’101 The Taiji, it will be recalled, 
was equated by Zhu with li. Elsewhere we also read:
In the Universe there is but one li; Heaven receives it to be Heaven, Earth receives it to be 
Earth, and whatever arises between Heaven and Earth receives it as its xing. Extended, it is the 
Three Bonds [of ruler and minister, father and son, and husband and wife]; viewed as a body of 
norms, it is the Five Relationships [which are the Three Bonds plus the relationships of elder and 
younger brother and of friends] … 宇宙之間一理而已，天得之而爲天，地得之而爲地，而凡
生於天地之間者，又各得之以爲性，其張之爲三綱，其紀之爲五常。。。
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The following quotes also show clearly Zhu’s association of the individual’s moral 
development with the state of his/her constituent qi:
…yet those endowed with qi that is pure and clear are sages and worthies, like a precious pearl 
placed in clear water; those endowed with murky qi are those lacking intelligence or virtue, like a 
pearl in murky water. By ‘manifesting the clear character’ (ming ming de) is meant cleansing this 
pearl which is in murky water.但禀氣之清者，爲聖爲賢，如寶珠在清冷水中；禀氣之濁者，
爲愚爲不肖，如珠在濁水中。所謂明明德者，是就濁水中揩拭此珠也。
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Someone asked again, ‘Qi may be clear or murky but the li is always the same. How so?’ Zhu 
replied, ‘Surely it is so. Li is like a precious pearl; in sages it is as if placed in clear water, its 
brilliance naturally manifested. In those lacking in intelligence or virtue, it is as if placed in murky 




Thus li is the ultimate source of all morality and it is our constituent qi that is 
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accountable for ‘the lack of intelligence or virtue’. This qi may veil our minds, so to 
speak, from the full realization of our original nature, depending on its state — whether it 
is pure and clear, or murky and clouded. In the former case our original nature will not be 
obscured and hence our conduct will be in accordance with li, but in the latter the 
beclouding of our original goodness will incline us towards thoughts and acts which are 
morally less than delectable, even though the original goodness is never lost or destroyed. 
As for the rest of creation, such as the animals, their qi is just ‘biased and obstructed’ —
it is so irremediably dense there is no way the light of their li could ever shine through to 
the same extent as in humankind; at best, according to Zhu, faint glimpses of the pearl’s 
light would at times be allowed by and shine through their constituent qi, and these would 
manifest themselves as rudimentary forms of moral behavior in the animal kingdom, such 
as ‘the sense of parent and child among tigers and wolves, or of ruler and minister among 
bees and ants.虎狼之父子，蜂蟻之君臣。’105
Given, then, that it is only with us humans that the inner illumination by the li is a 
possibility and that this is what edifies us morally, do any means exist for bringing it 
about? Here we may finally turn to the second aspect of Zhu’s religious thought, namely 
the values and ultimate telos by which human life should be guided. Given that li is the 
ultimate source and standard of all moral excellence, it quickly becomes evident that full 
understanding of the li, leading to a life lived in perfect accordance with its dictates — in 
other words, the exalted goal of sagehood in Confucianism — should constitute the 
supreme direction towards which all human life should be oriented. How is this to be 
achieved, then? The familiar recommendations of curbing our desires and being 
constantly watchful of our minds are found in Zhu as in most Confucians, and it poses no
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difficulty to see how these practices lead towards moral development. Also to be found 
are recommendations and instructions for the practice of a form of meditation to cultivate 
the mind, known as ‘quiet-sitting’ (jingzuo 静坐). But Zhu in addition advocated gewu 
zhizhi格物致知, the investigation of things to extend one’s knowledge.
Now how would ‘the investigation of things’ contribute to the goal of understanding 
the li, and hence to a life lived in accordance with it? Just what did Zhu mean by ‘the 
investigation of things’? We find one of the best-known occurrences of the term gewu in
the Great Learning (Daxue 大學), one of the Four Books of the Confucian Canon, in 
which gewu was advocated as a means to moral development. In this respect an 
explanation of what gewu is can be found in Zhu’s Commentary on the Great Learning
(Daxue Zhangju):
By ‘the extension of knowledge consists in the investigation of things’ is meant this: if we 
wish to extend our knowledge to the utmost, we should attend to things around us and study their 
li exhaustively. The intelligence of the human mind is never without the propensity for knowing, 
and of all things under Heaven, none are ever without li. It is only because li has not been 
exhaustively investigated that our knowledge is incomplete. Hence the Daxue’s first teaching is to 
instruct the learner, with respect to all things under Heaven, never not to seek to increasingly 





That gewu is intended primarily to serve the purpose of moral development can also 
be seen in Book 60 of the Conversations, where we find Zhu discussing a proposition 
from the Mencius, another of the Four Books: ‘To develop one’s mind (xin) to the utmost 
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(jin) is to know one’s nature. 盡其心者，知其性也。’107 Zhu ties this in closely with 
gewu. ‘Knowing one’s nature is like things being investigated, developing one’s mind to 
the utmost like knowledge being brought to completion. 知性猶物格，盡心猶知
至。’108 Indeed Zhu went even further, declaring that ‘As one’s nature is known, things 
are investigated; as one’s mind is developed to the utmost, knowledge is brought to 
completion.知性者，物格也；盡心者，知至也。’109
Hence, gewu is intended not for the sake of satisfying one’s intellectual curiosity, but 
primarily for the purpose of moral development. The question here is: could gewu
possibly lead to moral development at all? How is a mere increase in my knowledge of 
the nature of things supposed to make me a morally better person? Is Zhu not getting 
himself confused here between the different domains of human thought, mainly the moral 
and the cognitive? A brief review of Zhu’s conception of li provides the answer: li being 
the fountainhead of all moral values, one’s knowledge of them naturally grows in 
proportion to one’s knowledge of li. Also, Zhu’s vision of all creation as a unified whole 
on account of sharing the same li would naturally entail an augmented awareness of this 
unity once our knowledge of li is increased through the investigation of things — one 
important aspect of this unity being the unity of self and other. It then becomes clear that 
the well-being of others and oneself are inseparable, that whatever one does unto others, 
one does unto oneself; and one’s thoughts and actions would henceforth be guided by this 
insight, its morally edifying nature now evident.110
An alternative way of understanding this unity is actually available which would have 
a special bearing on how morality is necessitated in Zhu’s thought. The alternative is that 
proposed by contemporary scholar Galia Patt-Shamir, who sought in an article ‘to show 
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that moral life is its own foundation’111 in the context of neo-Confucian thought by 
demonstrating that the concepts employed in this school of thought ‘do not endow 
Confucianism with an external foundation, but rather with an internal ethical one’.112
Patt-Shamir’s understanding of the way the whole is conceived of in neo-Confucianism is 
summarized as follows:
The relation between the ultimate and the myriad of things can roughly be put such that “things” 
exist in one organic whole; this whole is the Great Ultimate, and anything included in it is an 
essential characteristic or aspect of this whole. Accordingly, morality is related to the Great 
Ultimate as an essential characteristic of the whole.113
The rest of the article appears as an analysis of abstract concepts, of humanity being 
origination and being substance and function, and so on. As far as I understand Patt-
Shamir, the ‘things’ discussed here that ‘exist in one organic whole’ appear to refer more 
to concepts than to real, living creatures. The concept ‘morality’ is related to the concept 
‘Great Ultimate’ as an essential part of it. What is discussed here is a unity of abstract 
concepts, not of flesh-and-blood people and living things.
The question here is: how does it follow from all these that I should be moral? How is 
morality necessitated by being ‘related to the Great Ultimate as an essential characteristic 
of the whole’? Could one not claim that immorality is likewise necessitated, being 
presumably ‘an essential characteristic of the whole’ as well by virtue of the simple fact 
that it exists? With all due respect for Patt-Shamir, this unity of abstractions, novel and 
interesting though it may be as an interpretation of neo-Confucian thought, appears 
somewhat unsatisfactory as a means of establishing the need for morality. If instead the 
unity in question were that of all life, understood here simply as the totality of all living 
beings, then the story would be different. I would then refrain from harming others and 
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seek their well-being for the reason that I form a unity with them, the same way my teeth
would refrain from biting my hands for the reason that they form a unity by virtue of 
belonging to the same individual organism. Going by this way of understanding, it will 
not be for the reason that ‘morality is related to the Great Ultimate’ that I should be 
moral, but for the reason that all living beings are related to me.
This understanding of unity would seem more in concord with what Zhu Xi and other 
Song Confucians had in mind. Recall Zhu Xi’s appropriation of Zhang Zai’s vision of all 
things forming a single living body, a vision shared by another major Confucian of the 
Song, Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032 – 1085), who compared the absence of ren to a limb that 
has grown numb:
The benevolent regards heaven and earth and the myriad things as one substance, so that 
nothing is not himself. If you can recognise them as yourself, which of them will be beyond your 
range? If they do not belong to yourself, of course they do not concern yourself, as when hands 
and feet are “unfeeling”, and the ch’i has failed to circulate through, so that they all cease to 
belong to oneself. 仁者，以天地萬物爲一體，莫非己也。認得爲己，何所不至？若不有諸
己，自不與己相干。如手足不仁，氣已不貫，皆不屬己。
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It is significant here that buren不仁, being ‘unfeeling’ or lacking in ren, is used here 
to describe a Natural phenomenon, namely a limb that has turned numb. As shall be seen, 
this use of moral concepts in understanding Natural phenomena is of the greatest 
significance for our exploration of the relationship between the religious and scientific 
sides of Zhu Xi.
But to return to the individual who realizes this unity of all life through gewu.
Viewing all beings as his/her brethren by virtue of sharing one and the same source of 
being, the li, the individual enlightened through gewu would naturally empathize with 
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their joys and sorrows, and accordingly take it upon him/herself to work for the weal of 
all. In this respect s/he becomes the shengren 聖人 or sage, the summum bonum of 
Confucianism, who ‘forms a trinity with Heaven and Earth’ and fulfills the classical 
Confucian ideal of ‘cultivating one’s own person, putting one’s family in order, ruling the 
state well and bringing peace to all under Heaven’ (xiushen qijia zhiguo pingtianxia修身
齊家治國平天下). Such a person also appears likely to be elevated into an exalted state 
of lasting felicity and beatitude. One major reason, it can be argued, would lie in the 
eradication of the fear of death. To identify with the li, the Mind of Heaven and Earth, of 
which one’s own mind or being is after all a temporal manifestation and with which it is 
therefore ultimately one, is surely to enter a state beyond the reach of birth and death —
the grave loses its sting here indeed. Another source of joy could be found in that sense of 
consanguinity with all of life arising from one’s intimation of the li, the One Thread in 
which all of life partakes; it then becomes plainly impossible to experience any sense of 
alienation from the rest of existence. A deep sense of freedom is likely to be experienced 
as well by such an individual, being so attuned to the li that his/her thoughts and acts all 
abide by its dictates naturally and without effort, so that s/he could ‘follow my heart’s 
desire without going against what is right’ like Confucius at the age of seventy.115 We 
have already found direct and indirect hints at all these in Zhu’s own words.116
The overwhelming temptation here, with which I am certain Julia Ching would have 
sympathized, is to make comparisons with the accounts provided by the mystics of other 
traditions, such as Sufism and Vedānta, in which are also found the idea of an ineffable,
transcendent reality underlying and unifying all of existence, and of inspired states of 
being attained through intimations of this reality, involving a sense of unity with all of 
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life. (I am not stating explicitly here a philosophical case for the actual existence of such 
a reality, or for viewing these traditions as identical, merely hinting at certain openings 
into further avenues of research on the special similarities between Zhu Xi and other 
traditions, which might prove highly fruitful.) After all is said and done, however, there is 
the issue whether gewu really does lead to a greater knowledge of li — specifically, li as
the fountainhead of all moral values — and if so how. And all this is not asking if indeed 
there is a li at all, which, alas, we can hardly take for granted. We have already touched 
on some of the issues involved in our discussion on the work of authors like Zhao Feng 
and Jin Chunfeng. All these we shall have to discuss at greater length later.
We may now recount the major points comprising the religious dimension of Zhu 
Xi’s thought: (a) the existence of an ubiquitous li which confers upon all entities in 
existence their characteristic features and modes of behavior; (b) the identification of this 
li with the xing or nature of the said entities; (c) the ultimately ineffable nature of this li, 
as can be seen in its simultaneous embodiment of apparently mutually contradictory 
attributes, such as being both unitary and plural, or being non-deliberative in maintaining 
order in the Universe while yet serving as the ‘Mind of Heaven and Earth’; and (d) li as 
the very embodiment of the Highest Moral Good, whereupon knowledge of the li
becomes the supremely important quest for humanity, one avenue to such knowledge 
being gewu or the investigation of things.
In being the ‘Mind of Heaven and Earth’, li confers structure and regularity upon the 
Ten Thousand Things, and also meaning and purpose. All things form a single living 
body; they all have a place within this greater whole, and therefore a role to play in it.
The Universe is not an accidental assemblage of inert particles flying about in a void.
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And speaking of gewu, we come to the scientific aspects of Zhu Xi’s thought. Just 
what affinities are there between Zhu’s thought and modern science — indeed can Zhu’s 
thought be considered scientific in the first place? Let us find out.
 2.3 The Scientific Side of Zhu Xi
It is easy to dismiss Zhu Xi as an unscientific, superstitious person on the grounds 
that he made sacrifices to spirits, consulted the Yijing易經 (Book of Changes) on certain 
occasions for divinatory purposes, and even believed in dragons — which he did, as
witness the following remark made in Book 3 of the Conversations in reply to the qualm 
whether dragons do indeed cause the rain: “It is not that dragons spit out rain from their 
mouths, but rather that as they move around, the rain follows.不是龍口中吐出。只是龍
行時，便有雨隨之。”117 The telos towards which gewu is directed, that of moral 
edification, would appear to bear further witness against viewing Zhu as a man of 
science, as we have seen was maintained by contemporary scholars Chen Lai, Zhao Feng 
and Jin Chunfeng. A closer look at what Zhu had to say regarding gewu, however, 
alongside an enquiry into the exact nature of what we term ‘science’ today, suggests the 
matter may not be that easily decided.
Before proceeding to discuss the scientific dimensions of Zhu’s thought, however, we 
need to attend to an aspect of science in general which would be of special import here. 
There is one prerequisite for all scientific pursuits which would appear so obvious as not 
to require much attention, and that is the correspondence of language and empirical 
reality.118 In science, we always need clear-cut definitions for different entities, classes of 
entities or aspects of empirical reality. They are supposed to be clearly distinguished from 
each other by the definitions; no muddle-headed mixing-up is permissible. The Pole Star 
79
79
is not the same as the Morning Star; a cat is not a dog.119 What gives us pause here is that 
several Western scholars of Chinese thought, as noted by contemporary scholar May Sim, 
have actually argued for the absence of such concern for realism, for linguistic and 
conceptual clarity in the Chinese tradition, at least in ancient times. Thus Sim cites David 
Hall and Roger Ames: ‘The name/thing correlation does not seem to concern Confucius. 
The act of ordering is not one of achieving appropriate reference to things in the world, 
but is an act of tuning the language, the practical consequence of which is to increase 
harmonious activity.’120 Chad Hansen goes even further:
Ancient Chinese philosophy contrasts with ancient Greek philosophy in lacking a 
preoccupation with meanings as expressed in definitions. Socrates and Plato regarded their 
attempts at definition as the crucial method of gaining real knowledge. Neither Confucius, Lao-tzu, 
nor Mencius ever viewed the philosophical task in that way or used definition as a discovery of a 
deeper truth… We might best understand the thrust of Chinese thought in this period by thinking 
of the philosophical schools as being interested in the use of language; they would be interested 
only in accounts of the way words functioned in, say, socialization, problem solving or behavior 
modification.121
Sim could have quoted John Makeham as well, who opined that 
Names, not actualities, were Confucius’ primary concern. He did not regard names as passive 
labels but rather as social and hence political catalysts. This was a function of the performative 
role that names were perceived to play in the networks of social patterns and human relations that 
constituted the underlying structure of li禮 (ritual, propriety).122
In other words, ancient Chinese thought was all about playing ‘word games’, so to 
speak, in the name of promoting social harmony, being unconcerned with the 
correspondences between names and actualities. Even Confucius’ concern with 
zhengming 正名, the ‘rectification of names’ as a means of promoting social order and 
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harmony, boils down supposedly to this. Sim draws the analogy of the creation or 
modification of a system of measurement regarded by all in a social milieu as a common 
standard, such as the Metric System. Such a system would be perfectly arbitrary, 
deferring to nothing in empirical reality, no aspect of which tells me I must make my 
basic unit of length this long and not that long. It is all up to me. Nor does it matter, so 
long as a common system is established whereby the cause of social harmony is served 
through the elimination of disputes which arise from the lack of such a system. 
‘Prominent contemporary Confucian commentators claim that the “rectification of 
names” is ultimately to be understood on something like the model of the conversion of 
measurement systems.’123
Clearly this issue warrants attention, as the implications for the nature of scientific 
thought in the Chinese milieu would be far-reaching, and not in a positive way. Indeed 
one would doubt if any kind of intellectual endeavor recognizable as scientific would 
exist in such a milieu at all. What room can there be for science in a sociocultural milieu 
which cares naught about the correspondences between names and observational facts?
And if Confucius proved guilty of such disregard for realism in the name of social 
harmony, it would not appear unlikely that later Confucians such as Zhu Xi would be 
guilty of the same thing.
Sim, however, begs to differ from the commentators, citing examples from Chinese 
astronomy and medicine as well as passages in the Analects to demonstrate the existence 
of a genuine concern in the Chinese tradition for the correspondence between linguistic 
signifiers and different aspects of empirical reality.124 The more appropriate analogy to 
use for the Chinese experience, Sim maintained, should be the creation or modification of 
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a calendrical system. Yes, such a system serves to promote social order by serving as a 
common standard for the members of a social milieu, just as a measurement system does, 
but unlike a measurement system arbitrariness is out of the question here. The lengths of 
the days, months and years and how they vary, the way this planet moves as opposed to 
that planet, have nothing arbitrary about them, as a consequence of which no calendrical 
system can define the lengths of days or years or the motions of the heavenly bodies as it 
pleased. Instead it must defer to definite facts pertaining to the behavior of certain aspects
of the phenomenal world. In Sim’s own words, ‘The rectification of names is on the 
whole more like the case of calendar reform than it is like the case of measurement 
conversion because it has political causes and consequences, but also makes reference to 
objective conditions that it must track and to which it must adjust.’125
Sim points out to us that Confucius exhorted his students to study the Shijing 詩經
(Book of Songs)126 so as to be familiar with the names of birds, beasts and plants.
…there is nothing sloppy about such knowledge, even if it lacks what we might consider scientific 
precision. One either knows that an osprey is an osprey or not. The most persuasive speaker is 
wrong to call an ostrich an osprey even if he could convince everyone that it is and they could eat 
it because it is tasty.127
We are also reminded of the distinctions made by Confucius between different types 
of people, their social roles, virtues, and vices.
…action and thought about action (such as one finds in the Analects) require correct names that 
amount to adequate definitions of states of character, social roles, and so on. One must know what 
a glib talker is, and what an authoritative speaker is (even if one does not try to formulate a set of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for these) and must refer the proper meaning, correctly, to the 
proper person — otherwise, practice will misfire.128
Hence, at least as far as pre-Qin Chinese thought is concerned, there is little substance 
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in the claim that the Chinese had no interest in matching names with actualities. This 
becomes even more evident as we examine the work done by the ancient Chinese in the 
fields of, say, astronomy and medicine. In astronomy, there were the more regular forms 
of behavior exhibited by the sun, moon and planets in their steady orbits and the less 
regular forms of behavior exhibited by such phenomena as comets and supernovae. ‘Both 
sets of astronomical phenomena are tied up with human life, though in different ways: the 
more regular provide a relatively constant background of influences, whereas the more 
irregular provide omens and portents’. 129 Hence it would have been of the greatest 
importance to identify the different kinds of celestial phenomena clearly and 
unambiguously. Sim quotes Nathan Sivin to the effect that ‘Chinese theory imposed on 
the history of astronomy an insatiable demand for increased precision — far exceeding, 
in the area of the calendar, any conceivable agricultural, bureaucratic, or economic
necessity’.130
A similar concern with matching word and actuality reveals itself in the practice of 
medicine. To focus on herbal medicine alone, its history in China goes as far back as a 
document titled the Wushier Bingfang五十二病方(Prescriptions for Fifty-two Diseases), 
said to be one of the oldest pharmaceutical works in Chinese history, predating the 8th
Century BC. More than two hundred prescriptions are spelt out in this work, ‘over two-
thirds of which were combination formulae containing two or more components’131
according to contemporary researchers.
Shen Gua, a near-contemporary of Zhu Xi mentioned before, also did much work on 
herbal medicine. In particular he was greatly concerned with mismatches between name 
and actuality in pharmacological documents, identifying such problems as yiwu duoming
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一物多名 (one thing having many names), yiming duowu 一名多物 (one name 
corresponding to many things) and mingshi cuoluan名實錯亂(total mismatches between 
names and actualities).132 Shen Gua was aware as well that different parts of the same 
plant can have different medicinal properties. ‘For medications we can use the roots, or 
we can use the stems and leaves. [Different parts of] the same thing can have different 
natures. 藥有用根，或用莖葉。雖是一物，性或不同。’133 Nor did the negative side 
effects of various herbal medications evade Shen Gua’s attention, such as the kushen 苦
參, widely used for cleaning the teeth during his time but injurious to the kidneys, as he 
noted.134
Thus it should be evident that careful correspondences between names and actualities 
were in fact of every concern to the Chinese in ancient times. To make one last 
interesting observation on Chinese herbal medicine, a formula called ‘Pulse-activating 
Powder’ was discovered by modern researchers which dates back to a document 
published in 1186. The formula was concocted from a combination of three different 
herbs, namely Radix ginseng, Radix ophiopogonis, and Fructus schisandrae, in very 
exact proportions, and the medicinal effects exerted by the formula were found to be 
significantly greater than the mere sum of the separate ingredients.135 More examples of 
such combination formulae are available. One would have reckoned that the Chinese in 
ancient times did know of the augmentation of medicinal effects through specific 
combinations of ingredients. It is difficult to see how such knowledge could have been 
acquired in the absence of scientific curiosity and experimentation. And a concern for 
realism.
A significant point of note here. In discussing ancient Chinese astronomy and 
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medicine, Sim often made use of the terms ‘harmony’ and ‘harmonization’. With respect 
to astronomy, for example, ‘Astronomy is extremely important to the rulers because it 
both provides information about the natural conditions with which their decisions must 
try to harmonize and information about the signs that indicate whether the attempted 
harmonization was successful.’136 As for medicine, ‘Health consists in a harmony and 
balance of the factors and phases internal to the body, but also a harmony of the organism
with its environment as a whole. Both sets of relationships are proper objects of Chinese 
medical study.’137 This ought to be indicative of a special outlook in the way Natural 
phenomena are studied in traditional China: an object of study is always placed in a 
larger context rather than apprehended as a thing-in-itself. It is always viewed as being 
situated in a web of relationships connecting it to other entities, leading naturally to a 
concern with how such relationships may be optimized for the well-being of all, how the 
myriad entities related to each other may exist in a state of harmony, like the parts of a 
single living body. Special implications for Zhu’s concept of li ought to follow. The li of 
a thing is its reason for being what it is and behaving the way it does, except that it does 
not exist on its own but forms a single living body with the rest of creation, in addition to 
which there is but one li. Recall what Zhu said on every entity being assigned a place, 
suoju zhiwei, in the scheme of things, and having to behave accordingly. In the light of 
this, one may venture to define the li of an entity as the specific way in which that entity 
contributes to the integrity of the whole.
A red blood cell exhibits such and such behavior because that is what its li dictates. It 
also does so because that is the way it would best serve the interests of the organism of 
which it forms a part. A tree exhibits such and such behavior because that is what its li
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dictates. It also does so because that is the way it contributes to the integrity of the 
ecosystem of which it is a member. In each of these two examples there appears no 
special reason why the pair of reasons for the particular entity’s behavior cannot be 
merged into one by simply defining li as just that: the entity’s specific way of 
contributing to the integrity of the whole. Henceforth this is what li shall be understood to 
mean in the present thesis.
Now that we have laid to rest the myth of the absence of realism in Chinese thought, 
let us proceed to discuss the scientific dimensions of Zhu Xi proper. Could anything in 
Zhu’s thought be considered as scientific? How do we decide what counts as being 
scientific anyway? With regard to this latter qualm, I believe the answer suggested below
should meet with little disagreement.
In science as practiced today, one first (1) engages in careful observations of various 
features of the Natural/phenomenal world, and (2) identifies special patterns or 
regularities in the observations made. (3) An explanatory hypothesis is then formulated 
as an attempt to account for the said regularities, and on the basis of this hypothesis one 
comes up with various (4) reasoned predictions on what further observations might be 
made through either special experiments, again designed on the basis of the hypothesis, 
or, where experimentation proves an impractical option, further explorations of the 
Natural/phenomenal world. One then (5) engages in the said explorations or experiments.
(In the case of experiments, they are repeated to ensure that the same results are 
obtainable.) Noting carefully whatever one finds as a result, whether it confirms one’s 
hypothesis completely, partially or not at all, one then makes further (6) refinements in
the hypothesis so as to make further predictions on the basis of the refinements, and to 
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account for whatever gaps there may be between the actual observations made and one’s 
earlier expectations — leading us back to (5), with new explorations or experiments being 
attempted this time. All of this assumes, of course, that (7) the manifold aspects of Nature
do not behave in a chaotic, capricious manner, but all follow definite patterns of behavior
and have reasons for doing so, and that (8) it is possible for us to discern, to discover 
these reasons, as well as worth our while to do so. These eight together shall be taken to 
comprise a necessary and sufficient condition for being considered scientific, with their 
sufficiency (i.e. the superfluity of yet other conditions) being argued for in due course.
We can imagine the following as a rough example. I make the observation that 
people, vehicles and other things traveling on the ground have a way of vanishing from 
sight as they move further and further away, and eventually disappear over the horizon. 
Seeking to explain this, I may venture the daring postulate that it is because the Earth is 
actually round, whereupon its curvature would block from my sight any entity on its 
surface separated a certain distance from me. On the basis of this postulate I predict that 
all things on the surface of the Earth should skid off its curved rather than flat surface and 
drop off into space. I fail to observe any instances of this happening no matter where I go, 
so to account for this I refine my original ‘Round Earth’ theory with the added 
speculation that the Earth emits a special force akin to magnetism which pulls all physical 
objects towards its surface, thereby keeping them from dropping off. And so on.
Which parts of this ‘Eightfold Path’ of science are found in Zhu Xi? From what we 
have gathered of li and gewu so far, (7) and (8) are evidently present. Instances of (1), (2) 
and (3) are present as well in much of the literature, such as Books 1 and 2 of the 
Conversations, in which are found numerous speculations on astronomical, 
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meteorological and geophysical phenomena. It is interesting to note that many of these 
speculations do not appear to have been contradicted by science today. Take his view of 
the forms of mountains: ‘Today when we scale the heights and gaze afar, the many 
mountains all exhibit a wavelike form, and that is the result of the surging of water. We 
merely have no idea when they solidified. As first they were exceedingly soft; only later 
did they become solid and hard. 今登高而望，羣山皆爲波浪之状，便是水泛如此。
只不知因甚麽時凝了。初間極軟，後來方凝得硬。’138 Zhu also spoke of the cause of 
solar eclipses: ‘Solar eclipses are due to being covered by the moon.日食是爲月所
淹。’139 On thunder and lightning, we find the following: ‘Someone asked: ‘Regarding 
thunder and lightning, Chengzi maintained that they are but the friction of qi; is that so?’ 
Zhu replied: ‘Indeed.’ 問：雷電，程子曰：只是氣相摩軋。是否？曰：然。’140 Nor 
did the phenomenon of rainbows escape Zhu’s attention: ‘It is not that rainbows can stop 
the rain, but that the vapors of the rain have thinned out by then, and also that the sun’s 
colors have been scattered apart by the vapors.虹非能止雨也，而雨氣至是已薄，亦是
日色射散雨氣了。’141
(Modern scholars have found that Zhu also acquired in his late fifties an armillary 
sphere with which he did serious work on verifying the astronomical claims made in 
ancient works such as the Liji (Book of Rites) and the Shijing (Book of Songs). Zhu wrote 
extensively as well on the structures of some armillary spheres, noting that they had gears 
shifted by moving water.142 The Pole Star in particular, used by Confucius as an analogy 
for the ruler who ruled by virtue,143 was of supreme interest to Zhu Xi, and in this respect
Zhu was aware that the Pole Star was not in fact fixed exactly at the North Celestial Pole 
in an unmoving way. ‘Yi Gang asked: ‘Does the Pole Star move?’ Zhu replied: ‘It moves 
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too, only it is near to that small central region without stars, so while it moves the motion 
is not perceived… Today people use a tube to view the Pole Star, and find that it moves 
hither and thither, but only within the tube and never out of it.’義剛問：極星動不動？
曰：極星也動。只是它近那辰後，雖動而不覺。。。今人以管去窺那極星，見其動
來動去，只在管裏面，不動出去。’144)
Now (4), (5) and (6) are to all appearances absent in Zhu. To the present author’s 
knowledge, Zhu never followed up on his speculations regarding various features of the 
Natural world by predicting any special observations on the basis of these speculations 
and then seeking out the predicted observations through experimentation or other means.
What does this tell us about Zhu? Does it imply that Zhu was not really a scientific 
thinker after all? I believe that is not necessarily the case. Granting the absence of (4), (5) 
and (6) in Zhu, we are presented with at least two possibilities, the first being that they
never occurred to him, and the second being conscious rejection. This second option 
would be confirmed by any words left by Zhu which clearly express his awareness and 
rejection of (4) etc., except that records of any thoughts to that effect on Zhu’s part do not 
appear to exist, leaving us with the first option. Should it be the case, though, that (4) etc 
merely did not occur to him, one could then ask if, going by what he had said or written, 
Zhu would have given his nod of approval to (4) etc. had he known of them. To 
determine this we would have to engage in a closer examination of Zhu’s thoughts on 
gewu.
To begin with, we find Zhu Xi asserting — fully in accordance with his many 
speculations on diverse aspects of the Natural world — that absolutely everything under 
the sun can and should be an object of our investigation:
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From the Taiji and Wuji above to every tree, blade of grass or insect below, all have li. 
Neglect to read one book, and we shall lack the principle (daoli) found in that book. Neglect to 
study exhaustively any event, and we shall lack the principle found in that event. Neglect to 




This ought to be expected, given Zhu’s contention that li is present in all things. Zhu 
did place more emphasis, however, on things which are close at hand and of immediate 
concern to us, such as the norms and values of human life which we should observe: ‘If 
one just widely seeks to exhaust the li of the Ten Thousand Things under Heaven, to the 
neglect of what is of immediate concern to oneself, this will be what the Yishu calls 
‘riding a horse around with no place to return to.’若只泛窮天下萬物之理，不務切己，
即是遺書所謂遊騎無所歸矣。 ’ 146 ‘In investigating things, one should start from 
understanding what is close at hand and concerns oneself. When understanding of what is 
close at hand has become definite, then slowly extend it out; this will count as being able 
to investigate things. 格物，須是從切己處理會去。待自家者已定疊，然後漸漸推
去，這便是能格物。’147
This seems reasonable enough, given that li is present in what is closest at hand as 
well as anywhere else. Hence among the most important things to investigate would be, 
of course, the Great Books penned by the ancient worthies, whose wisdom and previous 
experience we can draw upon. As for how we are supposed to investigate, Zhu gives a 
very concrete example of investigating things in the Conversations; asked on one 
occasion how grass and trees, say, could be investigated, he replied: 
Can’t one tree or one blade of grass be investigated? For example, [the special characteristics 
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of] sesame, wheat, rice and millet, when they should be planted and when they should be 
harvested, the fertility or otherwise of the soil, its thickness, what sorts of plants various specific 
types of land may be suitable for — all these have their li. 一草一木，豈不可以格。如麻麥稻
粱，甚時種，甚時收，地之肥，地之磽，厚薄不同，此宜植某物，亦皆有理。
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One should also learn to infer the general from the particular: from the characteristics 
found in specific entities and phenomena encountered, one should seek to recognize those 
features that are common to all instances of those phenomena and entities belonging to 
the same classes or categories. ‘For example, say there are a hundred things; if we have 
understood fifty or sixty of them, then even if we have not understood the remaining 
thirty or forty, [we can infer that] they will still roughly be as such.如一百件事，理會
得五六十件了，這三四十件雖未理會，也大概是如此。’149
Objectivity and impartiality are important as well in the investigation of things. ‘View 
a book from its perspective, and view things from their perspectives; do not form your 
own opinions first. 以書觀書，以物觀物，不可先立己見。’150 Nor is sincerity (cheng
誠) to be left out of consideration, being one of the most highly prized virtues extolled in 
the Great Learning and also considered by Zhu as a sine qua non in the pursuit of gewu.
As Zhu once exclaimed, ‘When one’s will is not established in sincerity, how can one 
engage in gewu! 誠意不立，如何能格物！’151 Sincerity for Zhu has the meaning of 
being determined in one’s attempt to truly exhaust the li of things, and not engaging in 
self-deception (ziqi自欺) of any kind, particularly with respect to whether one has indeed 
exhausted the li of a thing.
Liu Dong said: ‘Not to know about righteousness and li, yet to claim that one knows about 
them; that is self-deception (ziqi).’ Zhu replied, ‘A person engaged in self-deception is one who is 
half knowing and half ignorant. To know that one ought to do what is good and yet not to go all 
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out in doing it; to know that what is evil should be avoided and yet to love it and be reluctant to 




Hence, should one experience any inclinations away from what is morally sound and 
toward that which is morally reprehensible, this would be a clear sign that one is still 
sunk in self-deception and that further efforts toward attaining a state of true sincerity are 
in order. A further explanation for self-deception is as follows: ‘Someone inquired on ‘to 
make the will sincere is to avoid self-deception’. Zhu replied: ‘If for example there is a 
physical object which is coated with silver but is iron inside, that is self-deception. The 
exterior and interior must be as one; then there will be no self-deception.’或問誠其意者
毋自欺。曰：譬如一塊物，外面是銀，裏面是鐵，便是自欺。須是表裏如一，便是
不自欺。’153
It is to be noted that li needs to be grasped directly by oneself. It will not do for one 
just to parrot what others have said on the nature of li; one needs to verify this to oneself 
in one’s own experience through the practice of gewu. ‘True knowing is to really know 
that something is indeed so; it is not merely hearing what others have said that can be 
called knowing. 真知是知得真箇如此，不只是聽得人説，便唤做知。’154 Elsewhere 
in the Conversations one also reads:
[Someone] further inquired on true knowledge. Zhu replied: ‘[If one] had been injured by a 
tiger, [one would] then know that tigers are to be feared. [If one had] never been injured by a tiger, 
[one would] need to pursue and ponder on the principles (daoli) involved in such injuries; [when 






The example of being injured by a tiger comes from the Northern Song Confucian 
Cheng Yi and appears time and again at various places in the Conversations. What can be 
clearly seen here is that knowledge for Zhu cannot be of a purely cerebral nature; it has to 
possess a direct, compelling quality, as when acquired through personal experience,
before it can be considered true knowledge.
The pursuit of gewu is to be engaged in with the greatest diligence. The verb ge in 
gewu has for Zhu the meaning of pushing one’s knowledge to its limits. ‘Regarding 
gewu, ge means to exhaust (jin). One must exhaust the li of things. If one has but 
acquired three or two parts, then that is not yet gewu. One must exhaustively acquire all 
ten parts; that alone counts as gewu. 格物者，格，盡也，須是窮盡事物之理。若是窮
得三两分，便未是格物。須是窮盡得到十分，方是格物。’156 ‘Regarding gewu, ge is 
like reaching the utmost. 格物。格，猶至也。’157 One is required in particular to 
ponder (siliang思量) on what one has learned or observed:
…Thus the way of the Great Learning teaches us to learn and understand the principles of things 
and events one by one. If understanding of one thing has not yet been attained, one should again 
and again investigate it, ponder on it even when walking, and even when sitting; if in the morning 
one cannot arrive at understanding through reflecting on it, at night one should again bring it out 
into one’s mind and ponder on it; if at night one still cannot arrive at understanding in this way, 
ponder on it again the next day. In this way, are there any principles that cannot be acquired? But 
if one just reflects superficially, and just drops what is being investigated if one cannot arrive at 








Is one, then, to probe exhaustively the li of all things under Heaven? How practical is 
such a goal? Is it even remotely possible, and if not, are we doomed then to remain 
ignorant of the li of the Ten Thousand Things? Much to one’s relief, it turns out that we 
need not investigate every speck of dust under the sun. The unitary nature of li points to 
an interesting consequence for the investigation of things, namely that it is possible to 
acquire knowledge of the li of all things through the investigation of merely a number of 
them, albeit a large number. The earlier passage defining gewu cited from the 
Commentary on the Great Learning continues: ‘After exerting him/herself for a long time 
(in exhausting the li of things), one day s/he will suddenly come to a breakthrough, and 
the exterior and interior of all things, their finer and coarser aspects — none of these will 
s/he not be able to penetrate… 至於用力之久，而一旦豁然貫通焉，則衆物之表裏精
粗無不到。。。’159 Zhu also speaks in Book 114 of the Conversations of grasping the 
‘one thread’ that runs through the manifold phenomena of the Cosmos (yixian xiangtong
一缐相通) — in other words, the li underlying all existence. ‘Take trees and grass. 
Understanding their roots and origins, we shall then know that the countless stems and 
leaves all have a principle. A single thread runs through all things and events; we must 
understand this. 譬如草木，理會根源，則知千條萬葉上各有箇道理。事事物物各有
一缐相通，須是曉得。’160
Now the assertion that ‘a single thread runs through all things and events’ could lead 
to what Zhu would consider a misguided piece of wishful thinking regarding gewu, that 
being the idea that by investigating the li of a single entity or phenomenon alone it would 
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be possible to come to know the li of all things! We have now come to the opposite 
extreme from having to investigate every speck of dirt under the sun! (Lu Xiangshan 
went further still, as we know, in arguing that any amount of gewu is a waste of time 
since all li are already present within us.) This certainly was not acceptable to Zhu and 
Cheng Yi. The attainment of complete knowledge of li, except in the case of 
exceptionally favored individuals, could never come but through long periods of 
sustained effort in the practice of gewu, though neither does it require that absolutely 
every entity in the Universe be investigated. This is clearly stated in Book 18 of the 
Conversations, where repeated references are made with approval to a statement from 
Cheng: ‘Gewu does not mean one must exhaust[ively investigate] all the li under Heaven,
and neither does it mean that one can attain to all li merely by pursuing one li. But after 
accumulating much [through gewu], one will naturally arrive at a point of realization. 窮
理者，非謂必盡窮天下之理，又非謂止窮得一理便到。但積累多後，自當脱然有悟
處。’161
It s incidentally of interest to note that ge, in Chinese common usage, actually means 
a square box or grid. This could have a special bearing on the concept of gewu: gewu
could now be understood alternatively as finding out how things fit into a grid, what 
pattern there is which they fit into. This certainly is what one attempts to do in a great 
deal of scientific research today — to discern the patterns underlying various phenomena 
of Nature, patterns which may then be articulated through human symbols, such as 
mathematical equations. If such an interpretation of gewu could be entertained, it would 
mark a special affinity between Zhu’s thought and modern science, though this 
interpretation should only be seen as supplementing Zhu’s idea of gewu, not replacing it.
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We may now trace out from the foregone a rough outline of gewu and what it entails: 
(a) that there is nothing which does not constitute an appropriate object for gewu; (b) that 
one should get one’s priorities straight when engaging in gewu by starting with those 
things which are of immediate concern to oneself; (c) the use of inductive reasoning; (d) 
the importance of objectivity and impartiality, and of (e) sincerity, the avoidance of self-
deception; (f) the greater weight assigned to direct, non-mediated knowledge as opposed 
to second-hand accounts; (g) the need to pursue to the furthest extent possible the li of 
whatever one investigates; and (h) the belief that a single thread — the li — runs through 
the manifold phenomena of Nature, whereupon the knowledge accumulated through long 
periods of engaging in gewu would build up to a critical mass which would precipitate 
the crossing of a threshold in consciousness; one would then fully grasp this single li, and 
there would be nothing s/he could not penetrate with his/her understanding.
These being the essentials of gewu, how do they square with what we understand 
today by the pursuit of scientific knowledge, and more specifically — to return now to 
our earlier question — with the fourth, fifth and sixth aspects of the ‘Eightfold Path’ of 
scientific research spelt out earlier? Are any of these facets of gewu actually anti-
scientific, and would they oppose the practice of predicting special observations, seeking 
them out and making further refinements to one’s postulations (on whatever phenomena 
one may be studying)? To attend first to the second question, I really do not see how any 
of them would; if anything, the practice of predicting and seeking out special 
observations etc exhibits every semblance of being necessitated by gewu. The ceaseless 
cycle of prediction, experimentation and refinement of one’s hypothesis ties in with the
almost relentless pursuit of li enjoined by gewu, the injunction to go all out and exhaust 
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the li of things. The greater weight placed in gewu on direct, non-mediated knowledge 
clearly suggests as well the importance of confirming in one’s own experience the 
validity of whatever one has learned or thought, which is what experimentation, or the 
seeking out of special confirmatory observations, is all about.
Returning to the first question, would any of the eight aspects of Zhu’s conception of 
gewu enumerated above prove prejudicial to the pursuit of science? (b) appears a likely 
candidate at first sight. If we need first to develop to the full our understanding of what is 
‘close at hand’ before directing our attention towards what would presumably be those 
aspects of physical reality which are of less (obvious?) relevance to human concerns, 
such as, say, what goes on at the bottom of the oceans, then it appears we are unlikely to 
go far at all in the advancement of our knowledge of the Natural world. After all, human 
society and the human individual, than which there can surely be nothing of more 
immediate concern to us, are things people have spent their entire lives attempting to 
understand. What is interesting here is that Zhu himself showed great interest in and 
wrote much on all sorts of Natural phenomena regarding which it is difficult to see what 
special or immediate relevance to human concerns they might have, so either he himself 
had attained — in his own estimate anyway — to a full understanding of the li of what is 
‘close at hand’ for him, whereupon he became qualified to embark upon those further 
shores in his attempts at gewu, or he did not in fact have a complete understanding of 
what is ‘close at hand’, in which case he was not practicing what he had preached. Which 
is it?
The solution to the problem probably lies in just what Zhu meant by ‘understanding 
what is close at hand’. One thing to keep in mind in this respect is the supreme value 
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assigned to moral cultivation by Zhu in his agenda. Very shortly after the passage quoted 
earlier in Book 15 of the Conversations where Zhu spoke of making definite one’s 
understanding of what is close at hand before ‘extending it out’, he went on to discuss 
investigating the li of filial piety, brotherly love etc. Taking this into consideration, I 
believe he would have meant by ‘understanding what is close at hand’ simply to gain a 
firm footing in the basic essentials of morality, in particular how one should relate to and 
interact with those who are closest to oneself. This — and not a state of moral perfection 
— also ought to suffice for ‘understanding what is close at hand’; one need not attain to a 
state of moral perfection before extending the scope of his/her attempts at gewu, such an 
exalted state being after all the ultimate purpose of gewu, so that if one were to have 
attained to that state already, any further attempts at gewu would simply become 
superfluous.
If this interpretation of ‘understanding what is close at hand’ is accepted, (b) will no 
longer pose a problem for science. It might not appear obvious at first, though, just how
being conversant in the basics of morality constitutes a prerequisite for probing the 
workings of Nature. Why should I be a morally scrupulous person before the realms of 
physics or biology can be mine to explore? In reply one may point to the need for 
intellectual humility and honesty, both plainly moral virtues, in the quest for knowledge 
of any kind, where one needs to stay on one’s guard against taking as the truth one’s 
preconceived ideas regarding the objects of one’s inquiry, and to acknowledge at all 
times the possibility that whatever one has learned may stand to further correction as one 
finds out more. The pursuit of science is not indifferent to moral concerns. And this is 
where (d) and (e) come in, the need for impartiality and sincerity, the avoidance of self-
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deception, in investigating things.
One might object that such things as humility and honesty are primarily virtues
concerned with the acquisition of knowledge and truth, as opposed to virtues concerned 
with affirming the value of others, such as filial piety and brotherly/sisterly love, which 
would look more like what Zhu Xi had in mind. My reply is that the two types of virtues 
are not unrelated. Why should we ever bother about the truth regarding anything? Surely 
one major reason is that very often it has a direct bearing on the safety and well-being of 
people, both others and oneself. If a certain bank is located at the east end of a certain 
street and I knowingly tell a nice old lady looking for the bank that it is at the west end, I 
will cause her a great deal of exasperation and inconvenience. If a new and hitherto 
unrecognized form of healing is discovered which actually works and can cure all sorts of 
previously incurable conditions, and the prejudiced editors of various prestigious science 
journals condemn it as quackery, the sad consequences should be obvious. And if a wise 
and knowledgeable friend warns me of the dangers of certain financial investments and I 
arrogantly insist on my own judgment, I may pay dearly for that by going bankrupt, 
which will adversely affect others, too. Honesty and humility are therefore quite 
intimately related to the virtues of caring for others and being mindful of their welfare —
including, indeed especially, those closely related to oneself. So as the novice practicing
the virtues of humility and honesty as part of the preparation for embarking on gewu
begins to inquire on why such virtues are necessary — such inquiry corresponding 
possibly to what Zhu called ‘extending it out’ — s/he will surely come to learn the virtues 
of ren, and of brotherly love and filial piety.
Let us try and see what further ‘extensions’ we can make. Why in turn should I care 
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about others and be mindful of their welfare? Because all of life forms a single living 
body with me. But I do not feel any such unity with all of life, I may object; and the reply 
would be that this is precisely where gewu comes in.
To return briefly to the issue regarding Zhu Xi’s belief in the need for a firm 
grounding in basic moral values prior to investigating things, modern developments in 
the pursuit of knowledge have also given further support for the validity of this belief, 
though in ways which perhaps would not have occurred to him. Respect for other 
researchers by not plagiarizing their findings and claiming them for one’s own; the 
possible uses towards which the fruits of one’s research may be directed; decisions on 
how different areas of research should be funded; moral considerations inevitably enter 
the picture in all of these.
Now (h) might prima facie appear antithetical to science in general. The idea that one 
can reach a stage where the further study of Nature’s workings becomes unnecessary 
certainly sounds like bad news for the continued advancement of science. In fact, 
however, a very similar ideal has been entertained by the modern scientific community, 
as can be seen in the quest for a ’Theory of Everything’, which, far from discouraging the 
further study of Nature’s workings today, might actually have spurred it on instead.
The main objection would probably lie in the kind of goal envisaged for gewu in (h), 
together with the underlying metaphysical presuppositions — the whole conception of li.
As we have seen, Chen Lai asserted because of these that Zhu Xi was not really a 
scientific thinker, arguing that they ‘unavoidably appended’ to his ideas on Nature and 
the study of Her workings ‘many subjective ideas on account of the moral purpose which 
they serve,’ subjective, a priori ideas being presumably a big no-no in science. (The term 
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‘subjective’ here — translated from the term ‘zhuguan 主觀’, literally ‘[adopting] the 
view of the host’, as opposed to ‘keguan 客觀’, ‘[adopting] the view of the guest’ —
shall be understood to refer to any idea having no basis in observed facts regarding the 
nature of the external world, only in one’s own views, ideas and preferences. Thus the 
idea of a moral purpose in Nature is considered a subjective one by Chen; after all, 
empirical observations of the external world do seem to reveal nothing but brute, amoral
‘facts’.) The truth, though, is that such ideas are simply unavoidable in science or 
anywhere else; indeed without them no attempts at probing the workings of the Natural 
world can proceed. We never just have the ‘bare facts’ squatting ‘out there’ and waiting 
to enter our minds via our sensory faculties; even in ordinary interactions with the 
physical world we live in, let alone scientific research, our observations are always 
filtered through some conceptual schema — basically a whole set of subjective, a priori
ideas — which renders into meaningful information what otherwise would only be so 
much meaningless sensory qualia. This is what contemporary philosopher of science 
Alan F. Chalmers terms ‘the theory-dependence of observation’. Chalmers provides a 
rather alarming illustration, somewhat reminiscent of Mencius’ story of a child about to 
fall into a well:
…Consider the simple sentence in commonsense language, “Look out, the wind is blowing the 
baby’s pram over the cliff edge!” Much low-level theory is presupposed here. It is implied that 
there is such a thing as wind, which has the property of being able to cause the motion of objects 
such as prams, which stand in its path. The sense of urgency conveyed by the “Look out” indicates 
the expectation that the pram, complete with baby, will fall over the cliff and perhaps be dashed on 
the rocks beneath and it is further assumed that this will be deleterious for the baby.162
And there is no way of avoiding this deference to a priori presuppositions. Even if, 
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believing in taking nothing at all for granted, I decide to establish to my satisfaction the 
validity of those presuppositions through observation, experimentation and other means 
of securing evidence in favor of their validity, I can do so only by presupposing the 
validity of some other even more basic set of presuppositions, and so on in an infinite 
regress unless at some point I simply stop and accept some such set of presuppositions.
Suppose I see a table. Being the enthusiastic student of Zhu Xi that I am, I decide to 
engage in some gewu by studying the characteristics of the table — the shape and color, 
the overall design, the type of materials of which it is made, and so on. If I had not been 
equipped beforehand with such conceptual categories as ‘shape’, ‘color’ etc, what 
knowledge would I acquire through perceiving and studying the table? All that I would 
perceive are so much raw sensory qualia devoid of any intrinsic content. I would be 
seeing the table through the eyes of a young baby. It would not even be permitted of me 
to use the term ‘table’, and I certainly would have no idea what to ‘study’ in the first 
place. Repeated observation or closer observation (as if I knew what to observe at all) 
would help little, since it merely provides us with more intrinsically meaningless 
perceptual qualia. Thus the deference to various presuppositions is simply unavoidable.
A certain element of subjectivity is present as well in such presuppositions. One may 
consider the well-known duck-rabbit picture. On account of the very different 
presuppositions with which they have been equipped, a person who has seen ducks but 
never rabbits, one for whom the reverse is true and one who has never seen either will 
view and interpret the picture very differently. They will not perceive the same thing.
A further example of how the same phenomenon can be perceived very differently by 
different people comes from modern physics. Thus in addition to Newtonian mechanics, 
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which views all physical motion in terms of particles and the trajectories they follow, an 
alternative form of mechanics appeared in the Nineteenth Century according to physicist 
David Bohm and science writer F. David Peat, known as Hamilton-Jacobi mechanics, 
which instead views all physical motion in terms of waves. Clearly the two schools of 
mechanics are utterly different in their a priori understanding of physical reality, even 
though ‘mathematicians were able to show that the two theories, in fact, generated the 
same numerical results.’163
This may all sound like bad news incidentally for any form of inquiry into the nature 
of physical reality, be it modern science or Zhu’s idea of gewu or whatever. We seem 
trapped in an epistemological predicament from which there is no escape, being doomed 
never to be free of subjective, a priori presuppositions which by their very nature appear 
unavailable to validations of any sort and even cut us off from each other intellectually —
this cutting off being what modern philosophers of science like the late Paul Feyerabend 
term the incommensurability between different conceptual schemata. I am confident the 
situation is not all that bleak; with respect to the scenario involving the duck-rabbit 
picture, for example, there is really no reason why the three people viewing it cannot sit 
down and talk, each attempting seriously to learn of the other’s conceptual schema so as 
to see what the other sees. But all this shall have to be dealt with in greater depth only 
later; for now the main thing to note is that, for all these apparent difficulties, the pursuit 
of science today has continued largely unaffected. People have not ceased to call it 
science or ceased doing science. And if science today can remain no less science for all 
the said difficulties, neither does the present author see why Zhu Xi’s conception of 
gewu, affected by the same problems, should be considered any less scientific by nature.
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A few words in particular on the use of different conceptual schemata in studying the 
phenomenal/Natural world, touched on in the story of Hamilton-Jacobi mechanics and of 
the duck-rabbit picture. A prevalent view of science has it that there can only be one 
conceptual schema which offers a truly faithful account of phenomenal reality, our job 
being to find out what this single candidate is. There can be no plurality of different 
accounts. Some, of course, opine that the matter is already settled by placing all their bids 
in some existing account or schema, such as Darwinism in the case of the life sciences. 
The lesson offered here in this respect is that a multiplicity of different schemata can be 
employed in interpreting the very same aspect of reality or object of perception; we need 
not and should not insist on any specific schema. In the words of philosopher of science 
Paul Feyerabend, ‘there can be many different kinds of science. People starting from 
different social backgrounds will approach the world in different ways and learn different 
things about it.’164
The relevance for Zhu’s aversion to ‘conceptual fixation’, discussed in the previous 
section, should quickly become apparent. Given the above, it ought to be perfectly 
legitimate to have different accounts of li, to speak of the li as being both one and many, 
or as being both non-deliberative and yet a sort of Cosmic Mind. This would dispel any 
possible charges against Zhu which accuse him of being epistemologically wishy-washy, 
of being unable to commit himself to any definite stand. In addition it would no longer be 
acceptable to dismiss Zhu as falling short of being scientific — as Yung Sik Kim did 
towards the end of his The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi — on the grounds that he did 
not employ in his thought the same set of basic concepts as Western man did in studying 
the workings of Nature. It may be true that in Zhu Xi “There were no theoretical 
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speculations about problems involving concepts such as space, time, void, infinity, 
indivisibility, mixture, and so on,”165 but is there any reason why one could not engage in 
an exploration of Nature’s workings through a different set of concepts? Admittedly one
would then come up with a rather different kind of science, but that is in turn a rather 
different thing from saying that it would not be science. Exclusive adherence to any 
specific conceptual schema is no necessary condition for being scientific (though of 
course one would still need to adhere to the ‘Eightfold Path’ of science spelt out earlier).
Contemporary philosopher Richard Rorty once imagined a conversation between a 
modern medical practitioner and a tribal healer, in whose understanding diseases are 
caused by ‘demons’. Does the use of the concept of ‘demons’ automatically deny the 
tribal healer of all scientific credibility? Provided, being intellectually perhaps an 
exceptionally sophisticated tribesman and/or being born at a time when the confluence of 
various historical and geographical contingencies was catalyzing a special breakthrough 
in the consciousness of his tribe, he actually engages in such things as making various 
predictions on the basis of his ‘Demon Theory of Disease’, seeking out the predicted 
observations through experimentation or other means and then making refinements or 
modifications to his theory — basically the fourth, fifth and sixth aspects of the 
‘Eightfold Path’ of scientific research discussed earlier, and all the while being careful to 
avoid the pitfalls of ‘self-deception’ — the use of the concept of ‘demons’ is surely of no 
consequence. It need not have anything intrinsically unscientific about it. Likewise with 
such concepts as li, qi, yin陰, yang陽, wuxing五行 (the Five Agents), and so on.
Concepts are not static entities; they can be and at times are modified so as to express 
more faithfully those aspects of reality to which they correspond. Recall how Zhu 
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modified the concepts of gui and shen. So there is no logical reason why over time the 
many modifications the healer would probably be compelled to make to his concept of 
‘demons’ in his researches could not eventually make the concept capable of articulating 
various aspects of the reality of disease. Indeed for all we know he might even discover 
certain aspects of health and disease which might elude the attention of Westerners. As 
Feyerabend said so well, “even the strangest ways of life may have something to offer.”166
Perhaps the main gripe some have against viewing Zhu Xi as a scientific thinker lies, 
not so much in the fact that all sorts of a priori presuppositions are present in his ideas of 
li and gewu, as in the nature of these presuppositions. The concepts of, say, space and 
solidity seem innocuous enough as concepts to adopt beforehand as part of a conceptual 
schema, but what about things like li, with their weighty religious and moral content? My 
reply is that it makes no special difference whether or not those presuppositions are 
religious by nature. We remain stuck, one way or the other, with nontrivial and unproven
presuppositions which are adopted beforehand, and one fails to see how the difficulty of 
this predicament is mitigated by an endorsement of presuppositions of a non-religious 
variety. Indeed, the presupposition that the manifold aspects of Nature all follow definite 
patterns of behavior and have reasons for doing so — the seventh aspect of the ‘Eightfold 
Path’ of scientific research — is as metaphysically loaded as any religious belief one 
cares to entertain. Besides, there are several examples in the intellectual history of the 
West which show that being religious need not stand in the way of being scientific or 
making great contributions to science.
If there is one major figure in science concerning whom there can be little doubt just 
how appropriately the title ‘man of science’ applies to him, it is the great English scientist
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Isaac Newton. But for this amazing individual, the entire edifice of modern Western 
science would at least have been very different. What is so fascinating about Newton is 
that, contrary to what many today probably imagine a man of science like him would 
think and believe, he was actually a profoundly religious person, and the role his religious 
beliefs played in his pursuit of scientific knowledge was not at all peripheral, as was 
observed by, among others, contemporary Newton scholar Deborah Harkness:
In 1724/5, Isaac Newton explained to John Conduitt the key role he believed the comet of 
1680 would play in the catastrophic end of the world. Newton’s understanding of the comet was 
informed not only by his natural philosophical views, but also his faith in a providential deity as 
described in holy scripture. While alchemical literature explained the vital role putrefaction played 
in generation, Newton believed that the ultimate restitution of nature and mankind foretold in the 
Bible could only come about after a cataclysmic event such as the one he expected when the 
comet of 1680 hit the sun. Until that time of spiritual and material regeneration, Newton aspired to 
increase human understanding of God’s plan for the cosmos through what Betty Jo Dobbs 
described as “the knowledge of God’s activity in the world.” Like many of his contemporaries, 
Newton believed that such knowledge could be increased by consulting ancient authorities who 
lived and worked when human understanding had been less corrupted by the consequences of 
Adam’s Fall. Newton hoped that his search through ancient texts would yield a true religion and a 
true natural philosophy, both of which would help to increase human understanding of the natural 
world as well as the divine.167
It is evident from the above passage that Newton’s beliefs are hardly less charged 
with religious and moral significance than Zhu Xi’s li. Yet none of this prevented
Newton from bequeathing unto the world a great variety of important findings and 
innovations in physics and mathematics; indeed his beliefs could be seen as providing a 
telos for his scientific pursuits, even to the point of constituting a sine qua non for them.
So if we could acknowledge all this and still consider Newton as a man of science, why 
107
107
could we not consider Zhu Xi, with his comparably keen interest in Nature and rather 
more modest religious beliefs, a science-minded thinker as well?
A similar case could probably be spelt out with the ancient Greek thinker Aristotle, 
similarities between whose thoughts and those of Zhu Xi have been noted by others. 
Many scholars have also considered Aristotle a science-minded thinker for his great 
interest in Natural phenomena — in spite of his idea of an Unmoved Mover, in certain 
respects a Greek incarnation of the Taiji and equally a creature of profound religious 
significance.
Of course, granting, as these examples show, that science and religion can go 
together, we would still want to know just how they can do so. And that is what we shall 
attempt to find out later, specifically in the case of Zhu Xi. But before that we need to 
attend to one more thing: the body of special ideas and concepts employed in the Chinese 
tradition before and during Zhu’s time for understanding the workings of Nature, 
specifically the yin, yang and wuxing, which would form an important part of Zhu’s 
conceptual schema.
 2.4 Special Ideas and Concepts of the Traditional Chinese Worldview as found in 
Zhu’s thought
We begin with yin and yang. This well-known pair of concepts has been dated back 
by scholars like Needham to the Fourth Century BC and appears in texts such as the 
Yijing (Book of Changes) and the Daodejing 道德經 , and signifies virtually all 
phenomena which can be apprehended in terms of opposites, such as darkness and light, 
cold and heat, female and male, passive and active, guest and host, and so on. The yin and 
yang occupy an important place indeed in Zhu’s thought. ‘It’s all yin and yang; there is 
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nothing that is not yin and yang. 都是陰陽。無物不是陰陽。’168 Zhu has employed yin
and yang as classificatory concepts in the study of flora and fauna, for example, as can be 
seen in the following passage:
Grasses and woody plants are all endowed with yin qi, creatures that move on land and flying 
creatures with yang qi. To subdivide each [genus] further, grasses are endowed with yin qi and 
woody plants with yang qi, and for this reason grasses are soft and woody plants hard; creatures 
that move on land are endowed with yin qi and flying creatures with yang qi, and for this reason




Human relationships are defined in terms of yin and yang as well. ‘For example, the 
son is the yin of the father, and the minister is the yin of the ruler. 如子者，父之陰；臣
者，君之陰。’170 Many more examples of the use of yin and yang can be found (Yung 
Sik Kim found more than ninety in the Conversations). One quickly sees that yin and 
yang are not to be understood as absolutes but as relative to each other. Also, yin and 
yang are often viewed not as fixed but as constantly changing each into the other or 
giving way to each other — as is seen in Zhou Dunyi’s Taijitu Shuo 太極圖說
(Discourse on the Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate), the endless and beginningless 
interchange of yin and yang envisaged in which was accepted by Zhu. ‘From the point of 
view of the Taiji today, one may say that ‘through movement yang is generated’, yet still 
before movement there had to be rest, and before rest movement again; progressing back 




Nor are yin and yang to be thought of as distinct and separate; various phenomena can 
be understood as a mix of the two, as is aptly suggested in the hexagrams found in the 
Yijing which are viewed as signifying different kinds of phenomena and which are 
composed of different combinations of solid and broken lines, representing respectively 
the yang and yin. Here again, one state of affairs, represented by a hexagram, readily 
gives way in due course to another, represented by another hexagram. Twelve of the 
hexagrams, for example, had been singled out to represent different months of the year, 
and the bo剥 hexagram, representing the ninth month, has five yin lines and only a yang
line at the top; progressing to the tenth month, this yang line is replaced by a yin line to 
give us the kun 坤 hexagram, in which all lines are now yin. The eleventh month is then 
signified by the fu 復 hexagram, in which a yang line appears at the bottom. Zhu 
comments: ‘The retreating yang of the day before had been exhausted; here it is 
regenerated again.前日既退之陽已消盡，此又是别生。’172
The way the concepts of yin and yang are used suggests a picture of reality where all 
entities and phenomena undergo constant change, with one state of affairs giving way in 
due course to another. Also implicit in the pair of concepts is the idea of balance and 
equilibrium; when any state of affairs develops to a certain maximum point in one 
direction it begins to swing back in the opposite direction. Before we ask the question 
why this should be so, why we should expect things to behave in such a way, let us take a 
look at another set of cosmological concepts in the Chinese tradition at least as old and as 
important in Zhu’s thought, namely the wuxing or Five Agents (in no special order): fire, 
water, wood, metal and earth.
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The idea of the Five Agents has been traditionally attributed to the rather obscure 
thinker Zou Yan 鄒衍 who lived during the closing years of the Warring States period, 
and has been widely used in the Chinese milieu ever since. Zhu assigned to this idea the 
same degree of importance as the yin and yang. ‘Between Heaven and Earth, what isn’t 
wuxing [at work]?天地之間，何事而非五行？’173 It is now generally agreed upon that 
the Five Agents are not to be thought of as material substances, but more like states of 
being or the qualities possessed by various phenomena and entities. In this respect the 
Five have been associated by Zhu and others with all sorts of Natural phenomena and 
aspects of human life which can be reckoned in groups of five, including colors, musical 
notes, the planets, the seasons of the year, different organs of the human body, and 
sentiments and feelings. To give one example, Zhu even related five of the primary 
Confucian virtues with the Five Agents, so that ‘ren (humanity, human-heartedness) is 
related to wood, yi (righteousness) to metal, li (propriety, ritual) to fire, zhi (intelligence) 
to water, and xin (faith, trustworthiness) to earth. 仁木，義金，禮火，智水，信
土。’174 Zhu was to argue elsewhere that three of the other four virtues besides ren, 
namely yi, li and zhi, are but manifestations of it, ‘just as the four seasons may not be the 
same, yet they all come from spring, 猶春夏秋冬雖不同，而同出於春。’175 and when 
asked yet elsewhere whether and how the other three corresponding Agents likewise all 
come from wood, wood being the Agent associated with ren, he replied that ‘wood is the 
qi of life; when there is the qi of life, then things may receive it and flourish. If there were 
no qi of life, then fire, metal and water could not generate themselves. Thus wood can 




Here we have an example of how the Five Agents are associated with various 
phenomena. Wood (in its natural state) is alive and grows, and ren as a virtue is 
concerned directly with the preservation and nurturing of life; hence the association of 
wood with ren. Yi, on the other hand, is associated with metal because of the hardness of 
the latter, which corresponds to the hard and stern nature of yi. ‘Someone asked: ‘Does yi
belong to metal by virtue of its stern nature (yan)?’ Zhu replied: ‘Indeed.’ 問：義之屬
金，以其嚴否？曰：然。’177 Associative thinking of this nature is commonplace with 
the wuxing, another important aspect of which is also hinted at here: the mutual 
production and destruction of the Five.
Whether in Zhu Xi or others, the Five Agents have always been thought of as giving
rise to or inhibiting each other in some definite sequence. Thus according to Zhu Xi, 
‘water gives rise to wood, wood to fire, fire to earth, 。。。水生木，木生火，火生
土。。。’178 and so on, until we return to water, which gives rise to wood again in an 
endless cycle. (One can reason, as Sim does, that water gives rise to wood through being 
absorbed by woody plants which require it to grow; that wood gives rise to fire through 
being burnt; that fire gives rise to earth through the production of ashes; and so on.179)
The cycle has been associated with the rotation of the seasons, and a similar cycle of 
destruction has also been conceived of, with each Agent destroying or overcoming the 
one immediately preceding it; thus, as spelt out by Sim, water overcomes fire by 
extinguishing it; fire does the same to metal by melting it; the shaping of metal into 
implements for cutting wood shows the overcoming of wood by metal; and so it goes.180
Sequences different from the above are supposed to have been spelt out by others. 
Yung Sik Kim has also pointed out a certain inconsistency in the way Zhu viewed the 
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Five Forces; whereas the cycles above would suggest that the Five were to be reckoned 
with on an equal footing, with none of them being assigned any special place, Zhu clearly 
thought of wood as the primary Agent in drawing up his association of the Five with the 
Confucian virtues, this special place for wood being elsewhere given instead to earth in 
Book 79 of the Conversations where he acceded to another’s view that ‘water, fire, wood 
and metal all come from earth. 問：凡上四事，皆原於思，亦猶水火木金皆出於土
也。曰：然。’181 One would reckon that we have here yet another instance of the 
avoidance of ‘conceptual fixation’: from one point of view none of the Five would have a 
special place, but from another perspective a particular one would, and not necessarily 
always the same one.
Zhu also made attempts to tie the wuxing together with the yin and yang; indeed he 
considered the former a manifestation of the latter. ‘Leave the wuxing, and there will be 
no place to discuss yin and yang. 舍五行無别討陰陽處。’182 And ultimately, of course, 
they are all but the li at work. ‘Inferring upwards from below, the wuxing are but the two 
qi [i.e. yin and yang], and the two qi but one li.自下推而上去，五行只是二氣，二氣又
只是一理。’183
The details regarding how Zhu tied the Five Agents together with the yin and yang
need not concern us here, our interest at this point being in what is implied about the 
nature of reality in Zhu’s conception of the wuxing. And here again, as with the yin and 
yang, the underlying worldview is that of all things and phenomena being classifiable 
according to a number of categories by virtue of possessing certain attributes, with 
different (classes of) things and phenomena interacting with each other, either giving rise 
or giving way to each other, and often in a cyclical fashion, just like the seasons of the 
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year. Everything has its turn: water gives rise to wood, yin gives way in due course to 
yang, and so on. The question one would ask here is: why should the different (classes of) 
things and phenomena behave in this way in Zhu’s thought? Why not just classify them 
in certain ways and leave them at that? Could they not be thought of instead simply as 
sitting in their own respective niches in mutual indifference, or even locked in conflict?
The answer ought to be found in Zhu’s vision, noted before, of all things forming a 
single living body. What characterizes a living thing? One major defining feature would 
be change; a living thing ipso facto undergoes change, as manifested in such things as 
self-initiated movement and the processes of circulation, growth, digestion, transmission 
of nerve impulses etc taking place in its physical frame. Surely nothing completely static
in its behavior could be considered alive. But neither does change occur without rhyme or 
reason in a living entity; instead it occurs along the lines of definite patterns which serve 
to maintain the stability and integrity of the individual organism in question. Thus when 
the nutrients in the body are too heavily depleted, the organism feeds to replenish them;
when it feels discomfort after being in a position for too long, it shifts itself; and so on.
These are all examples of one state giving rise to or giving way to another, all for the 
purpose of keeping the overall condition of the organism — its internal environment, so 
to speak — at some optimal level. Should we not expect our Universe to behave in a 
similar fashion if the Ten Thousand Things all form a single living body?
Needham drew the same conclusion regarding the Universe being viewed as an 
organic whole in Chinese thought, in his study of the wuxing and the yin and yang:
…The key-word in Chinese thought is Order and above all Pattern (and, if I may whisper it for 
the first time, Organism)… Things behaved in particular ways… because their position in the 
ever-moving cyclical universe was such that they were endowed with intrinsic natures which made 
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that behaviour inevitable for them, If they did not behave in those particular ways they would lose 
their relational positions in the whole (which made them what they were), and turn into something 
other than themselves. They were thus parts in existential dependence upon the whole world-
organism.184
Misch rightly maintained that Chinese thinkers in all the descriptions which they gave of the 
regularity of natural processes had in mind, not government by law, but the mutual adaptations of 
community life. Harmony was regarded as the basic principle of a world-order ‘spontaneous and 
organic’… Not in human society only, but throughout the world of Nature, there was a give and 
take, a kind of mutual courtesy rather than strife among inanimate powers and processes.185
All this would only confirm what we have found of Zhu’s religious thought. The 
word ‘inanimate’ may incidentally have to be used with some qualification in the present 
context. If all things are presided over by the li, which is conceived of as ‘the Mind of 
Heaven and Earth’ and furthermore as the xing of all things, then all things will have to 
be considered as being at least in some sense alive, including those we commonly term 
‘inanimate’. What Needham spoke of as ‘mutual adaptations of community life’ and 
‘mutual courtesy’ could in this respect be understood as more than mere figures of 
speech; indeed to Zhu they would have served as examples of what he called ganying, 
‘stimulus-and-response’, a notion to be discussed at greater length later which points yet 
again at the idea of all things being alive.
(It is interesting to note at this point the dual nature of the concepts of yin, yang and 
wuxing. On the one hand, they appear as scientific concepts in that they provide an 
account of the workings of different aspects of phenomenal reality; on the other hand, 
they lead us to a vision of the Ten Thousand Things as forming an organic unity, 
betraying their religious nature. Hence they cannot be readily classified as either 
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‘religious’ or ’scientific’, being in a sense both. Here we may well have our first glimpse 
of how the religious and scientific sides of Zhu Xi may go together.)
The wuxing and the yin and yang, then, are concepts which lead us to look at things in 
certain ways, in particular to look at them as interconnected and constantly undergoing 
change in accordance to certain patterns, all because of the need to maintain the balance 
and integrity of the whole organism that is the Cosmos. Clearly in this respect the 
repeated use of such concepts in gewu, in any endeavor to study the nature of 
physical/phenomenal reality, is only likely to exert a lasting influence on our personal 
outlook on life and society. To discuss this issue further we shall have to proceed to the 
next chapter on the relationship between the scientific and the religious sides of Zhu Xi.
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3. HOW THE SCIENTIFIC AND THE RELIGIOUS SIDE OF ZHU XI ARE 
RELATED
 3.1 How Religion Needs Science in Zhu Xi
To establish the presence of both scientific and religious elements in the thought of 
Zhu Xi, and to have spelt out their contents, is to invite the question just what the 
relationship is between the two. Are they mutually antagonistic, indifferent, or 
complementary? How do we decide? I am confident a case can be stated and successfully 
defended for mutual complementarity and interdependence. The strategy for defending 
this case is twofold. First we need to show how the religious content of Zhu’s thought, in 
particular the highest purpose it held out for humankind, is supported and at least partly 
fulfilled by his idea of gewu. This would then have to be repeated with the roles of the 
two being reversed: we would need to show how the scientific side of Zhu’s thought in 
turn is supported by his religious ideas, chiefly the idea of li.
We begin with the question how religion needs science in Zhu. As we know by now, 
two main components comprise Zhu’s religious system, namely a body of claims 
regarding the nature of reality on the one hand, and on the other a goal for humanity 
based on this set of claims, the goal of sagehood and moral perfection. What need would 
each of these two have for gewu? The former, insofar as it comprises a set of views and 
ideas which one adopts beforehand when one engages in the study of Nature — and we 
have seen why we cannot avoid adopting beforehand some set of views regarding the 
nature of reality in such an endeavor — is at least in theory neither verifiable nor 
falsifiable by empirical evidence, so in view of that it may be said that it has no need for 
gewu. If anything, the reverse is true: gewu needs it. Consequently our attention shall 
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mainly be directed towards the goal of sagehood envisioned by Zhu, how gewu could 
help lead towards this goal, as Zhu clearly thought it would; if gewu could be shown to 
help lead towards it, the need of religion for science in Zhu Xi would then be established. 
There would of course be the important question by what means we could determine the 
truth of the body of views and ideas adopted beforehand in gewu, if not by empirical 
means. But this issue we shall have to deal with elsewhere in the present thesis.
 3.1.1 The characteristics of sagehood and how they are related
Let us take a closer look at the ideal of sagehood. In what does it consist? What 
characterizes a sage? A state of moral perfection would obviously be one of the marks of 
sagehood, but this does not suffice, another important feature of sagehood being the
ability to penetrate the li of all things. This special ability warrants further examination, 
one place to begin being Zhu’s thoughts on how our xin (mind/heart) ‘responds’ to things 
as it encounters them. 
Zhu once employed the analogy of a mirror in Book 16 of the Conversations. ‘The 
human xin is like a mirror. At first there is no image in it; only when a thing comes along 
is the reflection of its beauty or ugliness seen. Had some other image already been 
present in the mirror, how could the mirror properly reflect the thing? 人心如一箇鏡，
先未有一箇影象，有事物來，方始照見妍醜。若先有一箇影象在裏，如何照
得？’186 Zhu went on to elaborate that our xin is likewise originally ‘empty and bright’ 
(xuming 虚明) and merely ‘responds (ying, as in ganying, ‘stimulus-and-response’) to 
things as they come along, the details regarding their being high or low, heavy or light etc 




當依前恁地虚，方得。’ Had various emotions such as fear and anger been present in 
the xin beforehand, been allowed into the xin through encounters with certain things, or 
lingered on in the xin even after the things had gone away, that would have led to what he 
termed a lack of rectitude (buzheng 不正), this referring presumably to one’s now 
distorted view of things. As one would expect, the sage is free from this. ‘The xin of a 
sage is empty and bright, without any specks or traces of things.聖人之心，瑩然虚明，
無纖毫形迹。’187 Thus being emotionally unattached to all things is for Zhu an ideal to 
be sought which is realized in the sage. It is an ideal as emotions tend to distort our view 
of things, consequent upon which our understanding of their li would likewise miss the 
mark. This, then, comprises a further attribute of sagehood.
We find yet a further mark of sagehood again in the ability of the sage to grasp the li
of things without the use of words and concepts, relying merely instead on what Zhu 
called xiang, which translates as ‘image’, ‘appearance’, ‘shape’ or ‘form’. “Scholars who 
understand by words are shallow; those who understand by the xiang are deep.學者於言
上會得者淺，於象上會得者深。”188 Elsewhere Zhu went further and maintained that 
the sage does not even need to think, reflect or ponder in order to penetrate the li of 
things. 
Not thinking and yet being able to penetrate all things — that is being a sage; having to think 
and only after that being able to penetrate all things — that is being intelligent (rui)... Nor is the 
sage a clod that only budges when prodded by people (as might be thought of someone/something 
that does not think)… it is merely that at the very point of starting to think the penetration has 






Xiang may be understood generally to refer to the outward appearances of things, 
their visual manifestations, but as Yung Sik Kim noted, there is also a special association 
of the term with numbers and the hexagrams of the Yijing, numbers here being given in 
turn various special qualitative associations of a numerological nature rather than being 
employed simply as ways of quantifying various Natural phenomena, as in modern 
science. “Where there is this li, there is this xiang, and where there is this xiang, its 
numbers are here naturally. 有是理，則有是象；有是象，則其數便自在這裏。”190
Indeed there has been in the Chinese milieu an entire tradition devoted specifically to the 
study of the numbers and xiang with a view to unlocking through them the deepest 
mysteries of Nature, Zhu being aware of this tradition which he took quite seriously.
Xiang, shu and the Yijing comprise a large area of study which we cannot enter too 
far here, but a few things can be noted. To begin with, as observed by Richard J. Smith, 
‘there are as many versions of the Changes as there are readers of the document and 
commentators upon it.’191 The protean nature of the Yijing simply makes it all things to 
all people, and down the ages some have even seen fit to add fresh contents of their own 
to the work, whence the hetu 河圖 (Yellow River Chart) and luoshu 洛書 (Luo River 
Writing), two diagrams ‘of relatively recent provenance but ancient pedigree’,192 which
were taken quite seriously by Zhu Xi and found their way into imperially authorized
editions of the Yijing. According to On-cho Ng and Yu Dunkang 余敦康,193 however, 
two major schools of interpretation of this work took up most of Zhu Xi’s attention, one 
of them being the yili義理 (‘Righteousness and Principle’) school, of which Cheng Hao 
was one outstanding representative and which focused on the moral content of the text 
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accompanying the hexagrams in the Yijing. The other was the xiangshu (‘Image and 
Number’) school, traceable to the Han Confucians, which focused instead, in Ng’s words, 
on ‘the elaboration of the system of hexagrams into grandiose but finicky formulations of 
the workings of the universe in terms of cosmological and numerological schemas’.194
The two were viewed by Zhu Xi as biased in opposite ways. The xiangshu school, Zhu 
judged, was clearly wrong in its negligence of moral issues, but on the other hand Zhu 
did seriously believe with this school that special mathematical patterns, such as those 
enshrined in the hetu and luoshu, were inherent in the nature of things (though he also 
believed that the xiangshu school had misconstrued the said patterns by mixing all sorts 
of artificial elements into them), and in this respect he faulted the yili school for failing to 
take the said patterns into consideration in its interpretations.
As I see them, the xiang and shu constitute a special conceptual schema for 
understanding the workings of the Natural world, a schema which for all we know might 
evolve into a credible and effective science like Newtonian mechanics, given the right 
conditions for development. We also know at this point, however, that different schemata 
can be employed in understanding the same aspects of reality. What does this say about 
the place of xiang and shu, then, in Zhu’s conception of gewu? Must we adhere 
exclusively to the schema of xiang and shu when engaging in gewu, meaning we may no 
longer look upon modern scientific research (which does not employ this schema) as a 
form of gewu? I believe the answer is no. Recall what Zhu said on the ultimate 
ineffability of li, his avoidance of conceptual fixation, and his concession to the authoring 
of new ideas and concepts in articulating fresh insights. Taken together, what these three 
suggest is that gewu need not entail a strict adherence to the schema of xiang and shu,
121
121
that indeed it should not be strictly adhered to to the exclusion of other schemata. This 
schema may have a place, but other schemata may also be employed.
Hence, to return to what Zhu said on the ability of the sage to grasp the li of things 
without the use of words and concepts, this shall be understood simply as being capable 
of dispensing with words and concepts and grasping the nature of all things in what one 
might call a direct, unmediated manner. (The possibility of this shall be argued for in due 
course.) This would of course be in agreement with Zhu’s view of the li as ultimately 
ineffable. We need not be unduly concerned with how xiang and shu are to be factored 
into this ability of the sage.
How might this non-reliance on words and concepts, this ability to penetrate all things 
without reflective thought, tie in with the xin of the sage being empty and bright, whereby 
the qualities of all things are revealed to it as they come along? One reason not to rely 
unduly on words and concepts is that they limit one’s perception of things so that one can 
only look at things in certain ways. Words and concepts always come loaded with some 
specific view of things which is inevitably assumed beforehand as one employs them. 
Thus if, for example, I study the motion of physical bodies using concepts derived from 
Newtonian mechanics, whereby physical motion is viewed in terms of particles, and if I 
insist on this way of studying physical motion to the exclusion of other possible options 
whereby physical motion may be viewed instead in terms of, say, waves, it is only likely 
that I may stand to miss out on certain other important aspects of physical motion, 
leaving me with a partial understanding of it. Reality may be so multifaceted that no 
single account of it in words and concepts can ever do it full justice. My attachment to a
specific way of viewing things will therefore make me like the odd mirror in Zhu’s 
122
122
analogy that has images present in it beforehand, so that it cannot reveal properly the 
images of things that come along. Being empty of all attachments is therefore tied in with 
the avoidance of inflexible thinking, of ‘conceptual fixation’ in Zhu. And to continue 
with the above example on physical motion, even if I broaden the scope of my studies by 
acquainting myself with as many accounts of the nature of physical motion as I can, so as 
not to face the charge of being partial towards any of them, ultimately this will still not 
suffice as I am still relying on words and concepts, on second-hand accounts of the nature 
of physical motion. It is necessary that I study physical motion in a direct and unmediated 
manner as well.
To speak of grasping the nature of things in a direct and unmediated manner, without 
the use of words and concepts, would appear plainly to contradict what has been 
maintained so far on the perennial need for a priori conceptual schemata in all forms of 
empirical observation. This apparent contradiction shall be dealt with in due course; for 
now the thing to note is that, to the extent one is not attached to the specific view of 
things which comes with the words and concepts one uses in apprehending the world, one 
has that much less of an attachment and is that much closer to the ideal state of being free 
of all attachments whereby one becomes capable of ‘responding’ to things as they come 
along without the errors caused by the said attachments.
How in turn are all these connected with the ideal of moral perfection? To consider 
first the attribute of being free from attachments, the connection lies in Zhu’s conception 
of moral rectitude as consisting in the eradication of personal desires to preserve the li of 
Heaven, our attachments being none other than a form of personal desire. ‘Humanity has 
just gong (the public, what is shared by or common to all) and si (the private, that which
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pertains to one’s individual self, being often given negative connotations of selfishness);
all things under Heaven just come down to the evil and the good. To defer to the great
principle of all things under Heaven in dealing with all matters: this is gong; to defer to 
one’s own selfish intentions in one’s dealings: this is si. 人只有一箇公私，天下只有一
箇邪正。將天下正大底道理去處置事，便公；以自家私意去處之，便私。’195 Li, 
we recall, is always conceived of as the supreme source and arbiter of what is morally 
good; personal desires only work to obstruct its operations. As for the attribute of being 
capable of penetrating the li of all things without the use of words and concepts, it should 
only be expected that a mind in possession of such an attribute, being capable of grasping
more readily the li of things, would in consequence be better endowed to abide by its 
dictates than a mind that had to ‘ponder’ or ‘reflect’ on it first. Readiness of recognition 
suggests a high degree of familiarity, which can only conduce to acting on the demands 
of the li with fidelity.
In the context of Zhu’s vision of all things forming a single living organism, the sage 
may perhaps be viewed as a cell or organ in this organism which is perfectly healthy and 
functional. The behavior of this cell or organ is all fully directed towards bringing about 
and maintaining the optimal state or condition of ‘fellow’ cells or organs and hence that 
of the entire organism, with behavioral disorders caused by such factors as selfish desires, 
lack of knowledge etc being totally absent in this sagely cell or organ as these factors 
have all been rooted out by its own efforts. Non-sages would be ‘normal’ cells or organs 
in which the said factors are still present in large measure or have not been fully 
eliminated, resulting in possible or actual deviations in behavior from what would 
conduce fully to the organism’s well-being, as in the case of cancer cells.
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 3.1.2 How gewu would lead to the development of the attributes of sagehood
Such, then, are the three marks of sagehood as recognized by Zhu: (1) moral 
perfection; (2) the ability to ‘respond’ to all things readily without any personal 
attachments; and (3) the ability to penetrate the li of all things directly, without using 
words and concepts. To what extent other Confucians would concur with Zhu on these 
marks of sagehood need not concern us here (though they should surely agree on (1)).
Would gewu lead to the development of these three, and if so how? With respect to (1), 
the matter appears easily resolved at first sight: since li, the ultimate source of all moral 
values, is present in all, investigating things naturally leads to a greater knowledge of li,
and hence to the goal of moral edification. Also, if all creation (including oneself) forms 
a single living body and partakes of one and the same li, gewu would only be likely to
lead to a greater awareness of this unity of self and other. One then realizes that the well-
being of others and oneself are inseparable, that one does unto oneself whatever one does 
unto others, leading again to the goal of moral edification.
The sense of all creation forming a single living whole would only be reinforced by 
the concepts of yin, yang and wuxing examined earlier, which certainly would comprise 
part of the conceptual apparatus one employs in gewu. The constant interchange of yin
and yang and of the Five Agents through the process of ganying is plainly suggestive of 
the maintenance of some balanced, optimal state — such as what takes place in a living 
organism — throughout the Cosmos.
The greater knowledge of li acquired through gewu would quite conceivably lead as 
well to an increasing familiarity with the different manifestations of li and how it operates 
in different domains of reality. So much so, my ability to grasp the workings and 
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manifestations of li in various concrete situations would gradually become second nature, 
making all deliberations on such matters superfluous, just as a skilled acrobat no longer 
needs to ponder on his/her moves. In this way, it would not appear inappropriate to think
of gewu as leading to (3). Also, we have seen in Zhu the need to refrain from ‘forming 
our own opinions first’ in investigating things, to ‘view things from their perspectives’; 
sustained efforts at gewu in this respect could only lead ever closer to the goal of (2), 
whereby one sets aside all preconceived preferences in apprehending the li of all things.
Learning to view things from their perspectives can also lead in the direction of (1). 
Perspective-taking, where one acquires a greater awareness of other points of view 
besides his/her own and takes them into account in what one says and does rather than 
seeking simply to impose or enforce his/her own point of view at all times, has been 
acknowledged as an important aspect of the individual’s moral development. A person 
who fails to understand or even acknowledge the existence of viewpoints besides his/her 
own is morally speaking only likely to be a liability for others and society — and in this 
respect gewu, which entails viewing things from their perspectives, does not appear 
unlikely to serve as an excellent corrective.
One feature of Zhu’s thought which would be of special relevance here with respect 
to (1) is the frequent use, when discussing nonhuman Nature, of ideas and concepts 
which modern minds would otherwise consider applicable only in the domain of morality 
and human relationships. Indeed at times these ideas and concepts are even assigned a 
cosmological significance. Take the idea of cheng, meaning ‘honesty’ or ‘sincerity’ in 
common usage. ‘Cheng is the end and beginning of things; without cheng they will not 
exist. 誠者，物之終始，不誠無物。’196 Zhu cited this from another source and did not 
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elaborate, but clearly here cheng is no longer merely a human virtue but an essential part 
of phenomenal reality or our apprehension of it. (Interestingly, Zhu was not in fact the 
first in the Chinese milieu to expand on the meaning of cheng in this way; similar 
augmentations of the term’s meaning could be found in other sources, one being the 
Zhongyong or Doctrine of the Mean.) Or consider the virtues of ren and yi. We have seen 
how they were associated by Zhu with some of the Five Agents. Zhu also considered ren
and yi as embodied or manifested in various members of the animal kingdom in view of 
the special forms of behavior exhibited by them, such as ‘the sense of parent and child 
among tigers and wolves or of ruler and minister among bees and ants’ noted earlier, 
calling them renshou 仁獸 and yishou 義獸 accordingly, animals that exhibit ren and
yi.197 In addition one finds in Book 32 of the Conversations a considerable amount of 
discussion on how ren and zhi知(knowledge, being knowledgeable) should be associated 
with rest or movement, with winter or spring, which one should be associated with 
which,198 this discussion being prompted by a well-known passage in the Analects to the 
effect that ‘Those with zhi delight in water and those with ren delight in mountains; those 
with zhi move while those with ren are still. 知者樂水，仁者樂山。知者動，仁者
静。’199 As one might have anticipated, given Zhu’s aversion to ‘conceptual fixation’, he
rejected a fixed association of either virtue with either concept, but the point to note here 
is that such a discussion could take place at all, which again points to an understanding in 
Zhu of (what are otherwise merely) moral qualities as comprising an aspect of empirical 
reality. Had such an understanding of moral qualities not been entertained, one would 
then have expected the abovementioned discussion to have been aborted at the very 
outset as it would have been thought of as a confused misapplication of concepts.
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For one final example of the interrelatedness of moral ideas and nonhuman Nature we 
may take note of what Yung Sik Kim described as the ‘Four Cosmic Qualities’, a set of 
four characters which first appeared in the Yijing — yuan元, heng亨, li利 and zhen貞. 
In the context of the Yijing the Four were assigned special and somewhat obscure 
meanings rather at variance with those given to them in common usage, but whatever the 
case may be, in Zhu the Four ‘were closely connected with the four seasons and thus 
were routinely associated with characteristic attributes of the seasons,’200 though also 
with other things such as the four cardinal directions and the organs of the body. Thus, 
for example, ‘Warm is yuan, hot is heng, cool is li and cold is zhen. 温底是元，熱底是
亨，涼底是利，寒底是貞。 ’ 201 Indeed the ‘Four Cosmic Qualities’ seemed to 
constitute for Zhu yet another classificatory schema for all sorts of Natural phenomena, in 
addition to the yin, yang and wuxing, and here again, one might have guessed, the Four 
are associated with moral virtues. ‘Ren, yi, li and zhi are yuan, heng, li and zhen. If there 
were no germination in spring, there would be no growth in summer, nor any harvesting 
and storage in autumn and winter.仁義禮智，便是元亨利貞。若春間不曾發生，得到
夏無缘得長，秋冬亦無可收藏。’202 ‘To speak of them in terms of the Way of Heaven, 
[they] are yuan, heng, li and zhen. To speak of them in terms of the four seasons, [they] 
are spring, summer, autumn and winter. To speak of them in terms of the Way of 
Humanity, [they] are ren, yi, li and zhi.以天道言之，爲元亨利貞，以四時言之，爲春
夏秋冬，以人道言之，爲仁義禮智。。。’203
We are therefore led to the conclusion that the customary demarcations drawn by 
modern minds between moral and phenomenal/Natural categories are largely 
unacknowledged in Zhu; moral concepts are often equally applicable in understanding 
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various aspects of phenomenal or empirical reality. Empirical reality for Zhu was never
something value-neutral sitting ‘out there’, as Zhao Feng and Jin Chunfeng apparently 
thought. Given this, the pursuit of gewu can only instill a sense of moral values as deeply 
embedded in the grain of reality, and therefore as suodangran, as something to be 
followed as a matter of course. This would clearly lead in the direction of moral 
development, towards the first of the three attributes of sagehood enumerated shortly 
before. On the basis of the foregone, then, the investigation of things as conceived by Zhu 
does exhibit every semblance of leading towards the exalted ideal of sagehood.
 3.1.3 Justifying Zhu Xi’s use of moral concepts in understanding nonhuman 
Nature
The matter regarding the prospects of moral development to be found in gewu, 
unfortunately, turns out not to be that easily resolved: some of the ideas and concepts 
adopted beforehand in gewu as one’s conceptual apparatus do present certain difficulties, 
chiefly among them the application of moral ideas to the domain of nonhuman Nature, 
which we have been discussing. How justifiable is such an application? Does it not 
amount to a gross anthropomorphism whereby all of Nature is endowed with human 
qualities? When, after all, was the last time a falling brick altered its trajectory and speed 
of descent to avoid striking someone on the head? Clearly how we resolve this matter 
would be of every consequence for the relationship between science and religion in Zhu 
Xi; in the absence of any confidence in the plausibility and soundness of the basic 
conceptual apparatus employed in gewu, one could hardly expect of anyone the 
development of any sagely qualities in embarking on this path. Indeed even whether a 
scientific side appertains to Zhu’s thought might require reconsideration. Nor may the 
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issue, one fears, be resolved simply through an appeal to the possibility, discussed before, 
of having several different conceptual schemata in studying the same aspects of 
phenomenal reality, a possibility implying that we need not and should not insist on any 
specific schema to the exclusion of others, such as those that view moral qualities as 
inherent in nonhuman Nature. Just because we can have a plurality of different schemata 
does not mean that anything goes, surely, that a schema declaring everything made of 
blue cheese is a viable option. Newtonian and Hamilton-Jacobi mechanics might both 
prove equally competent at explaining various aspects of physical motion, leaving us no 
grounds for insisting on either, but both of them view nonhuman Nature as just that —
nonhuman. How would a third contender fare if it imposed human categories on 
nonhuman Nature, as in the case of Zhu Xi?
For a start, there are good reasons to doubt that Zhu would have meant, in applying 
moral concepts to various aspects of nonhuman Nature, that nonhuman Nature really 
engages in acts of moral deliberation the same way a human individual would. Nature 
could be moral in some different sense. The same word or concept can sometimes, if not 
often, be applied to very different spheres of reality, in each of which it acquires a 
different sense specific to that sphere. The concept of beauty, for example, can be 
variously applied to paintings, poems, mathematical proofs, and people who are 
supremely virtuous. A virtuous person would not be beautiful the same way a 
mathematical proof is beautiful, though of course some sense of what being beautiful 
consists in is retained which is common to all of the different domains where it finds 
application.204 May the story not be a similar one with respect to Zhu’s understanding of 
morality? We may recall, regarding the concept of ‘the Mind of Heaven and Earth’, how 
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Zhu maintained the need to understand in what sense Heaven and Earth have a mind and 
in what sense they have no mind. Zhu was very clear that Heaven and Earth do not 
deliberate as a human individual does. In a similar vein, one would expect that nonhuman 
Nature ought not to be thought of in Zhu as entertaining moral intentions and acting upon 
them like we find in the human world, except perhaps in the case of certain species of 
animals — what Zhu termed renshou and yishou — and then only in a limited manner.
But in what alternative sense may nonhuman Nature be reckoned as manifesting 
moral qualities, if not in the usual sense of consciously performing morally motivated 
acts? To examine this issue, let us start with cheng, sincerity or honesty. Recalling what 
Zhu said on cheng being the end and beginning of things and the impossibility of their 
existence without cheng, one would like to ask why this should be the case. Now, cheng
basically means being truthful, being faithful to what is true. And from what we have 
gathered of Zhu’s thought so far, a great deal of it is concerned of course with the nature 
of li and how to grasp it and abide by it. Li is the very raison d’tre of all things
(suoyiran); not to abide by the li is simply to deny to oneself one’s reason to exist, hence 
the value of seeking to know the li and to live in accordance with its dictates. Would it 
not be appropriate in this respect to regard the Ten Thousand Things as exhibiting cheng
insofar as they are being true to the li by being true to their own respective natures, their 
xing? Cheng consists mainly in desisting from all acts of deception, and one’s own self 
can fall prey as much as others to one’s tricks of deception, as when one fancies that s/he 
knows the li inside out and is living in accordance with it even though that may not be the 
case — hence Zhu’s warning against ziqi or self-deception. The Ten Thousand Things 
could thus be considered as exhibiting the quality of cheng to the extent that they do not 
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engage in ziqi and hence do not deviate from their xing, what is right and natural, 
suodangran, for them. If they did, their existence would be in jeopardy, one major reason 
being that they come together to form a single living whole, upon the existence of which 
their own is predicated and which hangs together only on the condition that they remain 
faithful to their xing. Cheng, understood as being faithful to the li, would thus no longer 
be a mere human virtue but the very end and beginning of things indeed, nor would it 
seem implausible that the fabric of reality would simply unravel in its absence.
This analysis of cheng actually finds confirmation in Needham. On discussing the 
meaning of cheng in the Zhong Yong, he commented:
The Chung Yung, punning, says, ‘He who is sincere (chhng), perfects (chhng) himself.誠者
自成也。’ This gives the clue that chhng is a quality essentially capable of inhering in an 
individual and not arising only from the relations between individuals. It is therefore a question 
rather of what might be called ‘integrity’, of being sincere with oneself, of not deluding oneself 
nor acting contrary to one’s true nature. The Chung Yung also says, ‘Sincerity is the Tao of 
Heaven; to apply oneself to sincerity is the Tao of Man’, indicating that it transcends the human 
sphere. Heaven has chhng because it faithfully follows its true nature and does nothing against its 
Tao… In this way we come to the realisation that chhng is achieved when every organism fulfils 
with absolute precision whatever its function may be in the higher organism of which it forms a 
part… 205
We now see how we can ‘read’ the concept of cheng so it can encompass the domain 
of Nature’s workings as well as that of ethical and social concerns. What about the other 
moral concepts, such as ren and yi? Here the story is not entirely different. Recall Zhu’s 
association of ren with wood and yi with metal in his discussions on the Five Forces. 
Wood (in its natural state) is alive and grows, which corresponds to ren as a virtue being
concerned with the preservation and nurturing of life, yi being associated on the other 
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hand with metal because of the quality of hardness shared by this virtue with metal. Yi
has the meaning of setting one’s own interests aside to preserve or uphold those of the 
group or social whole of which one is a member, and setting aside one’s own interests in 
the name of yi does conceivably require a certain strength of character which makes one 
think of the strength of metal. Now, may we not in consequence think of certain aspects 
of Nature, namely wood and metal, as exhibiting moral qualities like ren and yi in a 
similar fashion to the way Nature in general exhibits cheng? All things in Nature remain 
faithful (most of the time anyway) to their xing, thereby exhibiting the quality of cheng; 
water giving rise to wood shows the arising of the organic out of the inorganic in Nature, 
which corresponds to ren, a virtue concerned with the nurturing of life. In this way it does 
not appear inappropriate to assert that Nature manifests various kinds of behavior which 
allow for the application of various moral concepts.
Also, as with cheng, Zhu’s idea of the Ten Thousand Things coming together to form 
a single living body ought to provide further justification for the use of such concepts as 
ren and yi in understanding aspects of Natural phenomena. If the continued existence of a 
living whole qua a living whole is to be ensured, the constituent parts must not ‘concern’
themselves only with their ‘individual’ interests, but ‘seek’ to support each other (not 
necessarily in the conscious sense in which a human seeks something, but rather more 
like water following its xing by ‘seeking’ lower ground) — a form of behavior found 
today to be commonplace in Nature. An example can be found in an ecosystem, 
recognizable as an integral whole comprised of various species which conspire to 
maintain through their behavior the integrity of the system of which they form a part, as 
if each of these species acknowledged the existence of certain limits to their behavior the 
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transgression of which would threaten the whole system. A similar example is readily 
available when we look at the human body, with its constituent cells, tissues and organs 
working together to keep the whole body in working order rather than each following its 
own caprices, whereupon the whole would come undone. How far-fetched would it be to 
view these examples as manifestations of yi in Nature?
It is far-fetched if not entirely inappropriate, some might object, for the reason that 
moral virtues are things which are developed through making conscious, moral choices,
which do not exist in nonhuman Nature. In a way this objection begs the question against 
Zhu, as it rests on a view of moral virtues as primarily human with respect to their nature 
and origin; first there are certain things manifested in the human mind, and then one 
considers the appropriateness of applying them to Nature. This would presumably be 
Zhang Liwen’s stand. Why can it not be the other way around, though, as in certain 
things being considered firstly as fundamental aspects of reality, their specific 
manifestations in different spheres of reality, such as the human sphere, being then taken 
into account afterwards? It could be that what we call moral virtues first arose in the 
Cosmos in the guise of certain inclinations on the part of the Ten Thousand Things to 
follow certain patterns of behavior — to come together to form integral wholes with 
definite characteristics as wholes, for example, and then to seek to maintain the integrity 
of these wholes; only with the appearance of humankind in the Universe did the said 
inclinations manifest themselves in the form of what we call social consciousness, 
morality and virtues such as ren and yi. Those inclinations could be thought of as being 
ingrained in the very substance of reality. Such an idea need not seem so far-fetched or 
implausible; after all, there was the Universe first before there were human beings — as 
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Zhu Xi would have concurred, who subscribed to the idea of an endless series of cosmic 
cycles of creation and destruction, with humans being absent at the commencement of 
each cycle when the Cosmos is created afresh and appearing only some time after — and 
insofar as the latter are a part of the former the same may be said of any special forms of 
behavior exhibited by the latter, in consequence of which one could surely consider the 
said forms of behavior as arising from or manifestations of certain more primal or 
fundamental forces or elements encrypted somehow in the fabric of reality.
If we allow for this, conscious choice may then be regarded as merely the way in 
which things like ren and cheng are manifested in that part of reality called humankind;
in other spheres of reality they may manifest themselves in different ways which do not 
entail the exercising of conscious choice, because the native ‘occupants’ of those other 
spheres do not need or possess the faculties of (human) consciousness and choice-
making. Thus that which manifests itself as yi in the human domain, we could speak of as 
assuming a different guise in the animal and plant kingdoms, being, we could say, the 
tendency of different species to maintain the integrity of the ecosystems comprised by 
them; in the physical body of an individual living organism it may be found in that 
inclination on the part of the body’s constituent cells and tissues to work in unison so the 
body may function properly as a whole; and in other domains of reality, the subatomic, 
for example, there might be yet other manifestations of it. This ought to fit in well with 
Zhu’s assertion that li is one but its manifestations are many, and that the li does not 
function in the same way among the Ten Thousand Things.
It may incidentally be possible, on the basis of the above, for a modern defender of 
Zhu Xi to spell out a special defense in response to an attack some might launch against 
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Zhu. The idea of positive moral values being a fundamental aspect of the Natural/ 
phenomenal world, the attackers charge, is clearly an absurdity in view of the countless 
acts of violence occurring daily in Nature — ‘Nature Red in Tooth and Claw’. How can 
we take Zhu seriously anymore once confronted with the gory spectacle of a tiger feeding 
on a deer? That life feeds on life and the strong prey on the weak is surely the more 
correct view than Zhu’s hopelessly deluded one. Zhu, of course, has spoken of the 
denseness and opacity of the constituent qi of the animals as an explanation for such 
apparently reprehensible behavior on their part, but on the basis of what he has said on 
the nature of li I would venture a further possible reply to the effect that such behavior is 
part of the way the li operates in the animal world. In the human world, li operates 
through the realization of moral and social values, whereas elsewhere li operates 
differently. There are different ways of abiding by the li, of maintaining the integrity of 
the cosmic organism, each appropriate only in its own special domain. In that part of the 
cosmic organism called the animal world this function is performed through the predator-
and-prey relationship, whereas in the human world it would be performed through the 
exercising of virtues like cheng, ren and yi — the way they are manifested in the human 
sphere. To judge by the standards of human morality the behavior of the animals would 
therefore be inappropriate, as it would equally be for human beings to seek to emulate the 
ways of the animals. The animals are performing the functions assigned to them by the li, 
too, but in their own different way.
Animals which prey on other animals are also known to harbor little malice against 
their prey. They kill for food or in self-defense, not for fun or out of hatred. Citing the 
work of various scientists, contemporary ecologist Edward Goldsmith also informs us 
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that ‘The truth seems to be that animals seek to avoid competition, or rather avoid its 
more destructive manifestations.’206 Thus different species of living things are found to 
adapt themselves to different ways of life, so much so that they can and are known to 
coexist ‘without competing, because they eat different foods, or are active at different 
times, or otherwise occupy different niches.’207 The picture of the Natural world as an 
arena where the gory struggle for survival is constantly played out is therefore at best a 
biased and partial one — not unlikely to have been popularized for ulterior ideological 
motives. 208 We would do well to compliment this picture with one of Nature as a 
cooperative ‘enterprise’ as implied by Zhu’s thought, with the Ten Thousand Things 
‘working’ together to preserve the integrity of the whole.
It is incidentally of interest here to recall that there is a destructive aspect to the 
workings of Nature in Zhu’s understanding, as manifested in the destruction cycle of the 
Five Agents discussed before, where water puts out fire, which melts metal, which cuts 
wood, etc, all for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of the world-organism. It would 
not seem inappropriate to view the predator-and-prey relationship as yet a different 
manifestation of this destructive aspect of Nature.
All in all, the difference between human behavior and the forms of behavior exhibited 
by nonhuman Nature appears to pose little threat to Zhu’s notion of moral qualities as 
woven into the fabric of reality. To be sure, the specific associations conceived of by Zhu 
for certain moral virtues, such as li (propriety, ritual) with fire, do appear “arbitrary and 
forced” (Kim).209 “Someone asked again: ‘How does li belong to fire?’ Zhu replied: ‘By 
virtue of its brightness.’又問：禮如何屬火？曰：以其光明。”210 But examples like
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this still need not invalidate the more ‘reasonable’ associations and hence Zhu’s central 
thesis of the moral as something cosmological rather than exclusively human.
A source of perplexity yet remains, though. One might voice the complaint that Zhu 
has been guilty of stretching the meanings of certain terms way beyond their legitimate 
scope. Granting that something bearing a special semblance to ren, cheng and various 
other elements of human morality may indeed be found in what we observe of the 
Natural/phenomenal world, ultimately it is surely still different in some important sense 
from things like benevolence and sincerity as manifested in the human world. Should not 
some different terminology be employed, then, in naming those presumed manifestations 
of human morality in the nonhuman domain? To employ terms like cheng, ren etc for this 
purpose would seem to amount to a plain anthropomorphism, to reading too much of 
ourselves into Nature. Needham, as we have seen, voiced a very similar complaint when 
commenting on Zhu’s use of such terms as gui and shen in speaking of the dispersion and 
condensation of qi. My reply is twofold.
First, the concepts we use in our various intellectual endeavors do not remain 
unchanged down the generations; often they undergo modifications to accommodate 
fresh insights we may arrive at in the said endeavors. This ought to be true of the 
development of Western science down the centuries; the word ‘planet’ means a very 
different thing today, for example, from what it meant before Newton and Copernicus. 
Many more examples can be supplied. Why, then, could Zhu and the other Song 
Confucians not be permitted to expand the scope of the concepts of cheng, ren, yi etc in 
accordance to new insights they might have arrived at? Once people employing the 
modified concepts fully grasp Zhu’s reasons for modifying them, they need not commit 
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the error of thinking of Nature as being actually moral the way humans are moral, as is 
presumably the concern of those voicing the ‘anthropomorphism’ objection. Certainly 
few today using the term ‘planet’ still consider the sun and moon as planets anymore, or 
think of the planets as going round the Earth. Now, none of this, of course, forbids the 
creation of new terms and concepts (as opposed to the modification of existing ones), but 
what on the other hand would necessitate their creation in the present case?
Some might point in response at the presumed anthropomorphism of the said moral 
concepts. Concepts employed for providing an account of nonhuman Nature (or aspects 
of it) should be purged of all human elements, should they not? This leads us to the 
second part of my reply, namely that if we want to be really strict about it, there can be 
no concepts ever which are not contaminated by any human elements. The reason is that 
all concepts ever formulated by human beings are ipso facto based on human experiences 
— which already entails the presence of human elements in the concepts created. A 
concept truly devoid of all human elements would be one no human could understand or 
relate to; it would presumably have to be created by some nonhuman mind whose 
experiences of the Ten Thousand Things are utterly different from those of any human.
Consider the concept of a force, one of the most basic concepts of modern physics.
This concept — defined in the science textbooks of primary school children as ‘a push or 
a pull’ — appears decently free of all human elements. The only trouble is that our 
understanding of it is inevitably predicated on our personal experiences of pushing and 
pulling, and being pushed or pulled. There can be no concept for elucidating any aspect 
of reality but must draw upon (shared) human experiences of that aspect of reality. In 
certain respects the concept of a force may not be any less contaminated by human 
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elements than Zhu’s concept of cheng as applied to nonhuman Nature.
To be sure, a view of Natural phenomena being willed into occurrence by a conscious 
agent or host of such agents, presumably with human feelings — such as, say, a god of 
thunder — would indeed constitute an extreme form of anthropomorphism, but as we 
have seen such a view is not found in Zhu. He acknowledged that nonhuman Nature does 
not behave the way humankind does, though at the same time he perceived special 
similarities in the ways of behavior found in the two camps, similarities warranting the 
application of terms like cheng etc to both and accounted for by the presence in both of 
the very same li. There seems no special reason to stress the differences instead, but a 
very good reason to stress the similarities, that being to help instill in the individual 
engaged in gewu a view of the moral as a part of the Natural order of things, and 
therefore as suodangran, as something to abide by as a matter of course, thus gaining 
him/her credits in his/her moral development.
The whole schema of ‘human’ versus ‘nonhuman’ may in fact be ultimately of 
limited application in the present context (as far as the concepts we come up with for 
elucidating various aspects of reality are concerned), both domains being presided over 
by one and the same li. This could incidentally offer an interesting explanation for the 
apparently ‘amphibious’ nature of various words and concepts we use in everyday 
communication which are applicable to both human experience and different aspects of 
nonhuman Nature. Thus, for example, there may be something about a light that makes 
me squint that elicits in me certain feelings similar to certain other feelings I have when I 
come across a ten-year-old who understands Kant, whereupon I use the word ‘bright’ to 
describe both. May it not be because there is a part of the li of humanity which partakes 
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of the li of light, as would be allowed for in Zhu’s conception of li, that this dual use of 
the word ‘bright’ should appear to us as legitimate, indeed occur to us in the first place?
That all things partake of the same li may be just what enables humankind to ‘resonate’ 
readily with the diverse aspects of nonhuman Nature and to discern various ‘parallels’
between them and different forms of human experience, thereby allowing for such dual 
uses of words and concepts. To give another example, something about a string being 
stretched so taut it could snap at any time elicits in me certain feelings similar to what I 
feel when I have a lot of work to finish before a close deadline, whereupon I come up 
with the word ‘stress’ to describe both types of phenomena. Again, may it not be that
there is something about the li of physical objects which the li of humanity partakes of, as 
would once again be warranted by Zhu’s conception of li, thereby legitimizing yet again
the application of the word ‘stress’ to both of the above situations? Many more examples 
can be cited (and not just in English). And if we can allow for such ‘amphibious’ uses of 
the said words and concepts, why not moral concepts like cheng, ren and yi?
This ‘resonance’, this sympathy which enables me to understand various aspects of
nonhuman Nature through ‘parallels’ with different forms of human experience, may be 
precisely one of the most important aspects of gewu and also one which finds special 
support in the whole conception of li, thereby hinting at the need of science for religion in 
Zhu Xi, as shall be discussed at greater length in the next section. For now let us turn to 
another issue of significance — the exaltation of humankind in Confucian thought.
At least from the Han Dynasty onwards, humankind has always been regarded in 
Confucian thought as the crowning glory of all creation. Confucius’ assertion that “It is 
humankind that makes the Dao great, not the Dao that makes humankind great, 人能弘
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道，非道弘人。”211 certainly can be understood as saying that the Dao finds Its ultimate 
expression or fulfillment in the human race. The Han Confucian Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒
stated quite unambiguously that “Of the creatures born from the refined essence of 
Heaven and Earth, none is more noble than man. Man receives the mandate from Heaven 
and is therefore superior to other creatures.天地之精，所以生物者，莫貴於人。人受
命乎天也，故超然有以倚。”212 And Zhu, as we have seen, endorsed the view that 
human beings alone are able to penetrate fully the li on account of the constitution of 
their qi, which is not ‘opaque and obstructed’ like that of the animals. Leaving aside such 
issues as what arguments they put forward to defend this anthropocentric view — which 
certainly finds scant support in the terrible damage we humans have inflicted today on
our planetary environment — the question here to ask is: what special bearing might this 
exaltation of humankind have on the foregone regarding how the dictates of the li are 
followed in different spheres of reality? If we are supposed to stand supreme among the 
Ten Thousand Things, does the way we abide by the li likewise become the supreme way 
for the rest of creation to ‘aspire’ to or measure itself against? In which case can we still 
speak anymore of different ways of following the li, each appropriate only for its own 
special domain of reality? Should we not seek instead to impose on the rest of creation 
our way of abiding by the li?
My take on the matter is that superiority need not imply an ideal to be sought or 
attained — by the rest of creation in the present case. A position of superiority may need 
a position of inferiority and subordination to define itself against, making the latter 
indispensable. We may recall what Zhu said on the minister being the yin of the ruler, the 
child being the yin of the parent, and so on — illustrating clearly both the conception of 
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the yin as assuming a subordinate position and the need of the yang for the yin. The ruler 
may be superior, but there can be no ruler without minister. In a similar vein, it could be 
that despite the superior status of humankind the rest of creation is still obliged to observe 
in its own way what is required of its place in the scheme of things. It would still not be 
proper for the animals to seek to be like humankind (as if they have a choice in the 
matter), or for us to attempt to make them like us humans.
Speaking of choice, we may have here an answer to the possible question in just what 
sense humankind and its way of following the li may be regarded as superior. The answer 
could lie in our ability to choose. We can elect to follow the li through our own free will, 
out of our own understanding of the value thereof, in contrast to the rest of the Ten 
Thousand Things which can only follow the li the way an electric current obeys 
Kirchoff’s Laws: in an automated manner, so to speak, with no reflection on the suoyiran
of it. I am confident most if not all of the representative figures of traditional 
Confucianism would have conceded to this.
But ultimately, to employ the logic underlying Zhu’s avoidance of ‘conceptual 
fixation’, I believe that in the context of his thought one may speak of a sense in which 
humankind is superior to the rest of creation and also a sense in which there is no 
superiority or inferiority to speak of. Each option can be seen as telling part of the story. 
In a sense the brain may be the most important organ of the human body, being almost 
the one organ which defines what being human consists in, but from another point of 
view the brain, heart, lungs, liver etc are all of equal importance; a whole, normal and 
healthy human being cannot be a brain alone. Similarly the human race may stand in a 
sense at the apex of creation, yet in another sense the Ten Thousand Things have equal 
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status, being of equal importance in maintaining the integrity of the cosmic organism, and 
can only do so by being true to their own respective xing rather than seeking to emulate 
that of another, however exalted that other may be.
 3.1.4 Summary
I therefore submit that Zhu’s application of moral concepts to nonhuman Nature is 
entirely justified and that such application helps make gewu an effective means of 
fostering moral development. A summary of the present section follows:
(a) There are three major attributes of sagehood, the summum bonum of Zhu’s 
religious view. The three are moral perfection, the ability to grasp the li of all things 
without the use of language and thought, and a state of nonattachment to any 
preconceptions regarding the nature of things, whereupon one becomes like a mirror, 
reflecting or capturing the forms or images of all things faithfully. The three are all 
interrelated; each requires or leads to the other.
(b) Gewu, the investigation of things, which comprises the kernel of Zhu’s scientific 
thought, leads to the development of the three attributes by increasing one’s familiarity 
with the workings of the li in the Ten Thousand Things, encouraging the practice of 
‘perspective-taking’ whereby one learns to ‘view things from their perspectives’, and
providing a special conceptual apparatus through the use of which one learns to view 
what is moral as part of the Natural order of things.
(c) The application of moral concepts to nonhuman Nature makes up a special and 
important feature of the conceptual apparatus conceived by Zhu for the purpose of gewu
as it helps to instill a sense of what is moral as part of the Natural order. The said 
application finds justification in such phenomena as the formation of wholes such as 
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ecosystems or living organisms, the constituent parts of which seek to maintain the 
integrity of the wholes they constitute, thereby exhibiting forms of behavior which bear a 
measure of similarity to what we would consider as moral or prosocial behavior. It is 
clearly implied in Zhu on the other hand that morality is not manifested in nonhuman 
Nature the same way it is manifested in humankind, which absolves him of the charge of 
anthropomorphism in his thought.
We are led to the conclusion that the ideal of sagehood, the highest attainment 
envisioned for humankind in Zhu’s religious thought, is one towards which the 
investigation of things leads. This is how religion needs science, how religion finds its 
fulfillment in science in Zhu Xi. How about the converse, then? Of what use could 
religion be to science in Zhu Xi? Let us proceed to the next section to find out.
 3.2 How Science Needs Religion in Zhu Xi
That science could need religion at all might appear an unusual idea to many at first. 
Concerned as science is with uncovering the facts about Nature’s workings, what use 
could it have for something which serves instead as a basis or justification for various 
human values, and which all so often does so in a way not open to empirical verification?
To begin with, we know by now that every scientific endeavor is in fact unavoidably
‘guilty’ of the same thing, the adoption beforehand of a body of unverifiable ideas in the 
guise of a conceptual apparatus or schema, with all its tacit metaphysics. So if we can 
allow for this, why not go a step further and let this metaphysics be one adopted from a 
religion? And here gewu ought to provide precisely one excellent example of such an 
adoption. As conceived of by Zhu, the investigation of things is all about coming to know 
their li, the nature of which guides and informs virtually every aspect of gewu — what to 
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investigate, how to investigate, and so on. Thus Zhu Xi gives us a concrete illustration of 
how religion could be of use to science: as the supplier of a metaphysical basis.
This leads, however, to a question, namely what special reason we have to employ
any specific metaphysics or kind of metaphysics, in particular a religious over a non-
religious one, as an a priori conceptual schema in our scientific pursuits. Granting that no 
special reason exists for us not to subscribe to a metaphysics of a religious nature, what 
special reason on the other hand have we to do so? Why not a view of all creation as 
merely so much inert matter? A possible answer could lie in the affirmation of human 
values as opposed to their negation, which would indeed be a plus point in selecting a 
religious metaphysics. But a further answer may lie in a certain special problem present 
in the pursuit of scientific knowledge, indeed any form of knowledge. If the adoption of a 
religious metaphysics could be shown to lead to the solution for this problem — an 
example of such a metaphysics being Zhu’s system again, as shall be shown as well —
that would certainly constitute a compelling case for such an adoption.
 3.2.1 A problem with the acquisition of knowledge
What is the said problem? Let us recall the assertion, familiar to us by now, that an a 
priori conceptual schema is always required for processing incoming sensory qualia into 
meaningful information whereby knowledge pertaining to the external world may be 
acquired. The problem is how young babies or the very first humans to walk the Earth 
could ever have come to be ‘instilled’ with any schema in the first place.
Consider a young baby. Presumably no conceptual schema of any kind would be 
present in his/her mind. Now the child’s parents attempt to teach him/her a language, 
which is nothing if not a conceptual schema. The problem here is: how could the baby 
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possibly learn the language? Given the absence of any a priori schema in his/her mind, 
every attempt by the parents to teach the child a language, to ‘equip’ him/her with a 
schema, should come across only as a morass of meaningless perceptual qualia, just like 
anything else perceived by him/her through the physical senses. Shall we appeal to some 
form of hereditary memory whereby the experiences of previous generations with 
language-learning are somehow coded into the genes and passed down to the child, thus 
equipping him/her with a very rudimentary schema of sorts? This merely shifts the 
problem back to the remote past where it assumes a new guise: how the first humans 
could ever have developed any schema in their minds. The situation now is far worse: no 
one around has developed any schema yet, so no one could even make the attempt to 
teach any, nor is there any ‘in the air’ for one to ‘pick up’. The conundrum faced here is 
that, if already equipped with a schema, one is then no longer sunk in that infantile state 
of nescience, to gain release from which by learning a schema becomes a non-issue, 
whereas for one yet to be equipped with any schema it appears impossible to learn any, 
leaving one trapped in that nescient state.213 (An interestingly similar problem in the 
Confucian tradition would be how the earliest sages, such as Yao and Shun, could ever 
have become sages, there being no daotong before them, nor any corpus of literature 
bequeathed by ancient worthies which they could then peruse as a guide.)
The fascinating thing, as we know, is that (in most cases, fortunately) the child does 
not remain in his/her state of cognitive limbo, but eventually learns the language(s) taught 
by his/her parents. As for the first humans, over time they had gone on to create a great 
variety of languages which form the bases of the world’s cultures today. It was as if 
knowledge of the external (?) world had already been present in some form in their minds
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from the very beginning, so that incoming sensory data would have signified all sorts of 
things for them, rather than coming across as so much meaningless qualia.214
Such cases of acquiring knowledge recur in every young child and fill the annals of 
human history and experience. Knowledge is gained beyond what is available on the 
basis of empirical data alone. Nor is this merely an amusing but otherwise trivial oddity 
about the human mind, several important breakthroughs in modern science being known 
to originate in such apprehensions of the external world and aspects thereof.
Scientists such as Kekul, Loewi and Mendeleyev all arrived at their most important 
discoveries in a flash of insight,215 again apparently beyond what could be gained from 
mere perceptual data. It was not merely through the conscious, rational and stepwise 
construction of propositions in accordance with the perceptual data they acquired that 
they made their discoveries. In the words of psychologist Donald Norman, as cited by 
contemporary biologist and science writer Lyall Watson, ‘We leap to correct answers 
before there are sufficient data… we jump to conclusions despite the lack of convincing 
evidence. That we are right more often than wrong, is a miracle.’216 We may also recall 
what Popper said on the unavoidable presence of ‘an irrational element or a creative 
intuition’ in every major scientific discovery.
The present author cannot resist recounting one more example of such unusual cases 
of knowledge acquisition, that found in the human phenomenon known as astrology. 
During the 1940’s and 1950’s the French psychologist and statistician Michel Gauquelin 
sought to determine the truth of the idea that special relationships exist between human 
affairs and the positions of the heavenly bodies, and amassed large amounts of data 
which when subjected to statistical analysis actually confirmed such relationships, as well 
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as the traditional association of various planets with certain personality types. Critics of 
astrology have grudgingly acknowledged that “The research of Michel Gauquelin seems 
to have stood up quite well to criticism and replications.”217 It appears the ancient 
Chinese were not entirely misguided after all in their concerns with the influences of the 
celestial bodies on the human world. What piques the imagination here is how, on the 
empirical basis of mere points of light in the night sky, human beings could have gained 
awareness of influences of this nature on their behavior.
 3.2.2 Zhu Xi’s solution and how it shows the need of science for religion in Zhu 
Xi
Such then is the problem of how knowledge could at all be acquired, particularly 
knowledge of that world ‘out there’, outside of our skins. The usual account, which has 
us taking in sensory qualia and making heads and tails of it via a conceptual schema 
adopted beforehand, appears incapable of offering a competent explanation here, leaving 
the field at least open for considering the possibility of some alternative source of 
knowledge besides the physical senses. This source might be nowhere else but within 
ourselves, as has been hinted at. And Zhu Xi’s system in fact allows for, indeed requires 
this presence of the knowledge of the Ten Thousand Things within oneself.
What justifications could be given for attributing this solution to Zhu Xi? To recall 
his understanding of the nature of li, every entity, every human individual possesses a 
Taiji, a Supreme Ultimate, the Taiji being but another term for li taken as a whole. In 
other words, the li of the Ten Thousand Things is already all present within oneself. 
Zhu’s analysis, found in Book 60 of the Conversations, of a well-known assertion by 
Mencius to the effect that ‘The Ten Thousand Things are already complete in oneself, 萬
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物皆備於我矣。’218 provides an even more explicit statement of this view. Among 
Zhu’s comments on Mencius’ assertion one finds the following:
By the Ten Thousand Things is not meant here their outward manifestations, merely that their 
li are all already present in oneself. In none of the Ten Thousand Things, for example, is the sense 
of righteousness (yi) between ruler and minister absent, and here in oneself it is present as well. 
(The same is repeated with the sense of closeness between parent and child, that of love between 
brothers, and that of differentiation between husband and wife.) 萬物不是萬物之迹，只是萬物
之理皆備於我。如萬物莫不有君臣之義，自家這裏也有。。。
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What interests us here is what Zhu’s conception of li implies, namely that the li of all 
creation and all aspects of creation are present within oneself. Granting this, all learning
and acquisition of knowledge may actually be considered then as a form of recollection, 
though not a recollection of something known in the past, as in a previous life, being 
more like a raising into conscious awareness of something concealed deeply within 
oneself, something which has always been present within by virtue of the nature of li.
How would this apply to the pursuit of scientific knowledge? It may well be that in 
studying, say, benzene, my attempts at understanding the different aspects of the behavior 
of benzene will elicit at a certain point the li of benzene from within my person, so that I 
now become conscious of this li. May not Kekul’s discoveries regarding benzene be 
understood in such terms? This knowledge will not come ready-made in a form 
delineated in clearly defined concepts, of course, but rather in the form of some mental 
content spontaneously arising in one’s mind, perhaps a mental picture of a snake biting 




But how does my study of benzene, my attempt to understand its nature, elicit its li
from within me? The answer could lie in what Zhu termed ganying, translated by Yung 
Sik Kim as ‘stimulus and response’. Ganying has the meaning of sensing, apprehending
or being touched or affected by something (gan), and then responding to it (ying) — and 
this leads to interesting ramifications aplenty, as we shall see upon undertaking a closer 
examination of this term.
At least since Cheng Hao, ganying has been assigned a cosmological role in 
Confucian thought, being employed as a general term for all processes that take place in 
existence. (Something very much like the idea of ganying plainly manifested itself in the 
Han Dynasty Confucian Dong Zhongshu as well, the 57th chapter of whose main work, 
The Chunqiu Fanlu 春秋繁露 or Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn Annals, is 
clearly titled ‘Things of the Same Kind Activate Each Other 同類相動’.220) ‘Between 
Heaven and Earth,’ Cheng Hao once maintained, ‘there is but one [thing called] ‘gan and
ying’; what else is there? 天地之間，只有一箇感與應而已，更有甚事？’221 Zhu was 
to discuss this in Book 95 of the Conversations, viewing ganying as the operative force 
propelling such diverse phenomena as ‘the transformations of yin and yang, the 
generation and growth of the Ten Thousand Things, the removal of obstructions (tong) on 
its account in the mutual communication of affections and feelings (qing), and the 
conclusion and commencement of events, again on its account.蓋陰陽之變化，萬物之
生成，情爲之相通，事爲之終始，一爲感，則一爲應。。。’222 Further elaborations 
on ganying follow. ‘All things, all events have ganying. That is so with awakening from 
sleep and going to bed, speech and silence, movement and rest. As another example, the 




‘Someone inquired: ‘Concerning gan, does it only originate within?’ Zhu replied: ‘Things 
do indeed have gan which originates from within, yet not all gan is internal; there is gan
which originates from without as well. 問：感，只是内感？曰：物固有自内感者，然
亦不專是内感，固有自外感者。’224 Zhu was to follow up on this with examples of 
internal gan such as the need being felt to desist from speech after engaging excessively 
in it, and vice versa; examples of external gan would include the obvious case of being 
called by someone else.
Before addressing the issue just what ganying has to do with our attempts to sound
the li of things, let us consider why such a thing as ganying would exist in the first place. 
Why not far rather just plain mutual indifference, or a strictly external and mechanistic 
interaction between things, as for example in a physical object being pushed by another 
which happened to move towards it? The reason is that ganying is a fundamental feature 
of all life: surely, one distinctive characteristic of all living entities which sets them apart 
from non-living ones, as explained before, lies in an inclination on the part of the former 
to maintain a degree of internal integrity, whereby the various states of an individual 
organism’s internal environment, such as the temperature, blood pressure, degree of 
concentration of certain chemicals in the bodily fluids etc, are prevented from straying 
too far from certain optimal values lest the entire organism come to grief. This 
necessarily entails a constant act of self-regulation on the part of the organism in 
response to all sorts of signals, whether coming from within or without; when one 
experiences for example a certain uncomfortable feeling in the throat and mouth, one 
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goes for a drink, and when a hand registers pain upon touching something, the rest of the 
body will pull the hand away, and so on — all these being examples of ganying.
Now in order that ganying can serve effectively to maintain the integrity of an 
organism, it is surely imperative that every part of it ‘know’ how to work in perfect 
unison with every other. If any part of the organism were not to ‘know’ and therefore
were to act wrongly on the signals coming from the rest of the organism, as in the case of 
cells which continue supplying glucose to the bloodstream even when it is overloaded 
with glucose (though the problem could also lie with errors in the signals transmitted to 
the cells), the life of the whole organism would be in jeopardy. But how does each part 
‘know’ what the other parts need, how to ‘interpret’ incoming signals and to respond so 
that the needs of the other parts would be served? By virtue of being one with the rest of 
the organism. In what may be considered a holographic manner, the nature and 
inclinations of the whole organism, including the different parts thereof — what Zhu
would term its/their xing — may be said to be encrypted in each and every part of it. That 
is how each part of the organism can have ‘knowledge’ of the whole.225 Here is where
Zhu’s vision of the Ten Thousand Things as comprising a single living body comes in. In 
the light of this vision, may not all interactions between the Ten Thousand Things, being 
members of a cosmic super-organism, be seen as (ideally) serving a similar purpose, that 
of maintaining its overall integrity? And does the fulfillment of this telos not entail that 
all of them, including us humans, be equipped with knowledge of the whole, just like the 
parts of an organism?
Zhu’s vision of the organic unity of all things would therefore provide a reason for 
the presence of all knowledge of them in my person: being a constituent part of this 
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greater whole, I surely have a part to play in maintaining its integrity, and to do so would 
necessitate the presence in me of all knowledge regarding this whole and its manifold 
aspects. Only then can what my senses pick up (gan) from the world ‘out there’ and my 
responses (ying) to what they pick up be appropriately paired. It appears we have limited 
awareness of this knowledge, however, so some means of rectifying this state of affairs is 
in order, and gewu should surely be the way to go. And this time we know better: in 
investigating things, we ought no longer merely to attend to what our senses take in 
(gan), but also what inner stirrings are aroused in us (ying) as a result — inner stirrings 
which it would not appear inappropriate to term our intuitions, and which should be none 
other than the surfacing into our consciousness of the li of what we happen to be 
studying. That is how my study of things like, say, benzene, would elicit its li from within 
me. Would this not be a reasonable connection to draw between ganying and gewu?
(Recall also Zhu’s comparison of the sage to a mirror which responds to all things.)
Such, then, is Zhu’s epistemology: one based on an innate knowledge of the Ten 
Thousand Things, with all conscious learning being but a drawing forth from this inner 
store, the modus operandi of the process being the need to maintain the integrity of the 
cosmic organism. (It will be necessary to validate empirically the knowledge acquired, as 
shall be explained.) A further reason now presents itself for adopting a religious 
metaphysics as an a priori conceptual apparatus when engaging in gewu — specifically, 
Zhu’s metaphysics of li — in addition to the reason mentioned before that (1) a 
metaphysics of this nature affirms our values rather than negating them. The new reason 
is that (2) the acquisition of knowledge becomes a mystery, if not an impossibility, unless 
all knowledge is already present within us, as would be allowed for if not required by an 
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account of reality which views the Ten Thousand Things as one in some special way — a 
vision of undeniably religious import, being found in the mystics of well nigh all of the 
world’s major religions no less than in Zhu’s concept of li. It may be possible to spell out 
a third and still more compelling reason, namely that (3) some of the very steps 
themselves which need to be taken in the investigation of things become difficult to 
justify in the absence of a religious account of reality. To find out how this third reason 
could be arrived at, we shall have to embark on an exploration of some of the special 
consequences which would follow from Zhu’s thought as understood at this point.
For one thing, sensory stimuli would no longer be mere porters of data or 
information, as they are so often considered to be; perhaps more importantly, they would 
also play the role of a midwife, so to speak, who draws out the knowledge already present 
within us through the process of ganying.
To attend to another ramification let us examine the idea of ‘viewing things from their 
perspectives’, an important aspect of gewu as we know by now. This idea can actually 
seem an affront to all commonsense at first. In studying, say, a tree, am I not a separate 
and distinct entity from it? How, then, could I ever view this tree ‘from its perspective’, 
unless somehow I could be this tree, which is just ridiculous? Well, in the context of 
Zhu’s thought this may not seem so ridiculous after all, because the tree and I share one 
and the same li, so perhaps I can reach deeply within myself, so to speak, to acquire a 
‘feel’ of how it is like being the tree. Various kinds of mental content pertaining to the 
tree’s nature may then arise in my mind — say perhaps a fanciful idea of myself standing 
on the same spot, with little green things growing from my head — some of which would 
somehow feel right, or suodangran — which could be because they do in fact provide an 
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accurate ‘picture’ of the xing of the tree by virtue of arising from its li, of which I partake 
as well (recalling the earlier discussion on the ‘amphibious’ nature of various words and 
concepts found in common usage), whereupon the ideas would arise in me and I would
sense their veracity.
While Zhu himself might not have explained ‘viewing things from their perspectives’ 
in this way, I find it difficult to see in what other way it could be understood. That there 
exists such a way of knowing, which entails ‘entering’ the object of knowledge to have a 
feel of it from the inside, so to speak, has been seriously entertained by other thinkers as 
well, such as the modern French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859 – 1941):
…philosophers agree in making a deep distinction between two ways of knowing a thing. The first 
implies going all around it, the second entering into it. The first depends on the viewpoint chosen 
and the symbols employed, while the second is taken from no viewpoint and rests on no symbol. 
Of the first kind of knowledge we shall say that it stops at the relative; of the second that, 
wherever possible, it attains the absolute.
Take, for example, the movement of an object in space. I perceive it differently according to 
the point of view from which I look at it, whether from that of mobility or of immobility. I express 
it differently, furthermore as I relate it to the system of axes or reference points, that is to say, 
according to the symbols by which I translate it. And I call it relative for this double reason: in 
either case, I place myself outside the object itself. When I speak of an absolute movement, it 
means that I attribute to the mobile an inner being and, as it were, states of soul; it also means that 
I am in harmony with these states and enter into them by an effort of imagination. Therefore… 
what I feel will depend neither on the point of view I adopt toward the object, since I am in the 
object itself, nor on the symbols by which I translate it, since I have renounced all translation in 
order to possess the original. In short, the movement will not be grasped from without and, as it 
were, from where I am, but from within, inside it, in what it is in itself.226
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This is from Bergson’s essay “Introduction to Metaphysics.” Is he not speaking here 
in his own vocabulary of ‘viewing things from their perspectives’? Later in his essay 
Bergson was also to discuss the nature of intuition, defining it as “the sympathy by which 
one is transported into the interior of an object.”227 This is significant: to ‘enter’ an 
object, one needs to sympathize, to feel with this object, and not set oneself up against it, 
as separate from it, because that would contradict what one is in a sense attempting: to
merge with it. Interestingly, Bergson himself had reservations regarding the possibility of 
this, as is evidenced by the qualifier “wherever possible” found in the passage cited 
above, and also later in the same essay where he wrote: “There is at least one reality 
which we all seize from within…It is our own person…With no other thing can we 
sympathize intellectually, or if you like, spiritually.”228
What is of interest here is that this impossibility of ‘entering’ any object besides 
oneself — which Bergson in fact sought to overcome later — would not exist had one
also adopted Zhu’s system at the outset, which views all things as possessing an interior 
indeed which we can enter via a process of sympathizing with them. One might say that
Bergson laid out the details of a presumably imaginary and fanciful endeavor which in 
the light of Zhu’s view of reality becomes a perfectly real and possible one.
How, then, on the basis of what we have now come to understand of Zhu’s 
epistemology, should one engage in gewu? To return to the example of the tree, it would 
of course be necessary to gather of the tree all the observational data one can — its shape, 
different parts, behavior at different times, similarities to and differences from other trees, 
and so on. Questions should then be formulated from the data gathered, among them why 
the tree behaves the way it does, why it has such characteristics, and so on. How are these 
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questions to be answered? Where observational data can offer no further clues on this, it 
may then be time to seek to ‘enter’ the tree by engaging in an introspective exploration of 
the contents of one’s mind, to see what ideas, mental images etc have taken shape therein
in studying the tree — courtesy of the process of ganying — and sift through them to see 
which would ‘feel’ right in the sense of offering the most ‘satisfying’ answers for the 
questions. This is how one would progress from the second to the third limb of the 
‘Eightfold Path’ of science spelt out earlier: one studies carefully all the empirical data 
gathered, and then one allows it all to sink in and takes note of whatever interesting 
mental images, thoughts etc. emerge into one’s mind.229 And this is how one should 
engage in gewu — a step (or series of steps) which gewu shall be understood to entail 
from now on.
Of course, there are yet further steps to take in the endeavor to sound the li of the tree, 
but more of that later. At this juncture the important question to ask is: can the endeavor 
as described so far be legitimized (a) by any set of metaphysical assumptions adopted 
beforehand (by one engaging in gewu) regarding the nature of reality, or (b) only by
certain ones? It may be that according to certain metaphysical assumptions I endorse 
beforehand, all the steps enumerated above in studying a tree would be entirely possible 
and legitimate, whereas if I were to have adopted certain other a priori metaphysical 
views the story would be quite different. I believe (b) is the case: only on the basis of Zhu 
Xi’s worldview, or some other which agrees with it on certain major points, can full 
legitimacy be awarded to the account of gewu presented above.
Let us see how this is so by considering another worldview, say the mechanist-
materialist one, which does not entirely lack for a following today. To what extent can 
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such things as ‘entering’ a thing to have a feel of it from within be admitted by the 
mechanist-materialist view of reality? Since this view acknowledges only mechanical 
interactions between bodies of inert matter as the ultimate reality of things, any ‘interior’ 
we might ascribe to an object of knowledge, such as the tree in the above example, could 
only be a product of our own imagination, and accordingly the attempt to ‘enter’ it could 
never yield genuine knowledge regarding the nature of the tree. If it happens to do so, 
that can only be pure coincidence. Thus certain key steps in the above account of gewu
would be certified illegitimate. Of course, one could ignore this and carry on with gewu
the way it is spelt out above anyway, but then gewu would be engaged in in spite of one’s 
a priori metaphysical views, rather than being supported or justified by them.
Clearly, then, not any metaphysical view will do for engaging in gewu. Only Zhu’s 
metaphysics of li — or a metaphysics which shares the view of the Ten Thousand Things
as having an inner being which we can enter via a process of sympathizing with them —
can provide the required support and justification for the steps entailed in the 
investigation of things. Insofar as this view (of all things as having an interior which we 
can enter) is in turn plausible only on the basis of the religious vision of a grand unity of
which all of creation partakes — the interconnectedness making all things one being the 
means by which I ‘enter’ them — this vision comprises a crucial aspect of gewu, making 
plain the third reason identified earlier as to how science needs religion in Zhu Xi.
 3.2.3 Further ramifications of Zhu Xi’s system, and possible challenges to it
Certain issues still await resolution after establishing the need of science for religion 
in Zhu Xi. In doing so we have uncovered aspects of his thought which for all we know 
might conceal special difficulties that could render his entire system defunct, a possibility 
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we can ill afford to ignore. On the other hand, those aspects of his thought could also lead 
to further ramifications of a positive nature.
One of the positive ramifications would be that we are now provided a further reason 
for having to be moral before engaging in the investigation of things, discussed in Section 
2.3. We may recall the need to sympathize with the object of one’s knowledge in order to 
‘enter’ it and grasp it from within, and not set oneself up against it — and this is already 
what being moral entails: taking the perspective of and being sensitive to the other, and 
acting accordingly. The morally edificatory effects likely to be precipitated by the 
diligent practice of adopting such a mindset in gewu should be evident, further 
demonstrating how gewu could serve as a means to the development of sagely qualities 
It is also noteworthy that because this sympathetic mindset is directed towards anything 
one is investigating and anything constitutes an appropriate object for such investigation
in Zhu’s understanding, engaging in gewu is therefore only likely to foster a benign and 
ecological attitude towards all of creation, not just humankind — a further bonus to the 
moral edification effected by gewu. Nature becomes charged with value. This ought to 
compare favorably with the hostile attitude towards Nature characteristic of so much of
Western scientific thought since the time of the English thinker Francis Bacon.
One wonders at times if this hostility towards Nature could be partly credited to the 
idea of a perennial ontological gulf between the knower and the object of knowledge, an 
idea rejected only at times by thinkers like Bergson and found in the West as far back as
the ancient Athenian philosopher Plato, who in fact also happened to endorse the idea of 
all knowledge being already present in oneself, and of all learning and acquisition of 
knowledge being therefore a form of recollection. Concerned directly with the problem 
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how we could acquire knowledge of what we initially know nothing of, discussed earlier 
in subsection 3.2.1, Plato was to spell out a solution involving an appeal to such notions 
as rebirth and the immortality of the soul, found in the following passage from his Meno:
…The soul, then, as being immortal, and having been born again many times, and having seen all 
things that exist… has knowledge of them all; and it is no wonder that she should be able to call to 
remembrance all that she ever knew about virtue, and about everything; for as all nature is akin, 
and the soul has learned all things; there is no difficulty in her eliciting or as men say learning, out 
of a single recollection all the rest, if a man is strenuous and does not faint; for all enquiry and all 
learning is but recollection.230
How does Plato’s account compare with that of Zhu Xi? I believe a ‘tragic flaw’ in 
the former places the competition squarely on the Oriental side of things. Granting Plato 
for now the idea of an immortal soul which has gone through an infinitude of previous 
lives, and assuming that the soul is endowed with the same cognitive apparatus in every 
incarnation — certainly the Meno did not state otherwise — the same problem how one
could learn anything without any a priori schema would confront the soul in previous 
lives as much as in the present one; in her previous lives the soul would have been mired 
in the very same epistemological predicament as that out of which Plato’s solution is 
supposed to be able to lift her in her present life. If, on the other hand, some special 
faculty in past incarnations enabled her to acquire knowledge (not that Plato thought of 
any such faculty), surely the same faculty should be present in her current incarnation, 
rendering the appeal to previous lives to account for the soul’s present stock of 
knowledge redundant. Hence Plato‘s account is unsatisfactory.
The trouble with the account provided in the Meno is that knowledge is still seen as 
being taken in via the physical senses. A gap still exists between the knower and the 
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object of knowledge, in contrast to Zhu’s system where the whole process of acquiring 
knowledge presumes an ontological unity between the two — an account of knowledge 
now found to possess many advantages.
Another positive ramification of Zhu’s system concerns a different type of gap: the 
gap discussed before between the two main schools of Confucian thought which have 
arisen since his time, the Chengzhu and the Luwang. One of the most serious doctrinal 
disputes between the two, as we may recall, lay in how the li should be sought; while the 
former school advocated gewu, the investigation of things, the latter contended instead 
that the li, being after all as much within ourselves as anywhere else, should be sought 
only within oneself. Wang Yangming, the chief exponent of this school, was very clear 
on this in his Chuanxilu傳習錄 (better known as the Instructions for Practical Living):
…For instance, in the matter of serving one’s parents, one cannot seek the principle of filial piety 
in the parent. In serving the ruler, one cannot seek the principle of loyalty in the ruler. In the 
intercourse with friends and in governing the people, one cannot seek the principles of faithfulness 
and humanity in friends and the people.且如事父不成，去父上求箇孝的理；事君不成，去君
上求箇忠的理；交友治民不成，去友上，民上求箇信與仁的理。
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What we have gathered so far of Zhu’s idea of gewu may help in this respect to heal 
the rift between the two schools. Put simply, we need to look both without and within. 
Neither option by itself will do.
Wang Yangming may have a point in maintaining the absurdity of looking for the li
of loyalty in the ruler rather than in oneself, that of filial piety in one’s parents rather than 
in oneself, and so on. After all, what our physical senses perceive of the ruler etc are but 
so many sensory impressions when taken in themselves. But still, could one ever come to 
know of the li of loyalty without meeting a ruler and interacting with him/her? And could 
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one have knowledge of the li of filial piety in the absence of parents or people assuming 
similar roles? Surely not: it is necessary to meet and/or interact with such people before 
knowledge of the said li can be acquired. Now, are we to draw from this the inference 
that the principles of loyalty etc had come after all from the ruler or parents over into 
oneself, and therefore, contrary to what Wang Yangming had said, are to be sought in the 
ruler or parents? This is likely to be the main quarrel the Luwang had against gewu as the 
Chengzhu conceived of it: that the li are viewed in consequence as external to and grafted
upon oneself, rather than as an integral aspect of one’s person. On the basis of what we 
have gathered of Zhu’s epistemology so far, however, we now know that this need not be 
the only possible conclusion and another inference could be drawn, namely that the 
principles had surfaced into one’s consciousness from deep within as a result of meeting 
and interacting with the ruler etc.
This inference would have the advantage of allowing both for the Luwang’s 
insistence that the li be sought within oneself on the one hand and on the other the need 
for gewu as advocated by the Chengzhu. The li of the Ten Thousand Things may indeed 
be already present within ourselves, as both camps would concede, yet it is only through 
interacting with and studying those things that their li can be brought out into one’s 
consciousness from deep within oneself, presumably by a process of ganying. One is not 
to deduce from the need for gewu that the knowledge of the li acquired had come from 
outside, from the things we investigate — we have seen earlier in subsection 3.2.1 the 
difficulties with empirical accounts of knowledge. No, it comes from within; gewu
merely brings it out in what might be thought of as a sort of epistemological midwifery. 
Thus, in investigating things, one should be equally attentive to whatever ideas or mental 
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content may emerge in one’s mind as one investigates. Had this been what he did, the 
outcome of Wang’s attempt to investigate the nature of some bamboo might have proven 
more fruitful.
I am confident that adherents of the Luwang should find little objection to the above. 
After all, however much Wang and his followers advocated looking for the li within 
oneself, they still had to interact with the ‘external’ world at all times. There appears little 
cause for complaint from the Chengzhu side of things either, as one equally doubts if Zhu 
would have considered as sufficient the bare sensory input acquired in investigating 
things. Hence the two camps may now be viewed merely as stressing different tenets 
from one and the same philosophical tradition rather than being fundamentally divergent 
in their thought. Indeed the customary notions of ‘within’, ‘without’, ‘external’ etc may 
all have to be seen as being ultimately limited in their meaning and usage. As the Ming 
Confucian Jiao Hong maintained on one occasion, ‘The awakened state knows of no 
‘inner’ or ‘outer’ (jue wu neiwai覺無内外).’232
Such, then, are some of the positive ramifications of Zhu’s system; it is now time to 
look at the likely problems inherent in it and how they may be dealt with. For one thing, 
to return to the earlier example of investigating a tree, all that talk of ‘entering’ the tree to 
grasp it from within sounds very well, but how am I to tell that it is not just my own 
fevered imagination? By what means shall I establish that the intuitions that arise in my 
mind regarding the nature of this tree really do reveal the facts about its nature? Can it 
really suffice that I just ‘feel’ that the ideas are right?
I wish to make it very clear at this point that I do not claim that our intuitions are 
sufficient as a means to knowledge (and neither does Zhi Xi). This cannot be sufficiently 
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stressed. Further confirmation of what our intuitions reveal to us — through 
experimentation or seeking out new, confirmatory observations etc. — is decidedly in 
order. We cannot be certain, after all, if the insights we have gained may not still be 
clouded to some degree by our deep-seated mental habits and prejudices — our qi
endowments, to employ Zhu’s terminology. Surely Kekul did not just have a vision of a 
snake biting its tail and then simply leave it at that. Also, if the experiences of people like 
Kekul are anything to go by, a long period of assimilation and analysis of observational 
data is probably necessary prior to acquiring the intuition, reminding us of what Zhu said 
on the long period of time to be spent on gewu before that breakthrough. Even if there 
could be special leaps of intuitive insight without long periods of assimilation of 
observational data, we would still need to build on the knowledge acquired. After the 
intuitive realization, say, that diseases are caused by microbes — and its confirmation 
through experimentation — one would still need to build on this knowledge by finding 
out which microbes cause which diseases.
While our intuitions may not be sufficient, though, they still remain necessary. That 
they can and do lead us astray at times provides no reason for dismissing them as a valid 
source of knowledge. After all, the same charge can also be directed against reasoning 
and sensory perception, virtually the only two recognized sources of knowledge today. 
The enterprise of acquiring knowledge should therefore employ all of the three faculties: 
intuition, reasoning and sensory perception. Each can serve to make up for the 




Another problem, which has probably been on the reader’s mind all along, concerns 
two plainly irreconcilable statements to the effect that (1) one always requires an a priori
conceptual schema for processing incoming sensory qualia, and that (2) knowledge can 
be gained without the aid of any such schema (as witness a young child learning a 
language). This is also the contradiction, noted in subsection 3.1.1, between Zhu’s idea of 
grasping the nature of things in a direct manner, without the use of words and concepts, 
and what has been maintained on the perennial need for a priori conceptual schemata in 
all forms of empirical observation. Clearly (1) and (2) cannot both be true, yet serious 
conclusions have already been drawn on the basis of both in the present thesis. What is to 
be done? I contend that the difficulty merely rests on a failure to differentiate between 
two forms of knowledge: intuitive or instinctive knowledge on the one hand, and 
conceptual knowledge on the other, knowledge articulated in words and concepts.
The two varieties of knowledge would correspond respectively to what Zhao Feng 
termed wuxing tizheng and lixing renzhi. Bergson, as could be seen in the passage from 
his work cited earlier, also distinguished between these two, referring to the former as 
‘absolute’ and the latter as ‘relative’. In contrast to the latter, which employs signs and 
symbols and involves studying the object of knowledge from without, the former
involves ‘entering’ it and dispenses with all signs and symbols. This would be the ‘raw’
type of knowing where one becomes aware of or recognizes ‘something’, or feels that 
something is ‘right’, though the awareness or feeling is not expressed in words or 
concepts. It should be the type of knowledge acquired in a new scientific breakthrough, 
or in sounding the li of an entity, what Zhu called ‘not thinking and yet being able to 
penetrate all things’. By contrast the latter variety of knowledge would assume the guise 
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of a body of explicit statements with definite truth values, statements built on symbols or 
signifiers which refer clearly to various aspects of the reality we experience. And if we 
limited ourselves to conceptual knowledge, then (1) would be valid, whereas (2) would 
hold if intuitive or instinctive knowledge were the form of knowledge with which we are 
concerned. In this way contradictions need not arise between (1) and (2).
The example of sounding the li of the tree should help clarify this further. Suppose I 
am the first human ever to encounter this entity which I would later term ‘a tree’. Now I 
have no ready-made conceptual schema by which to interpret what I perceive, which will 
therefore come across as a meaningless morass of sensations, validating (1). The sensory 
stimuli I receive do not merely carry information, though, but also have a second role to 
play, that of an epistemological midwife, this being the only role they can play at this 
point in the absence of a schema on my part to ‘decode’ the information. Certain insights 
may then arise in me, brought out by the stimuli through the process of ganying, by virtue 
of which I would then be able to single out certain features from the whole morass of 
(initially) meaningless qualia. I would have this vague awareness that those features 
always hang together in certain ways to form this entity I would later call ‘a tree’, that 
this entity is alive, grows, and exhibits certain special patterns of behavior, and so on, 
though I have yet to develop the means by which to express any of these intuitions. And
to the extent that they reveal the true nature of this strange entity, (2) is validated.
Of course, unless I am contented with living like the animals, who rely almost 
exclusively on their instincts and have no use for words and concepts, I cannot remain in 
this inarticulate state. Science and the advancement of human knowledge cannot proceed 
on the basis of raw intuition alone; they must have some conceptual schema to build on. I 
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may then create one which will communicate those glimpses I had, or if I am already in 
possession of a schema except that it has no concepts for articulating those glimpses, I 
may then augment this schema by creating a new concept, the concept of a tree, and 
adding it to the schema. It now becomes clear how wuxing tizheng and lixing renzhi can 
be related. We may also recall here Zhu’s concession to the creation of new ideas and 
concepts for the purpose of expressing fresh insights, as noted by Berthrong
Now this creation will entail a compromise; since one of the primary uses of a 
language, a conceptual schema, is to facilitate communication, and since intuitions are 
not readily open to public observation the way physically perceivable entities are, the 
concept or schema I create will have to place greater weight on the ‘external’ aspects of 
trees, those aspects which are open to public observation. Subjective elements in the 
guise of limitations in my cultural background and my experiences of the physical world 
will inevitably shape the account of trees which I come up with as well. Thus a gap of 
sorts will always be present between what I have personally grasped with my intuition 
and what the concept I have created communicates. That is why words and concepts 
always fall short of the true nature of things and our intuitions of them, and also why 
reality is ultimately ineffable. Here we see the wisdom of Zhu’s counsel on the avoidance 
of ‘conceptual fixation’ and his insistence on the ultimately ineffable nature of reality.
Now this leads us back to a problem discussed before in Section 2.3, the problem 
whether our accounts of the workings of Nature or of our intuitions of them can never be 
free of subjective presuppositions (meaning by them here the limitations in my cultural 
background etc.). My answer is: yes — though it need not constitute an undesirable state 
of affairs. That no amount of effort on our part can ever lead to some final and perfect 
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account of reality (i.e. one completely untainted by subjective presuppositions), however 
close we may get, can in fact be a blessing. Noting the apparently endless development of 
science, Lyall Watson once wrote that ‘I find this tremendously exciting. The picture of 
science as a jigsaw puzzle, with a finite number of pieces that would one day all be 
slotted neatly into place, has never been appealing.’233 Reality being ultimately ineffable, 
no account of it can ever prove adequate, requiring a continual revision and improvement 
of our conceptual schemata, our accounts of reality, and therefore making for an endless 
journey of discovery — a much more felicitous state of affairs, one would think, as 
opposed to some static end-state which would preclude all further scientific and 
intellectual development. We would be continually compelled to exercise our creativity 
in coming up with new ideas and concepts, and different people may come up with 
different accounts of the same aspects of phenomenal reality, owing to different cultural 
backgrounds, life-experiences and perhaps qi endowments, which ought to be an asset as 
well in view of the colorful diversity of different ways of grasping reality, different ways 
of mental and intellectual life, to which this would lead.
None of this is to be taken to mean that reality is ultimately unknowable. It is
perfectly knowable, through our intuition; what it is not is being fully expressible in 
words and concepts. Nor does the existence of different (yet equally workable) accounts 
of the same aspects of phenomenal reality imply an unbridgeable gulf in understanding 
between people subscribing to those different accounts, as they can always learn of and 
understand each other’s views of things. After all, one person’s view of Nature can be as 
much an object of investigation in another’s attempts at gewu as Nature Itself.
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 3.2.4 Summary and remaining issues
Such, then, are some of the ramifications which follow from and challenges overcome 
by Zhu’s idea of all knowledge as being already present within oneself and brought out 
through gewu, an endeavor where one seeks to ‘view things from their perspectives’ by 
‘entering’ them. The following is a summary of this section:
(a) Gewu, the scientific aspect of Zhu Xi’s thought, requires the metaphysics of li, 
which comprises the religious side of Zhu Xi, as its guiding conceptual apparatus for the 
following reasons. First, a metaphysics of this nature affirms our values rather than 
negating them. Second, the problem how knowledge could be acquired in the first place 
becomes unsolvable unless one adopts the metaphysics of li, which provides a solution to 
the effect that all knowledge is being already present within and merely brought out 
through gewu. And finally, certain steps which we need to take when engaged in gewu
become unjustifiable, chiefly the step where one ‘enters’ a thing to ‘view it from its 
perspective’, unless again one adopts the metaphysics of li, which grants full legitimacy 
to the idea of ‘entering’ a thing.
(b) A number of desirable derivations can be made on the basis of Zhu’s 
epistemology of innate knowledge elicited through ganying and sympathizing with the 
objects of one’s knowledge. For example, the need to ‘enter’ a thing by sympathizing 
with it when investigating it further augments the moral edification effected by gewu, and 
fosters a benign attitude towards all Nature, not just humanity. The long-standing dispute
between the Chengzhu and Luwang schools of Confucian thought concerning whether li
should be sought without or within also stands to be resolved: all li is within, but the 
investigation of things is required to draw it forth.
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(c) On the other hand, a number of apparent difficulties also present themselves upon 
adopting Zhu’s epistemology, though they are readily overcome under closer analysis. 
Thus the problem how ganying and intuition could suffice for the acquisition of 
knowledge ceases once it is understood that they are not viewed as sufficient, but as 
necessary aspects of the pursuit of knowledge. The issue of reconciling the two 
seemingly contradictory assertions that (1) an a priori conceptual schema is always 
required in gaining knowledge and that (2) none is needed also finds a ready solution 
once we distinguish between intuitive and conceptual knowledge.
We see now (at long last) how science and religion need each other in Zhu; roughly 
speaking, various aspects of gewu need the metaphysics of li as their basis and source of 
justification, while the ideals conceived of for humanity in this metaphysics need gewu as 
a vehicle whereby we may travel towards them. The bridge between religion and science 
in Zhu Xi now stands complete before us, a resplendent arch across the great divide.
A few issues remain which would warrant some attention. First, is there a danger that 
new discoveries made through gewu could actually pose a threat to the view of reality 
spelt out in Zhu’s metaphysics of li and therefore the values upheld by it, leading to a 
new source of conflict between science and religion in Zhu Xi? The idea of the planets
going around the sun rather than the earth was supposed to have proven highly traumatic 
for the Western mind in its implication that the place of humankind was no longer at the 
center of the Universe; could the views and ideas found in Zhu’s thought likewise be 
shaken by some future discovery? This issue was raised before in discussing Berthrong’s 
work in Section 1.1. My reckoning is that this need not happen. New discoveries need not 
invalidate old views in a complete manner, only prove them limited, an eventuality which 
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at some point will confront the new discoveries as well — courtesy of still newer 
revisions of the old ideas, sometimes — since there can be no scientific theory, paradigm, 
discovery or whatever but will eventually prove limited. Einstein’s findings did not 
establish that Newton’s were wrong, only that they were limited; even today, all works of 
civil and mechanical engineering make use of Newtonian mechanics as much as ever. It 
ought to be likewise with Zhu’s worldview, which need not be threatened by new 
findings etc in science and the limitations of which Zhu himself had indeed already 
acknowledged, as recall the couplet he composed, cited by Julia Ching.
No account of reality, or of any aspects of reality, need be completely and 
conclusively falsified at the first encounter with observations which contradict its claims,
or lead to implications which contradict its claims. This is not in fact the way by which 
science progresses. According to Chalmers:
An embarrassing historical fact for falsificationists is that if their methodology had been 
strictly adhered to by scientists then those theories generally regarded as being among the best 
examples of scientific theories would never have been developed because they would have been 
rejected in their infancy. Given any example of a classic scientific theory, whether at the time of 
its first proposal or at a later date, it is possible to find observational claims that were generally 
accepted at the time and were considered to be inconsistent with the theory. Nevertheless, those 
theories were not rejected, and it is fortunate for science that they were not.234
Contemporary philosopher of science Imre Lakatos also provides a lively and 
‘characteristic’ account of an imaginary physicist working with Newton’s theory of 
gravitation (hereby abbreviated as N):
A physicist of the pre-Einsteinian era… calculates… the path of a newly discovered small 
planet, p. But the planet deviates from the calculated path. Does our Newtonian physicist consider 
that the deviation was forbidden by Newton’s theory and therefore that, once established, it refutes 
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the theory N? No. He suggests that there must be a hitherto unknown planet p’ which perturbs the 
path of p. He calculates the mass, orbit, etc., of this hypothetical planet and then asks an 
experimental astronomer to test his hypothesis… Were the unknown planet p’ to be discovered, it
would be hailed as a new victory of Newtonian science. But it is not. Does our scientist abandon 
Newton’s theory and his idea of the perturbing planet? No. He suggests that a cloud of cosmic 
dust hides the planet from us. He calculates the location and properties of this cloud and asks for a 
research grant to send up a satellite to test his calculations. Were the satellite’s instruments… to 
record the existence of the conjectural cloud, the result would be hailed as an outstanding victory 
for Newtonian science. But the cloud is not found. Does our scientist abandon Newton’s theory, 
together with the idea of the perturbing planet and the idea of a cloud which hides it?235
One would have guessed: no, he comes up with yet some further explanation for 
which he then seeks supportive evidence, and so on. The same goes for philosophical 
theories and worldviews, such as that of Zhu Xi. Hence observations one makes in the 
pursuit of gewu which prima facie appear to militate against the whole philosophy of li, 
or parts thereof, can always be accounted for in ways which would leave Zhu’s 
philosophy intact — a perfectly acceptable move. Gewu need not expose Zhu’s system to 
danger.
But what about new accounts of reality which offer a different way of viewing things, 
as opposed to mere observations which contradict Zhu’s system? Here the story need not 
be all that different. Consider the example of a scientific paradigm which seeks to reduce 
everything to the mechanical interactions of billiard balls in a void. Fine, so even things 
like ren and yi are reducible to such interactions? This would seem very bad news indeed 
for our most cherished values — until we remember that all scientific theories, ideas etc 
are ultimately limited in their scope, this one no less than any other. It may indeed prove
capable of explaining and predicting many kinds of physical phenomena, maybe even 
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certain forms of human behavior, and enable us to manipulate various aspects of the 
physical world to useful and beneficial ends. But all this is still a long way from the claim 
that the workings of phenomenal reality are exhausted by this paradigm; in practice there 
would also turn out to be a lot of things it cannot explain, as is the case with all scientific 
theories and paradigms that have ever existed or will ever come into existence. We know 
not (unless we are sages, shengren) what new aspects of phenomenal reality, including 
that part of it called humankind, still await our discovery. Hence a follower of Zhu Xi can 
take with a pinch of salt the claim that things like ren and yi amount to nothing more than
the interactions of billiard balls in a void. Who is to say that new findings in science 
might not actually suggest instead that the mind has a special and non-incidental place in 
the Natural order of things? In fact such discoveries are being made in the field of what 
are known as ‘paranormal phenomena’, of which more later. They may not totally 
disprove the more materialistically inclined scientific paradigms, but that is unnecessary 
as it will suffice to establish that the said paradigms do not tell the whole story.
This leads to the question whether it amounts to a form of dogmatism which impedes
scientific progress when we demand of all developments in science that they do not 
contradict our values, or, in Zhu’s words, that they be ‘not contradictory to the 
established usage of the sages’. My reply is that, if it is a form of dogmatism, it is one 
based on an unfounded fear, because, as has just been argued, no scientific developments
(properly understood) need ever constitute a real threat to our values, at least the way our 
values are grounded in Zhu Xi. No need for any pro-value sanctions or directives on how 
science should or should not develop. The only likely threat to be posed by a value-
negating scientific theory or paradigm would be from proponents of this theory or 
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paradigm who refuse to acknowledge that it is limited, or will eventually prove limited, 
and insist that it tells the whole story and that there is nothing new to be found anymore, 
even going so far as to engage in naked power play to push their agenda, whereupon they
become the real dogmatists and enemies of scientific progress.
Here is a good case example of a possible challenge to Zhu Xi coming from an 
alternative account of knowledge. It has been suggested to the present author that what 
we term intuition could perchance work in this way. A person working on a scientific 
problem sifts through large numbers of possible solutions, none of which work. Then one 
day a workable solution suddenly occurs to him/her. What happened? Maybe all the 
information this researcher took into his/her mind during the course of his/her research 
just went on being cycled through continuously in the back of his/her head, so to speak, 
the brain trying out fresh solutions based on new permutations of the bits of information 
gathered until finally it hit the right one. No need anymore for any mystical nonsense 
such as Zhu Xi’s li. One might perhaps call this the computational model of intuition. 
Certainly the experiences of people like Mendeleyev, father of the Periodic Table, would 
correspond to the above, this gentleman having tried out hundreds of possible solutions 
for a problem he attempted to solve before a workable solution finally occurred to him 
one day after a nap. Where does this leave Zhu’s epistemology, then?
To begin with, it is not clear to me that Mendeleyev’s experience typifies that of all 
who have had leaps of insight in sounding the workings of Nature; some of the said leaps, 
in contrast to Mendeleyev’s case, do not appear to have involved taking in and working 
with large amounts of information beforehand. One doubts if the first humans to have had 
intuitions of the astrological influences of the planets, for example, had actually taken in 
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and examined copious quantities of information involving correlations between the 
positions of the planets and the behavioral patterns exhibited by people. Perhaps all this 
information was somehow taken in and processed unconsciously, in some subliminal sort 
of way? All that processing would presumably require some kind of unconscious 
conceptual schema to work as a piece of software and make sense of the information. 
Where did the schema come from? And why should I care anyway which solution works 
and which does not? Workable or not, they are but different combinations of bits of 
information. If we seek to explain these by appealing to the individual’s connection to 
some larger whole whereby maintaining the integrity of this whole becomes a categorical 
imperative for him/her and for fulfilling this role effectively s/he is therefore equipped 
with some kind of inborn schema to process all incoming information, that will amount to 
admitting Zhu Xi in through a back door.
The usual ‘monkey-and-typewriter’ explanation that living organisms are but 
cybernetic machines thrown together by the chance combinations of atoms and molecules, 
the inclinations (for working solutions among other things) and information-processing 
apparatus of these machines being likewise accounted for, remains highly controversial. 
Certainly it is a bit of a stretch on our commonsense (to say the least) to believe that a 
group of monkeys striking the keys of typewriters haphazardly would, given enough time, 
produce the complete Recorded Conversations of Master Zhu. Ultimately, it appears the 
computational model has so much to account for that it is not clear if it would serve as a 
better substitute for Zhu’s theory of knowledge. (And however much it may be developed, 
one can be certain that much about the human mind and how it acquires knowledge will 
still remain beyond its grasp, leaving the field open to alternative views on the same 
176
176
aspects of reality which would prove more Zhu-friendly and which could also undergo
the same process of being developed alongside our computational model.)
Now to attend to one final issue, just how workable in practice is all that pretty talk of 
a benign attitude towards all of Nature in gewu? How benign can or should we be 
towards lab animals, for example? It appears we cannot but inflict a certain amount of 
suffering on them for the purpose of experimentation, which does not seem all that
benign to them. But if for this reason we desist from all such kinds of experimentation, 
would that not obstruct the advancement of scientific knowledge? I would offer the 
counsel that at times, things like animal experimentation may indeed be necessary for 
acquiring special pieces of knowledge which would help in alleviating physical suffering 
in the human world, as in the domains of medicine and disease, in which case 
experiments of this nature, while still regrettable, would be justified. It remains 
obligatory for a follower of Zhu Xi, nevertheless, to ensure beforehand that all other 
possible means of acquiring the said knowledge without causing harm to any have been 
exhausted, so as to avoid inflicting unnecessary suffering on animals to the best of his/her
ability. The admonition to adopt a benign attitude towards all of creation in gewu remains 
a workable guide. (One wonders incidentally if all that we have come to know of the 
workings of the human body were the results of experimenting on humans in a like 
manner.)
All in all, the example of Zhu Xi demonstrates that there is nothing ordained about 
the conflict between science and religion and that a relationship of mutual affirmation 
and dependence between the two is entirely possible, at least with respect to the specific 
incarnations assumed by the two in Zhu; nor does his system appear to have fared too 
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poorly in the face of various challenges directed against it. If, therefore, we of today seek 
an end to the conflict, Zhu’s thought may well prove an indispensable case study for our 
task. And to look at the prospective applications to the modern situation, as well as what
the contemporary world could offer which might further fortify and enrich Zhu’s ideas, 
we shall have to proceed to the next and final chapter of the present thesis.
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4. SOME THOUGHTS IN CONCLUSION
 4.1 Relevance for Modern Times and Prospects for Further Developments of Zhu 
Xi’s Thought
What good for today is there in what we have found regarding the scientific and 
religious dimensions of Zhu Xi and the relationship between them? I am confident there 
is much of value for the modern world, from which conversely the neo-Confucian 
tradition of which Zhu Xi is the outstanding representative stands to gain much as well.
For one thing, there appears a dearth of serious academic studies which recognize 
Zhu as a scientific thinker and examine his thought accordingly. Many studies still treat 
him almost exclusively as a religious thinker (as in one who is concerned with 
transmitting the Way and promoting Confucian values), and some have even 
emphatically denied to his thought any true concern for science: there are rather more 
Ohashis than Sakumas today in the field of Zhu Xi studies. As for explorations of the 
relationship between the religious and the scientific side of Zhu’s thought, I believe it can 
be safely claimed that they are nonexistent. In this respect, perhaps the present thesis 
could help fill an academic lacuna.
On a more ambitious note, I believe what we have gathered of the scientific thought 
of Zhu Xi offers a possibility for the development of an independent scientific tradition in
the East Asian milieu. It goes without saying that at present science (to say nothing of our 
academic, economic and social institutions) is an area of human endeavor largely 
dominated by Western ideas and modes of thought — not a very desirable state of affairs 
surely. The many non-Western traditions, with their own interesting ways of 
apprehending the phenomenal world, are effectively silenced. (Any a priori judgments of 
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their possible worth would only be presumptuous; we do not know what interesting 
things might be offered, or arrived at over time, in those many ways of life.) Perhaps the 
Chinese milieu could take the lead in breaking out of this situation. To some degree this 
is happily already a reality, as witness the acknowledgement among medical authorities 
around the world of the efficacy of Chinese medicine. Who knows what further surprises 
might await in the fields of fengshui風水 and qigong氣功?
The problem with a near-exclusive view (such as the one we have now) of 
phenomenal reality and how this reality should be apprehended may lie not merely in the 
silencing of other views, but also with the presence in the said view of certain value-
hostile elements. That dominant trends in contemporary Western scientific thought leave
little prospect for a grounding of our values in the Natural order of things as opposed to 
our ‘subjective’ preferences seems evident (and has a way of shaping our academic, 
economic, social etc institutions, too). Certainly one does not recall hearing of serious 
discussions in science journal articles on how our values might be grounded in, say, 
quantum reality.
The voice of the alleged advocates of science in the West can be positively anti-
religious, not merely a-religious. Contemporary Intelligent Design theorists, who dispute 
the neo-Darwinian account of the emergence of life from pure chance, remain today the 
targets of countless vicious personal attacks. Even in an Asian country like Singapore the 
self-proclaimed crusaders of scientific rationalism are not absent: during a talk the 
present author attended on Nineteenth Century Indian thought at the National University 
of Singapore the question-and-answer session was dominated by a very vocal woman of 
Occidental background who ceaselessly derided all that religious and superstitious 
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nonsense in the name of ‘science’. With no intention of demonizing the modern West, 
this hostility displayed by its scientific community (or a large portion thereof) towards 
religious and even human values, whether in the tacit guise of alleged scientific truths 
which rule out as irrelevant all religious considerations or in the explicit condemnations 
of religion made by people who identify themselves as bearers of the searing white light 
of scientific rationality, simply does not appear as one of its more delectable aspects, 
though at least voices of protest raised against this value-hostile outlook in science are 
not absent in the West itself. Contemporary physicist and science writer Paul Davies 
reports that in a television debate on science and God in which he participated a man 
complained bitterly that “Scientists claim that when I say to my wife “I love you” that is 
nothing but one meaningless mound of atoms interacting with another meaningless 
mound of atoms.” 236 Back in Whitehead’s time he wrote sarcastically as well of 
“scientists animated by the purpose of proving that they are purposeless.”237 And many 
with considerable academic credentials continue to dispute the doctrines of neo-
Darwinism.
Contemporary philosopher-theologian and scholar of Chinese thought Robert Neville
is fully aware of the value-hostile inclinations of modern Western scientific thought, and
in this respect he has the following to say of the Confucian tradition:
…contemporary Confucianism needs to develop a comprehensive conception of knowledge 
expressive of its core motifs of value and valuation, a kind of axiology of thinking… this axiology 
needs to be compatible with science and in fact to provide accounts of fallibility in both science 
and morals and of the justification of the interests that guide science… [it also] needs to 
reconstruct the valuative elements of the Confucian tradition’s symbols… Confucian spiritual 
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engagement as grounding value is impossible without a reconstruction of the Confucian symbols 
in terms that address and circumvent the value-subjectivizing ideology of modern science.238
It ought to be evident from our study of Zhu Xi that at least the essentials of such a 
conception of knowledge — one affirmative of high values and the pursuit of knowledge 
alike without any contradiction — are present in his thought. Zhu’s system therefore 
offers the promising prospect, if adopted today and further developed, of providing for 
the Chinese milieu a full-fledged schema to serve as an independent basis for grounding 
the traditional values of this milieu as well as for further probing the workings of Nature.
Armed with such a basis, the heirs of this milieu may then engage in exchanges with the 
Western tradition on a more equitable basis and their values would no longer be subject 
to the same abuse as those of the Occident at the hands of its own ‘scientific’ views. This 
could perchance inspire other non-Western milieux, even the West itself, to come up with 
their own means of counteracting the ‘value-subjectivizing ideology of modern science’, 
and the different milieux could even come together and engage in dialogue, to share their 
views and perspectives on this issue. The desirability of such outcomes would 
presumably be self-evident and not require much elaboration.
None of this is to say that the Occidental scientific tradition is so irremediably rotten 
that there is nothing the Chinese and other non-Western milieux can or should draw upon 
from it. What is suggested here is merely that no member taking part in the Great 
Conversation should dominate or play the role of a supervisor as opposed to a participant; 
dialogue as a path towards greater mutual appreciation or at least understanding should 
be entirely welcome otherwise. Different milieux engaged in dialogue can always learn 
much from each other, but each should do so only on its own terms.
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A universally endorsed scientific agenda, to be sure, can be a good thing in certain 
respects. It can facilitate the exchange of information between different groups, for 
example, so they can share their scientific know-how. But it is to be hoped that such an 
agenda will not be imposed by any specific group on all parties concerned. Far better it 
would surely be for them to work out such an agenda through dialogue and the mutual 
exchange of ideas — on a voluntary basis, of course. Such an agenda would take into 
account the historical and cultural experiences of different peoples, and offer a more 
satisfactory and value-affirming account of Nature and human life than that supplied by 
the orthodox modern Western narrative. Zhu Xi ought to serve well in this respect as the 
voice of the Chinese milieu.
Already there are individuals and groups in diverse milieux around the world today 
seeking to spell out ways of thought and life, often on the basis of traditional systems of 
belief while at the same time taking into account the findings of and problems posed by 
science, which would simultaneously address the different needs of modern humanity 
(physical, intellectual, spiritual etc) and avoid the negative aspects of both traditional 
religions and modern civilization. One such group would be the Center for Process 
Studies in the US, which focuses particularly on process and Whiteheadian thought.
Some, such as the contemporary philosopher Christian de Quincey, are actually aware of 
and drawing upon the insights of Zhu Xi and other neo-Confucians. It can only be the 
most profitable thing for the modern heirs of Zhu Xi to engage in exchanges with them, 
especially if some of their views are already in concord with those of Zhu Xi in certain 
respects, Whitehead’s thought being a case in point as noted by Berthrong and others.
Jiao Hong ought to be enthusiastic about such exchanges, as witness his assertion that
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Dao is one… In China we speak of Confucius, Mencius, Laozi and Zhuangzi, and coming to 
the Western regions we speak of the Buddha. Extending yet further from this, outside of the Eight 
Wastes and going back to the earliest antiquity, there have always been those who have attained to 
It first to serve as our teachers, not just these few individuals alone [i.e. Confucius etc]. 道一
也。。。在中國者曰孔孟老莊，其至自西域者曰釋氏。繇此推之，八荒之表，萬古之上，
莫不有先達者爲之師，非止此數人而已。239
Zhu himself would not have been entirely averse to such exchanges with other 
schools of thought either, as can be seen in his views on Daoism and Buddhism for 
instance. Despite his generally negative evaluation of the two bodies of thought, an 
attitude shared by many of the Song and Ming Confucians, a perusal of the relevant 
portions of the Conversations reveals that he did not reject them wholesale without a 
careful examination of their contents, often acknowledging readily what he judged were 
laudable features in them. Thus in Book 125, which discusses Daoism, parts of the Laozi
were highly praised, among them Chapters 44 and 59. ‘’He who hoards most will lose 
heavily.’ Laozi has said this well also. 多藏必厚亡，老子也是說得好。’240 ‘The virtue 
of frugality is supremely good. One who exercises frugality in any matter rarely goes 
amiss. 儉德極好。凡事儉則鮮失。’241 Coming to discussions on Buddhism in Book 
126, Zhu actually viewed early Buddhism in a generally favorable light, mentioning at 
least twice the simile, found in earlier Buddhist texts, of the musical instrument, the 
strings of which should be adjusted neither too taut nor too slack. Zhu also remarked on 
the ‘extreme precision and ingenuity皆極精巧’ of various Buddhist analytical concepts 
such as the Six Roots（六根）, the Six Kinds of Dust （六塵）etc. ‘Hence those of the 
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past generation who practiced Buddhism held that Confucius fell short on this.故前輩學
佛者，謂此孔子所不及。’242
Contemporary scholar of Confucianism Peng Guoxiang 彭國翔 , in his Rujia 
Chuantong: Zongjiao yu Renwen Zhuyi zhi jian 儒家傳統：宗教與人文主義之間
(Confucian Tradition: Crossing Religion and Humanism), has also expressed confidence
that the Confucian tradition has much to contribute to the encouragement of dialogue 
among the world’s different milieux, pointing out the value of such ideas as li being one 
but diverse in its manifestations and also the prevalence of dialogue in the Confucian 
tradition.
…Whether of an inter-religious or intra-religious nature, the history of the development of 
Confucianism has always been characterized by dialogue. To attend to the intra-religious variety
first… After Confucius, there had been a bewildering tangle of strands in pre-Qin Confucian 
thought, involving incessant exchanges… As for the centuries-long development of Song and 
Ming Confucianism, it manifested even more fully this predilection for dialogue…243
Peng offered several examples to illustrate this, such as the ‘Goose Lake’ debates 
between Zhu Xi and Lu Xiangshan and the formation through dialogue of the different 
schools of Song and Ming Confucianism, among them those of the Cheng Brothers, Zhu 
Xi and Wang Yangming. As for the inter-religious exchanges, those between the Three 
Teachings of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism ought to be well-known. The domain 
of science appears absent from Peng’s considerations, however, and it surely will not do 
for any future dialogues on religious issues between different traditions and milieux to 
leave out this highly important area of human thought.
To return to the aforementioned groups and individuals around the world working on 
new ways of thought and life, it is noteworthy that they might actually already agree on 
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certain ideas of import, among them the vision of a Grand Unity underlying all of 
existence, a vision lying at the heart of many of the world’s diverse religious and 
philosophical traditions. On this vision of Unity Bergson, St Hildegard, Robert Fludd,
Jacob Boehme, Rūmī, Śamkara and Chief Seattle could have agreed with each other and 
with Zhu Xi and many of the other Confucians of the Song and Ming periods, even 
Twentieth Century Confucians like the great Xiong Shili 熊十力. Each tradition could 
offer its own unique perspective on this Grand Unity, and this sharing of perspectives
could lead to new insights, opening up new avenues of thought.
Much has been said on how Nature has come to be denuded of all value and viewed 
as a mere quarry of resources in the eyes of the modern West, resulting in the enormous 
damage to the biosphere with which we are all familiar today. The unitive vision, which 
views all life as one, ought to go a long way towards correcting this attitude if 
incorporated into a universal scientific agenda, leading us back to the reenchantment of 
Nature and to the development of more environment-friendly ways of life and thought.
One outstanding feature of this unitive vision, namely the ultimately ineffable nature 
of reality, would comprise yet a further source of concord, besides being also of special 
significance for our understanding of the nature of science. For one thing, all scientific 
theories would be seen, as argued before, as tentative and ultimately limited. Gone is the 
possibility of exclusive adherence to specific theories, leading to the persecution of 
different views. Instead scientific theories could now be viewed simply as conceptual 
tools, even works of art. This is certainly one feature the world’s many cultural milieux 
would do well to incorporate into their scientific agendas. Zhu Xi could provide precisely 
one source of reference here (though the Chinese certainly could learn from others, too).
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It is easy to dismiss Zhu Xi, Bergson, St Hildegard, Robert Fludd etc as so many 
woolly-minded romantics, if not for special personal experiences of this Grand Unity 
which many of them and other individuals around the world throughout history have had
— what have been termed mystical experiences. Often the lives of people with such 
experiences were utterly transformed by them, and similarities in what they have related 
of them have also been noted by Julia Ching, among others. Repeatedly we read of a 
sense of the eternal and of unity with all of life, of great joy, and of the utter ineffability 
of what is experienced. It is difficult to attribute any of these to any special factors. Lyall 
Watson informs us that the Religious Experience Research Unit at Oxford University has
amassed thousands of case histories involving such experiences, which ‘transcend age, 
sex, education, geography, cultural and religious backgrounds, and point very strongly to 
a common core.’244 This conclusion was supported by similar work carried out by other 
academic institutions, as Watson further noted. Clearly mystical experience — which for 
all we know could amount to a momentary penetration of the li of the Ten Thousand 
Things — depends on no special a priori schema, and its universality would only provide 
yet further grounds for concord between the different groups mentioned before.
We cannot enter here any in-depth discussion on just what sort of philosophical 
verities we can derive from mystical experience, but a couple things can still be said. 
First, it would not square with the facts to dismiss mystical experience as a symptom of 
mental illness, perhaps a form of ziqi indulged in by those too spineless to face the brute 
realities of life. Studies have found that those who have had such experiences performed 
significantly better than average on a variety of tests for mental health.245 Secondly, the 
similarities in the details of their experiences despite the wide differences in other factors 
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such as age or sex ought to indicate a non-arbitrary source for the experiences which does 
not depend on subjective hopes and fancies and which may not therefore be lightly 
dismissed. I may never have seen the Egyptian Pyramids myself, but from similarities in 
the accounts of them provided by people of widely different backgrounds who (claim to) 
have seen them, I can still deduce that the accounts are not subjective fantasies. 
Happily, some contemporary scientists in the West are in fact sympathetic to this 
vision of a unifying Absolute and do not dismiss it as so much unscientific nonsense. One 
might take note of physicists like David Bohm, a long-time friend of the great Indian 
philosopher Krishnamurti, and biologists like Rupert Sheldrake and Lyall Watson, both 
of whom are open to the possible presence of special insights of scientific significance in 
the traditional lore and magical practices of ‘premodern’ cultural milieux. This highly 
commendable attitude towards traditional cultures is found as well in Joseph Needham, 
who more than once remarked in his works that the archers of Chinese thought had shot 
an arrow close to the spot where the mountaineers of Western science were later to stand.
Speaking of the views of Sheldrake and Watson, one largely still unrecognized area 
of modern science which ought to be of special interest to a modern follower of Zhu Xi 
lies in the study of what have been termed ‘paranormal phenomena’ — specifically, those 
phenomena involving such unusual abilities of the human mind as the ability to effect 
changes in the physical world through direct application of the will (psychokinesis or 
telekinesis), to perceive directly the thoughts of others (telepathy), or to gain perceptual 
information regarding things otherwise barred from the physical senses (clairvoyance). It 
might be possible to understand such phenomena in ways which would lend scientific 
credibility to the idea of a Grand Unity discussed so far, an idea which could therefore be 
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admitted as articulating accurately an important aspect of reality (of which the
experiences of the mystic could be genuine intuitive apprehensions for all we know).
Why is it that I can directly will my hands to move, but not the pen I write with? Because 
my hands are a part of my body, but not the pen. But what if the Ten Thousand Things in 
fact come together to form a single living body, as Zhang Zai and Zhu Xi maintained? It 
might be possible then for me to will the pen to move, after all. Again, commonsense has 
it that I can perceive directly my own thoughts but not those of another for the reason that
our minds are discrete and separate. But what if there were experimental evidence that 
one could in fact directly access the contents of another mind? The idea of discrete and 
separate minds might then warrant some revision, a possibly more accurate view being 
that all minds are actually but local manifestations of a single Universal Mind — what 
Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming would term the Mind of Heaven and Earth.
To be sure, certain aspects of Zhu Xi’s thought (as interpreted in the present thesis) 
would probably already possess a paranormal flavor in the eyes of a modern scientist. To 
gain knowledge of things through a process of empathetic ganying, whereby one enters 
and identifies with them, would seem to amount to a form of clairvoyance, for example.
This discussion on the paranormal is no mere New Age sensationalism; there is much 
experimental and anecdotal evidence to establish its existence, besides which a number of 
respectable academic works on the subject have already been penned, such as Stephen 
Braude’s The Limits of Influence, David Ray Griffin’s Parapsychology, Philosophy and 
Spirituality (plus a sixty-two page chapter in his Religion and Scientific Naturalism), and 
the collection of papers, Critical Reflections on the Paranormal, edited by Michael 
Stoeber and Hugo Meynell. Thinkers like De Quincey have reflected as well on the
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philosophical implications of the reality of the paranormal in their work, the same 
implications being explored from a Whiteheadian perspective in Griffin’s works with 
respect to our moral and spiritual values. Could similar work not be done with a view to 
exploring what bearings the said phenomena might have on Zhu’s thought? Perhaps
studies of this nature could provide serious empirical support to help buttress the whole 
edifice of Song and Ming Confucianism, which could be of great value for the effort to 
put together an independent philosophy of science based on the thought of Zhu Xi.
To sum up, a major problem with the state of science around the world consists in
being excessively dominated by the scientific agenda of one of its cultural milieux, an 
agenda which furthermore proves on certain counts incapable of accommodating 
religious or even human values. It would therefore constitute a more desirable state of 
affairs for the world’s diverse cultural milieux to seek to develop their own independent 
scientific traditions, which would better suit their specific cultural backgrounds as well as 
provide a basis for their own convictions on the good life and on the place of humanity in 
the Universe, though they can still learn much from each other on their quests. And with
respect to the Chinese milieu in particular, Zhu Xi would provide the essentials for an
independent view of Nature’s workings, how they should be sounded and what they 
imply for our values. This is how Zhu Xi can still be of relevance today.
 4.2 Do we need a Daoti?
One may, of course, question the very need for religion itself. That we need science 
today for our well-being can hardly be disputed; what would appear more open to dispute 
is whether the same holds true of religion. If religion is but an obsolete intellectual fossil 
left behind by previous generations of utterly benighted human beings, then the present 
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thesis becomes a mere piece of intellectual jugglery, of interest only to connoisseurs of 
antique curiosities. So, understood (as it is in the present thesis) as the explicit 
articulation of a set of ultimate values and a metaphysical basis or grounding for them, is 
religion an essential aspect of a becoming human existence? What special values and 
special basis for them — in Confucian terms, a daoti — do we need? Can the job not be 
done by a strictly secular outlook on life instead?
At the very least human life will surely have to be accorded unconditional value. It is 
bad enough if we torture animals or pollute the biosphere, but go further and discard this 
most basic of all values, the value assigned to human life, and the limit is surely reached; 
there will be nothing more to say and we can forget about all further discussions. Human 
civilization simply disintegrates. Clearly a line exists as to how far we can go in 
discarding our values.
Why value human life, though (or indeed anything else)? Some might reply: who 
cares, so long as human life is valued? This was presumably the view of contemporary 
author and newspaper columnist John Bittleston when he once opined that ‘Good 
behaviour is good behaviour, whatever the motive.’ The only trouble with this view is 
that certain motives which give rise to good behavior in certain circumstances might just 
as easily give rise to bad behavior in other ones. If material profit were my primary 
motive for behaving well, for example, then it does not appear inconceivable that I might 
engage in bad behavior instead in contingent situations where good behavior stands in the 
way of the big buck rather than leading to it — and, with all due apologies to Adam 
Smith and his ilk, such situations arise all the time in real life, reducing to a joke their 
belief in the power of the invisible hand of the profit motive to create a better world.
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We need a reason for upholding and abiding by our values because without any such 
reason all we have left are our whims and passions, and just how reliable they are as a 
guide one can guess. (Even allowing for the celebrated Mencian doctrine on the original 
goodness of our xing, there are still our qi endowments to take into account!) The force of 
custom might prove effective in instilling good behavior, but one would like to know if 
this does not reduce the moral agent to a mere automaton who follows the rules or the 
herd unreflectively, without knowing why. We have just found it unsatisfactory as well to 
base our reason on the contingencies of the world we inhabit, such as the prospects for
social status, material wealth, or whatever (‘Being courteous brings more customers’). 
No, the reason should be based on something which transcends the limitations of our
ever-changing world — and a further special reason exists as to why this should be so.
In a Peanuts comic strip the immortal cartoonist Charles M. Schulz showed Lucy 
calling upon her baby brother Linus to come for supper, explaining to him: ‘Mom says, if 
you don’t take your supper, you won’t grow up to be a big boy.’ Thoughtful beyond his 
years, little Linus reflected: ‘Five hundred years from now, who’ll know the difference?’
Who indeed? By then my physical form will merely be so much dust, my name faded 
away from everyone’s memory; same with all of the billions of human beings (and 
animals) alive today, all those billions who have ever lived or will ever live, and even our
sociocultural milieux and our planet, albeit reckoned with on different timescales. The 
seeming futility of it all forces on each of us the question why at all I should exert myself
in any special direction, for example towards being a more virtuous person or a ‘success’ 
at work or business. What is the point? Why not just eat, drink and be merry instead, for 
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tomorrow we kick the bucket? We may as well even kick it now if ‘the going gets tough’, 
it being merely a matter of when that we do so.
Perchance I may compose a great work of philosophy, or come up with some other
‘great’ achievement, which will earn me the same ‘immortality’ as people like Confucius, 
Zhu Xi and (of course) Charles M. Schulz. Leaving aside the obvious problem that the 
cultural and historical, even the physical conditions allowing for the remembrance of my 
name will not themselves last indefinitely, there is also the question: so what if my name 
could actually be remembered forever? What is it to me? (The Roman emperor and 
philosopher Marcus Aurelius asked the same question in his Meditations.) When one 
comes to think of it, it is probably of no more meaning to me than the news that my
appendix will be preserved in a jar for all eternity, to borrow a phrase from contemporary 
philosopher Antony Flew. That is why this kind of immortality is ultimately bogus. It 
also seems kind of unfair that only a few of us can enjoy this kind of ‘immortality’ while 
the rest of us sink into oblivion. Finally, folks like Jie 桀 , Zhou 紂(two tyrannical 
legendary rulers in ancient China), Hitler and Genghis Khan are as well-remembered as 
Yao, Shun, Gandhi and Mother Teresa, though for somewhat different reasons. Why is it 
preferable to be remembered for one reason rather than another? Does one not enjoy the 
gift of ‘immortality’ either way?
The point made in the preceding paragraphs is driven across with even greater 
poignancy in a scenario someone imagined which the present author once found on the 
Internet. Technologically advanced aliens desirous of laying claim to our planet as their 
own offer us humans a choice. We can opt, all of us, to (1) have ourselves painlessly 
sterilized by them, and let them cater to all our physical needs so all of us can live in 
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comfort for the term of our natural lives; then when the last of us are gone they will take 
over the planet. Alternatively we can (2) turn down their offer, and take up arms against 
them in defense of our world. The question here is why (2) is preferable to (1). Assuming 
the aliens are true to their word, (1) can actually seem an irresistible offer from certain 
points of view. Certainly (2) will only add a whole lot more to the countless sources of 
distress we already face in our lives. What values are served anyway in an indefinite 
continuation of the human race, given the thousand and one forms of misery each of its
countless members must endure through their lives only in the end to meet with the glum 
prospect of dissolution? Far better it would seem for us, all the people alive today, simply 
to cease all procreation, live out our lives in comfort, and let the human race end with our 
passing, together with its long history of blood and tears.
There appears no option in the end but to concede that any reason we wish to devise 
for affirming anything we deem ‘noble’, ‘worthy’ or otherwise valuable in some similar 
sense entails the existence of some special ens or aspect of reality which resides beyond 
the reach of time and mortality, be it God, Logos, Brahman, Dao, Dharma, or li. In a 
Cosmos where all are reducible to mechanical interactions between inert portions of 
matter and accidental arrangements of them, the conclusions spelt out in the above 
paragraphs become unavoidable. Yes, we need a daoti.
To be sure, a daoti alone may not comprise a sufficient condition for the grounding 
and hence affirmation of our values; we need in addition to take into account, among 
other things, how this metaphysical basis would ground them, whether it works as a basis 
for them. It remains the case, nevertheless, that a basis unafflicted by the same scourge of 
impermanence as the flesh would still serve as a necessary foundation for our values.
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This basis will have to be seriously regarded as something real. If instead people 
thought it was something made up, it would cease to work and lose all its value. That is 
why it is vain to affirm as valuable an account of reality containing such a basis merely
for the reason that it is useful for promoting ‘good behavior’, as was apparently the 
approach towards the world’s religions adopted by people like Stephen Jay Gould, Carl 
Sagan and Edward O. Wilson. These three spokesmen of science are known to have been
dismissive of all religions as mistaken accounts of reality, yet in a meeting that issued a 
‘Joint Appeal by Science and Religion on the Environment’ they were unanimous in their 
assessment of religion as a positive force in “foster[ing] the kind of moral fervor that the 
environmental movement sorely needs.” Referring to this statement, contemporary author 
John Haught pointed out that ‘it is only because believers take their religious symbols and 
ideas to be disclosive of the truth of reality that they are aroused to moral passion in the 
first place. If devotees thought that their religions were not representative of the way 
things really are, then the religions would be ethically impotent.’246 Thus the ‘practical 
purpose’ of fostering certain desirable types of behavior constitutes a poor reason for 
granting recognition to pro-value accounts of reality; either you concede that the views of 
reality contained in them are true (or at least tell a part of the story), or you do not. 
Haught’s insight finds support in the famous Twentieth Century English popularizer of 
East Asian thought, Alan Watts:
Once there is the suspicion that a religion is a myth, its power is gone. It may be necessary for 
man to have a myth, but he cannot self-consciously prescribe one as he can mix a pill for a 
headache. A myth can only ‘work’ when it is thought to be truth, and man cannot for long 
knowingly and intentionally “kid” himself.247
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How well, then, does Zhu Xi’s li perform the job as a basis for our values, assuming 
its reality for now? Not too poorly, one would estimate. We have seen how the
metaphysics of li necessitates ‘good behavior’; leads to a deep sense of consanguinity
with all of life; provides human life with a telos, namely to raise our moral nature to a 
state of perfection; and overcomes the problem of mortality through the identification of
one’s mind or being with the li, the Mind of Heaven and Earth, whereupon we arrive at 
the realization that we cannot die because we were never born. The previous form of 
‘immortality’ being discussed acquires a new value as well, that of inspiring future 
generations to tread the same path (though of course if that were one’s true intention then 
one would no longer care about such ‘immortality’). Convictions along these lines have 
sustained in the face of adversity several dignitaries in Chinese history, such as the great 
scholar-statesman Wen Tianxiang 文天祥 (1236 – 1283), who lived towards the end of 
the same dynasty as Zhu Xi. Captured by the Mongols who asked him to join them, he 
refused and held on tenaciously to his principles to the very end. Clearly he would have 
chosen (2), not (1). One is apt to wonder if the secular, materialistic ethos of modern 
industrial society could have likewise sustained him.
It is of special interest and significance to note that li has been thought of as a 
creative power, one that eternally regenerates life anew to replace what has withered and 
fallen away. Insofar as we are supposed to partake of the li, it would seem entirely in 
accordance with its dictates for us likewise to exercise our creative faculties in different 
domains, such as science and the arts; after all, we are endowed with such faculties by 
virtue of the li. A further telos would thus be added to our human existence: to exercise 
our creativity to the full. From the looks of things, therefore, it does not appear unlikely 
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that the basis for our values supplied by Zhu Xi would conduce, not merely to ‘good 
behavior’, but also to a meaningful and fulfilling human life.
Lest the reader’s suspicions, incidentally, be aroused at this point, I offer my 
assurance that I entertain no intention here of ‘sneaking up’ on the conclusion that Zhu 
Xi’s basis alone can do the job. The ways of affirming human values and purpose spelt 
out above might not in fact be the exclusive patents of Zhu Xi, since the near-universal 
occurrence of the idea of a unifying Absolute among the world’s diverse sociocultural 
milieux, which we have noted, suggests that very similar values and ways of grounding
them should likewise be found among them.
But to return to the question of reality, how shall we know that there is such a thing as 
li, or a unifying Absolute of similar nature? This is the one issue on which everything 
else hangs; the most exquisitely conceived, most life-affirming account of reality will not 
do the slightest good if reality refuses to cooperate. While no indisputable evidence of the 
reality of such an Absolute is forthcoming (short of a mystical experience on one’s part), 
I believe clues indicative of its existence are not unavailable. There is the widespread 
occurrence of mystical experience to begin with, discussed earlier. The aforementioned 
findings in parapsychology and the physical sciences come in as well, which again allow 
for ways of understanding them that would be in harmony with this vision of the unity of 
all things, suggesting that it should at least tell a part of the story.
One aspect of the phenomenal world which may not specifically bear witness to the 
unitive/mystical vision but which still bespeaks the presence of a guiding purpose would 
be the very phenomenon of life itself. In terms of the support it can provide for believing 
in the presence of a telos in the Universe, this might perhaps be one of the most powerful 
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pieces of evidence to emerge from science today. The degree of complexity manifested in 
living things as revealed by science is staggering. To consider the human body alone, 
specifically the proteins employed by it, contemporary British astrophysicist Fred Hoyle 
estimated the odds against the chance formation of the molecule of just a single protein 
from its constituent amino acids to be equivalent to the odds against solving a Rubik cube 
blindfolded, which are of such magnitude that even at the rate of making one move every 
second the attempt to solve the cube would take about 1,350 billion years. That is just a 
single protein; the human body employs 200,000 different ones. Even limiting oneself to 
the 2,000 enzymes which form an especially important group of proteins, the odds 
against the chance assemblage of their molecules from their constituent amino acids have
been reckoned by Hoyle to be along the order of 1040,000 — ‘1’ followed by 40,000 
zeroes. Given such figures, it really would be rather difficult to believe that such 
complexity could have arisen by chance; to believe this would amount to believing that 
the complete Recorded Conversations of Master Zhu could emerge from an explosion in 
a printing works.248
How did life in all its complexity arise, then? That an intelligent and purposive agent 
is involved appears an inescapable conclusion. Clearly this agent cannot itself be a living 
thing in the sense of being reckoned with on the same footing as the living things whose 
existence it brings about. Those who follow the Abrahamic religions, of course, would 
identify this agent as God (this being apparently the only pro-design option neo-
Darwinists know of). What about Zhu Xi or a modern follower of him? No doubt for 
them the agent would be the li which resides in all, by which qi shapes itself into the Ten 
Thousand Things.249 One of the critical differences here from the Abrahamic tradition is 
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that for Zhu Xi li would be immanent, as opposed to the Judeo-Christian God, who is 
transcendent and works on His creation from without. Those who subscribe to the idea of 
some omnipresent, unifying Absolute similar to the li, say Brahman, would probably 
follow lines of thought not too different from those of Zhu Xi as spelt out here. In any 
case, it is affirmed that life did not arise from blind chance and insentient forces, that life 
and the world are teleological by nature. And the findings cited on the complexity of life 
ought to provide substantial backing here for this conviction, offering us a fine example 
of how our beliefs on the reality of a metaphysical basis for our values can find support in 
the findings of science or at least would be allowed and not contradicted by them.
It might be asked whether a serious problem might not confront the conclusion drawn 
here on the legitimacy of religious belief, namely the problem posed by the fact that two 
different ways are found here for grounding values and purpose — the theistic and the 
‘unitive/mystical’. Surely one should expect no such differences if it were the same 
reality that were apprehended by all parties, right? This problem has already been 
addressed elsewhere, though focusing on the sciences. Recall the example of Newtonian 
and Hamilton-Jacobi mechanics. It is perfectly possible to have different views or ideas 
pertaining to the same aspect of reality. Truth be told, similarities between the theistic 
and the ‘unitive/mystical’ outlook are not entirely absent: many in the Judeo-Christian 
tradition have had experiences and expressed views which to all purposes would identify 
them with those from the ‘unitive/mystical’ camp, mystics like St Hildegard being cases
in point — granting further plausibility to the notion that one and the same spiritual 
reality could have been apprehended by the two camps.
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It would go beyond the scope of the present thesis to examine in further detail the 
evidence for and against neo-Darwinism and the Intelligent Design thesis; here it ought to 
suffice to observe that many scientific academicians of note today still consider as 
grossly inadequate all the evidence available for the neo-Darwinian account of the 
emergence and development of life.250 The question the present author would like to 
explore at this point, the one question that piques his understanding no end, is why 
anyone should actually be desperate to believe in a purposeless Universe where all values 
are ultimately void, so desperate they want to believe that the complete Recorded 
Conversations of Master Zhu really could be assembled by an explosion in a printing 
works. If someone were desperate to believe in a purposeful Universe, the present author
would understand. But a purposeless Universe? Why? There are many today to whom the 
former is a notion more offensive than pornography would have been to the Song 
Confucian Cheng Yi. For them, religion and the Intelligent Design thesis are things to be 
treated in the highest contempt. A special term has been coined to designate these people:
militant atheists. (I understand by ‘atheism’ here not merely the denial of a God in the 
Abrahamic sense, but the complete denial of any kind of spiritual reality, including Zhu 
Xi’s li.)
One sometimes wonders if Western intellectuals from Darwin and Nietzsche onwards
have not been suffering from some sort of philosophical masochism, where the human 
condition has to be made to look as black as possible with every attempt being made 
either to deny any basis to anything of value and worth in the human sense or to reduce it 
to a ‘nothing but’. Thus all living things, human beings included, are nothing but mounds 
of atoms; human minds nothing but computers; all acts of altruism and forms of artistic 
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inspiration nothing but the sublimation of repressed sexual urges or animal instincts; and 
all historical events reducible to the play of market forces. As if that were not enough, the 
deconstructive postmodernists and the heirs of the liberal tradition had to add insult to 
injury by turning words like ‘common’, ‘public’, ‘shared’ and ‘universal’ into dirty 
words, thereby denying all possibility of communication and the exchange of ideas as a 
possible route towards the resolution of the problems concerning the status of our values. 
But to focus for now on the question why anyone would be desperate to be an atheist, one 
often-encountered reason — so often encountered it has become old hat — is that 
religious beliefs are irrational. They are neither provable nor disprovable. It is the mark of 
rationality not to accept anything as true until incontrovertible evidence as to its truth is 
found, and such evidence is not forthcoming as far as religious views are concerned. The 
hatred for religion is then understood to be really an aversion to irrationality.
We should know by now how we may reply to this charge against religion as the 
antithesis of rationality. (As if it were all that rational to believe, as so many pro-Darwin 
scientists do, that the Recorded Conversations of Master Zhu could be created by an 
explosion in a printing works.) To begin with, the crime of deferring to unsubstantiated 
presuppositions adopted beforehand is one we commit all the time, and unavoidably so. 
No scientific endeavor or conscious act of any kind can proceed without it. As for the 
view of science being the enemy of irrationality, of which religion is supposedly the very 
embodiment, what are we to make of Newton, one of the greatest scientists who ever 
lived, who was at the same time a deeply religious person? Nor have scientists 
themselves always been true to the scruple of not accepting anything as true pending the 
discovery of incontrovertible evidence as to its truth, being in fact often highly defensive 
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of their pet theories. Recall Lakatos’ example of the physicist who refuses to give up on 
Newtonian physics, which illustrates the problem with falsificationism as well. Why can
it not be allowed of the follower of a religious view to do likewise? Indeed Lakatos’ 
example would lead us to ask: why should the rule be ‘not to accept anything as true until 
incontrovertible evidence as to its truth is found’? Why not this instead, ‘not to reject
something as false until incontrovertible evidence as to its falsehood is found’, at least 
when it comes to such things as religious beliefs? As contemporary scholar Robert Koons 
asked with respect to the two options of a purposeful Universe on the one hand and a 
purposeless one on the other, “where should we locate the presumption of truth, and 
where the burden of proof?”251
There is a favorite quote among the witch-hunters of ‘scientific rationalism’, 
apparently from Carl Sagan, to the effect that ‘extraordinary claims require extraordinary 
evidence’, the existence of things like God or li (not to mention paranormal phenomena) 
being examples of what are termed ‘extraordinary claims’ here. Either incontrovertible 
evidence can be supplied as to their existence, or believing in them constitutes a case of 
pure irrationality. But one can retort with the rebuttal that ‘serious claims require serious
evidence’, the belief that no metaphysical basis of any kind exists for our values being an 
example here of what would count as a very serious claim indeed. Can serious evidence
ever be produced to substantiate this claim, and if not, then may not belief in some such 
basis be advisable in view of the potentially disastrous ramifications for our values to 
which its rejection would lead? This does not appear all that irrational a conclusion to 
draw — all the less so in the light of the numerical evidence in favor of design — but 
even assuming it is, why should the concern with rationality take precedence over the 
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concern for our values? They (our values) may not comprise an appropriate area of 
concern for science — depending actually on what rules we lay down for science in the 
first place — but are scientific concerns the be-all-and-end-all of human life?
All in all, the alleged irrationality of religion makes up an unsatisfactory reason for its 
condemnation. Another possible reason might make it easier to understand why people 
would be desperate to be atheists: the proselytism and intolerance of which various 
religious groups are unfortunately guilty.
The inability to countenance the views of others and the persecution of others on the 
basis of their beliefs have not been among the finer aspects of religion in its historical 
manifestations. But then such proselytism and intolerance of other views probably stem 
from that perennial desire for certainty, certainty as to the validity of one’s views or 
beliefs — a perfectly understandable sentiment though one based on an unfounded fear. It 
is understandable; we all would like our pet views/beliefs/theories to be true, just like 
Lakatos’ physicist. But the fear which forms its basis is also unfounded because the 
validation of a view or account of reality, as has already been stated several times (one 
way or another) in the present thesis, need not entail the invalidation of all others. The 
proselytizers evidently thought it does, though, and by pushing too hard for the 
acceptance of their beliefs by others — wide acceptance of one’s beliefs by others being 
certainly a powerful way of assuring oneself of the validity of the said beliefs — would 
have unwittingly incurred a great deal of annoyance from others indeed. Little wonder 
there should be those who hate religion! This ought to constitute an excellent illustration 




Human and to some measure forgivable though this thirst for certainty may be, a 
different kind of desire far more sinister by nature exists: the desire for secular power.
We now have more than mere annoyance with the unrelenting proselytizer to worry 
about. Often the two kinds of desire go together: for those hankering for certainty, secular 
power can prove a highly effective means of propagating one’s beliefs, while for those 
concerned on the other hand with secular power, certain religious beliefs (at least in the 
past) would have served well as a means of enforcing the meek obedience demanded by
such power, such as the threat of eternal damnation. Thus the quest for secular power 
often went hand-in-hand with religious intolerance and persecution; religious ideas are 
now deformed into means of intellectual and political suppression, the emotional scars 
inflicted on countless individuals as a result soiling only further the image of religion in 
the eyes of many, along with the negative impact of these scars down the generations. In 
the West various intellectual movements viewed as a threat to the church have been put 
down, while in China the same desire for secular power came close to separating Zhu 
Xi’s head from his body, and later was furthermore to distort his system into an
instrument to serve the interests of those in positions of power, inspiring the well-known 
lamentation of the Qing Dynasty Confucian thinker Dai Zhen 戴震 (1723 – 1777) that the 
li had been used to kill people. Little wonder, then, that there are people even today who 
condemn Confucianism as a ‘feudal’ ethic which destroyed human lives. And people who 
are anxious to endorse the atheist view.
The desire for worldly power is perhaps the most hateful legacy of the human race. 
Among countless other things it led to two World Wars, gave birth to such abominations 
as nuclear weapons, led the West to destroy the traditional ways of life of virtually all 
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non-Western peoples, and in China painted red with the blood of hundreds of student
protestors the square of the so-called ‘Gate of Heavenly Peace’ in Beijing on the 4th of 
June, 1989. Here indeed is one sorry aspect of humankind that might tempt one to accept 
the aliens’ offer. With respect to the distortions of religious ideas and beliefs by this
desire for power, the emotional scars left in the minds of those affected might have been 
so deep as to preclude the possibility of any persuasion by reason regarding religion as 
originally but a sincere attempt, unsoiled by the concern for worldly power, to answer the 
question what values we should have and what metaphysical basis exists for them.
Still, reason and dialogue remain the only options we have if we do not consider as 
satisfactory the current state of affairs confronting the religious and scientific aspects of 
our intellectual/mental lives. If we opt to enforce our views and ideas through the 
exercise of secular power, we end up following the example of the miscreants who 
visited upon our world the aforementioned tragedies, with another being added in our 
name. Hence we have little choice but to trudge on through dialogue and reason. As 
already mentioned, there are groups and individuals around the world today who share 
the same concern for our values, for the relationship between science and religion. The 
mutual support and companionship provided by these can prove invaluable for the 
journey, which hopefully will lead one day to the emergence (or resurrection?),
recognition and acceptance of ways of thought and life where science and religion can go 
hand-in-hand in a state of harmonious interdependence, ways of thought and life 
answering more satisfactorily our different needs (physical, intellectual, spiritual, 
aesthetic etc). Zhu Xi’s thought ought to comprise a major ingredient in this respect in the 
attempt to spell out such a way of life for the Chinese milieu in particular.
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The journey would not end there, but continue as one of endlessly surprising and 
delightful discoveries coming from the interactions and exchanges between the different 
camps and from their explorations of the workings of Nature. The said ways of life, 
coexisting harmoniously in mutual appreciation or at least mutual tolerance like the 
colorful diversity of schools of Confucian thought which appeared during the Song 
Dynasty or the Three Teachings of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism during the time 
of Jiao Hong, would respond to new challenges from the said discoveries and in the 
process assimilate and give rise to fresh elements of thought, thereby growing ever richer 
in content and greater in depth, the way Confucianism met the Buddhist challenge by 
assimilating Buddhist elements to give us Song and Ming Confucianism.
Behind all this would be the constant recollection that the true and ultimate nature of 
reality lies forever beyond the grasp of words and concepts. This would be a cause for 
celebration, not consternation. Words and concepts are dead and static, so we would not 
want a li, God or Brahman that can be exhausted by them. This would also entail a 
different outlook on our attempts, whether scientific or religious, at articulating in words 
and concepts the nature of reality or aspects thereof; the said attempts, the conceptual 
schemata we create, could now be viewed as works of art, the creation of them a means 
of exercising our creativity. As in Zhu’s avoidance of conceptual fixation, each of the 
schemata would be seen as presenting a part of the picture, possibly an interesting part
hitherto undiscovered, or presenting the picture in an interestingly different way, though 




This creativity would be understood as a manifestation of the creative power of the li
itself (or God, Brahman or whatever) in the human sphere by virtue of our unity with it, a 
unity by virtue of which again we partake of the same immortality. Truly we shall be as 
gods — or sages. The inclusion of the Ten Thousand Things in this unity would enable us 
as well to view them as a Grand Epiphany of the Absolute. Nature would become fully 
reenchanted, bringing to an end the rampant consumerism born of that sense of 
disenchantment and the exploitation of Nature as a mere quarry of resources.
Whether any of this will become a reality is really up to us, all of us. Certainly folks 
like Zhu Xi, indeed all Confucians, believed that through human effort a better world can
be created — which may be the one thing above all else bearing witness to Zhu Xi’s 
relevance for today.
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